Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities

State of Elected Local Councillors & Constituency Interactions in Rwanda: Implications for Accountable Local Governance

FINAL REPORT

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State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

CONTENTS

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

List of Figures

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Abbreviations and Acronyms

BC.	Before Christ
CNF	Conseil national des Femmes (National Council for Women)
CNJ	Conseil National des Jeunes (National Council for Youth)
CSS	Cascading Style Sheets
JADF	Joint Action Development Forum
DALGOR	Deepening Accountable Local Governance in Rwanda
DASSO	District Administration Security Support Organ
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty reduction Strategy
ELC	Elected Local Councillors
ETPM	Enablement Through Potentials Maximising
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoR	Government of Rwanda
GPS	Global Positioning System
HTML	Hypertext Markup Language
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IT	Information Technology
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government
MVC	Model-View-Controller
NAR	Never Again Rwanda
NCPD	National Council for Persons with Disabilities
NET	Network
PSF	Private Sector Federation
RALGA	Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities
RGB	Rwanda Governance Board
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SQR	Standardized Query Language
UNDAP	United Nations Development Assistance Plan
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Executive Summary

This study aimed to assess *the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors (ELC) and Constituencies and its implications for accountable local governance in Rwanda*. The interactions defined a two-way process: 1) Elected Local Councillors collect constituents' opinions to their priority needs and proposal for solutions. 2) Elected Local Councillors give feedback and explanations to Constituents about Local Councils' final decisions on Constituents' views about identified priority needs.

On methodological grounds, the study combined the qualitative and quantitative approaches and collected data using Focus group discussions and individual interviews, as well as survey questionnaires. The study covered five beneficiary Districts of a project known as 'Deepening Accountable Local Governance in Rwanda' (DALGOR). The target Districts namely included Burera, Nyamagabe, Nyamasheke, Gasabo and Ngoma. In total, 2,667 respondents (to the survey questionnaires) and informants (to both individual interviews and focus group discussions) were involved in the study. Among this sample were 558 Elected Local Councillors (at District, Sector and Cell levels) and Elected Executive Committee members at Village level. Also, the sample included 1,954 Constituents/citizens. Focus group discussions involved 150 informants purposively selected from the target Districts of DALGOR. Equally, the study sought for the expert knowledge of 5 key informants closely involved in issues of decentralization and good governance. They were selected from the national level of civil society organizations, public institutions, and the private sector.

Despite of the improvements factually established during the current councillorship term (since 2016), empirical findings indicate that the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their respective constituencies is regarded as *satisfactory*. The level of interaction is fairly *average*. This is evidenced in the fact that constituents are only '*very*' and '*much*' aware of Elected Local Councillors' responsibilities at the rate of 59.3% (See the Figure 15). Likewise, the '*average*' level of interactions between constituents and Elected Local Councillors is clearly encapsulated in the general level of satisfaction among constituents. To this end, the study has measured the following variables:

o The intensity of constituents' interactions with Elected Local Councillors, which ranks 51.5% (See the Figure 34);
o How often and regular Elected Local Councillors advise their respective constituents in the identification of priority needs. The study established that Elected Local Councillors only do '*sometimes*' at the rate 49.6% and 48.6%, respectively (See the Figure 43);
o The intensity with which Elected Local Councillors collect constituents' proposals for solutions to their views on priority needs: the collect only takes place '*sometimes*' at the rate of 55% (See Figure 47);
o How often and regular constituents are given the opportunity to suggest solutions on their priority needs: this opportunity is only '*sometimes*' given at the rate of 51.1% and 45.9%, respectively (See Figure 49);
o Level of Elected Local Councillor's feedback to constituents about Local Councils' final decisions on Constituents' priority needs: they report back at the level of 50.6% (See Figure 51);
o Level of explanations by Elected Local Councillors to constituents about Local Councils' final decisions: at the rate of 55.6%, it '*sometimes*' takes place (See Figure 55);
o The constituents' level of satisfaction with Local Councils' final decisions about Elected Local Councillors' explanations amounted to 47.9% (See Figure 57).

The overall problem found with councillorship interactions was the absence of a regulatory framework. The law determining the functioning of Local Councils/Councillors is silent as to how Elected Local Councillors should interact with their respective constituencies. The absence of a regulatory framework on councillorship interactions was found with negative implications for accountable local governance. This fact is likely to make it very difficult, even impossible, to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable for their responsibilities.

On basis of these findings, the study suggested to take the following actions:

–   Since the level at which constituents are '*very*' and '*much*' aware of Elected Local Councillors responsibilities is average (59.3%), capacity building measures need to be put in place in order to raise the level of citizens' awareness. The use of existing formal and informal platforms, such as community works (*Umuganda*), civic education academy (*Itorero ry'Igihugu*), community assembly (*Inteko y'abaturage*), and parents' evening forums (*Umugoroba w'ababyeyi*), among others, could be beneficial.

–   The fact that the state of councillorship interactions is on an average level (between 47% and 60%) also suggests the necessity to effectively make use of the existing formal and informal platforms or mechanisms much as they ease councillorship interactions. Again, these mechanisms include community works (*Umuganda*), civic education academy (*Itorero ry'igihugu*), community assembly (*Inteko y'abaturage*), parents' evening forums (*Umugoroba w'ababyeyi*), etc. Likewise, creativity and innovation to initiate some additional and suitable mechanisms are equally recommended. Thus, Elected Local Councillors should set up effective mechanisms for the evaluations of councillorship interactions (Example: performance contracts) and clear plan or agenda for the same interactions.

–   The absence of a regulatory framework (Example: absence of mechanisms for accountability) is strong obstacle to effective councillorship interactions. As a result, it makes it impossible to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable for their duties. This study recommends an urgent enactment of regulations on councillorship interactions.

This study has explored key feature of councillorship interactions (See the two-way process of these interactions). However, the study did not dig into all detailed aspects of these interactions. For instance, it has not detailed how many times constituents and Elected Local Councillors interact, how many time constituent's opinions are documented and filed, what priority needs most recurrently emerge, the channels used in holding Elected Local Councillors accountable for their duties. Equally, the study did not look into the impact of the interplay between Elected Local Councillors and Local Executives on councillorship interactions. Further explorations are thus recommended. A similar study may be undertaken with extension wider scope. To measure the real impact of DALGOR project, an evaluation design will be the most appropriate to involve more Districts out of this project.

10

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

General Context

Rwanda is successfully recovering from a long history of governance failure, commonly referred to as 'bad governance'. This statement holds true much as "bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within human societies" (UNESCAP, undated, p.1). In Rwanda, some important characteristics marked this style of governance. On top, there was decision-making authority and resources whose management was the sole monopoly of the central government. Decisions affecting citizens' lives did not consider their voices. The one-year national level consultations, held from May 1998 to March 1999, also referred to as the Village Urugwiro consultations boldly highlighted this gap. They found out that people had never really participated in ways they were being governed and in important decisions that engaged the entire country. Besides, these decisions were ascribed to citizens while "all was done in the interest of those who were governing" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.38). It is universally defined by the UNESCAP (undated, p.1) as "the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented…"; governance being greatly skewed over the pre-genocide Rwanda.

Similarly, established local government authorities were exclusively accountable to the central government. Citizens and local communities were completely left out of the exercise of accountability in local government settings. This practice has enevitably undermined key features of inter-governmental relations found in vertical and horizontal accountability linkages. The linkages are attributed to special importance of forstering "mutual accountability at all levels, especially considering that both central and local governments have the common goal of serving and uplifting the wellbeing of citizens" (Kigdom of Lesotho, 2014, p.13).

Instead, vertical accountability has obviously dominated over horizontal accountability linkages that could have actively engaged citizens. There are many repercussions attributable to this gap. For instance, "considerable inefficiencies in public service delivery [emerged], consequently fostering an unreceptive attitude towards civic responsibilities among citizens" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013c, p.7). Leaders, at all levels, turned their backs to the values that the United Nations for Human Rights (2016) considered important for the last couples of years. These values include, among others, "full respect of human rights, the rule of law, effective participation of various stakeholders, effective multi-actor partnerships, constructive political pluralism, transparent and accountable processes and institutions" (Never Again Rwanda & Interpeace, 2016, p.5). In one way or another, the experience of genocide against Tutsi finds remote roots in these inefficiencies.

In line with these inefficiencies, the style of leadership reflected an image of authoritarian, centralized and discriminatory governance in the past Rwanda. To some extent, Rwanda marked some similarities with Kenya as further supported.

11

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Centralized governance systems "misused power and committed gross human rights violation, unequal distribution of available resources, embezzlement, systematic marginalization and exclusion of citizens along ethnic and/or regional background. This went along with the situation of poverty, extreme lack of participation and disempowered citizens" (Orina-Nyamwamu, undated, p.2). To refer to Rwanda, at least, these were necessary conditions to fuel ethnic-based divisions and persecutions that culminated into the 1994 genocide against Tutsi.

Indeed, this genocide should be regarded as heavy legacy of bad governance. Though genocie has cost thousands of human lives and material resources, Rwanda has stood as a resilient nation. Sound policy-making is widely attributable to this important fact. Among other things, decentralization policy is increasingly credited to have given a new shape to governance in the post genocide era. Decentralization processes have remained an important benefit of Village Urugwiro consultations. They have laid strong foundation for shifts in the field of governance.

Decentralization policy in the post-genocide practice

In the first place, decentralization constitutionally supposes public powers that " decentralized at local administrative entities in accordance with provisions of law" (Constitution of Rwanda, Article 6). Since genocide was put to an end, the Government of National Unity embarked on decentralization[1] processes and put strong emphasis on particular fields. Examples include notably citizen empowerment, participation, service delivery, and accountability. These were key areas to the 2000 National Decentralization Policy, which was later on revised in 2013. This policy was a result of " a long consultative process with all stakeholders that had started in 1996 in a quest for good governance" (Republic of Rwanda, 2012g, p.10). It was established specifically to serve the purpose of three major objectives, namely: to (1) Increase citizens participation and mobilization, (2) to ensure better service delivery in all sectors and to (3) Promote Public Accountability and Democratic Governance (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.31). Empowerment and participation in making

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[1] Decentralization is a generic term which covers a number of modes such as the following: (i) deconcentration which refers to the process of administrative decentralization whereby the central government designs a structure that enables its agents to work close to the local people in field units / agencies of central government, (ii) delegation which is the transfer of responsibilities from central government to semi-autonomous bodies that are directly accountable to the central government, (iii) devolution which is the process of transferring decision-making and implementation powers, functions, responsibilities and resources to legally constituted local governments, (iv) delocalization which is the spatial distribution of central government socio-economic development facilities and activities such as schools, hospitals, etc. in peripheral regions. Discussion on these terms can be found in: Gay Braibant: *Institutions Administratives Comparees: Les Controles* (Fondation nationals des Sciences politiques, Services de Polycopies, Paris, 1985-1986 pages 89 – 93) and in Jacques Chevallier, *Science Administrative* (Presse universitaire de France, Paris, 1986, pages 372-386). See also Charles Debbasch, *Science Administrative 5th edition* (Dalloz, Paris, 1989, pages 221-237).

12

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

decisions over issues that affect beneficiary people most was the primary target to achieve.

In this framework, the National Decentralization Policy was set to ensure political, economic, social, managerial, administrative and technical empowerment of local populations. As a result, it was meant to empower local populations with necessary and significant skills to fight poverty through participation in the planning and management of their development process. This endeavour is known as '*political decentralization*' that generally engages two related perspectives. First, there is consideration of the power of citizens to elect their leaders (vote power). Second, there is the right, for citizens, to participate, either directly or indirectly through representation, in decision-making (voice) (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.1).

In connection to the political decentralization, the Government of Rwanda uses decentralization as an instrument for people's political empowerment. This is one of the key reasons for which the National Decentralization Policy was designed. Decentralization gives the floor and freedom to the citizenry to talk about and agree upon their problems and to suggest possible solutions. This marks good governance as both 'consensus oriented'and 'effective and efficient' process, at least, to believe in the next source: "Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved… Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal." (UNESCAP, undated, p.3)

Total absence of '*good governance'* as above understood has been the real practice of governance in the pre-genocide Rwanda. To illustate, citizens had never been given that floor before. As national-level consultations pointed out earlier, citizens always were used to, and driven by, superior-led instructions. Hence, decentralization is taken as necessary mechanism of giving that floor to the people (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.40). Combined, these facts mark both the significance and rationale for this important study.

Conversely, decentralization is a platform for sustainable democratization, a structural arrangement for mobilization of economic development energies, initiatives and resources. In all, it is a means for reconciliation, social integration and wellbeing. In the framework of political decentralization, democracy is visibly strong driving force for citizens' participation in the governance of Rwanda. It empowers local communities. Also, it enables citizens to receive and utilize powers that are transferred to them especially in areas like problem analysis, priority setting, planning, and budgeting. Citizens constantly demand accountability from their local and national leadership or any governance actor at local level. To refer to the existing literature, citizens' participation is very complex and takes more time to manifest itself. Local governments have an obligation to facilitate and promote the

13

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

participation of citizens in setting priorities, planning, budgeting and making an implementation of decisions regarding the services they provide (Kauzya, 2007, in Republic of Rwanda, 2012g, pp.12-3).

Conclusively, political decentralization came to give a new shape to the relationships between leaders and citizens through democracy. Within the political decentralization framework, democracy is definitely all "about relations between governing people and governed people.... How [governed] people adhere to them. How governing people fulfill their duties of governing the Country and the role which governed people have to play" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.36). As this source implies, the transformation of highly centralized system into a democratic system was an innovation in contemporary governance style. It brings with it an innovative idea of two-way interactions regulated under clear, transparent and cost-effective vertical and horizontal accountability linkages (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2014, p.13). Respectively, they stand for upward and horizontal accountability, which can only be functional if citizens are fully engaging and empowered actors. A number of factors have successfully prompted the decentralization policy to be strong engine for active citizenry in Rwanda. Conducive culture and customs of people sharing the same history and experiences are the most critical factors to consider. This is key asset for vertical and horizontal accountability linkages to function.

This endeavor perfectly fits with the objective of elections as was set in the national-level consultations. It is made a necessary condition to offer the floor to citizens in order to participate actively in various initiatives that affect their lives. One of these important initiatives engages citizens in the transformation of relationships between leaders and citizens. It consists of "Electing their leaders themselves in a transparent way" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.44). This is a matter of participation in governance processes. However, there are fierce debates about whether citizens have to either directly participate in governance or to do so indirectly. The quick answer to such debates is obviously affirmative: "Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives" (UNESCAP, undated, p.2.

Positioning towards direct and inderect citizens' participation in governance

An active role of citizens in governance is seen as an important ideal. It is captured in the 2003 Constitution, as amended to date.[2] This has gone to the level where citizens' participation in governance is made a constitutional right: "All Rwandans have the right to participate in the Governmenty of the country, either directly or through their freely chosen representative …" (Republic of Rwanda, Article 27).

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[2] As stipulated in its Article 2, "Suffrage is universal and equal for all Rwandans. All Rwandans, both men and women, fulfilling the requirements provided for by law, have the right to vote and to be elected. Suffrage is direct or indirect and secret, unless this Constitution or any other law provides otherwise…"

14

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

However, direct citizen participation is viewed with scepticism and even wariness. Thus, representative democracy, also known as indirect citizen participation, is perceived as most advantageous once compared with direct participation. The proponents of indirect democracy widely hold that it protects citizens from the dangers of direct involvement. It buffers them from uninformed public opinion, it prevents the tyranny of the majority, and it serves as a check on corruption. It also meets the needs of a complex, post-industrial society that requires technical, political, and administrative expertise to function (Dahl, 1989 in Roberts, 2004). The size and complexity of the modern nation state seems to strongly support the significance of indirect democracy. Some studies have accorded to state that direct citizens' participation is not a realistic or feasible expectation (Dahl, 1989 in Roberts, 2004). To draw from the wider support to the indirect democracy, it may look like direct and indirect democracies are exclusive processes.

To the contrary, both direct and indirect citizens' participation in governance are functionally used. Within the framework of representative democracy, for instance, Elected Local Councillors[3], widely recognized in Rwanda, are good indication of indirect democracy. In local government settings, indirect democracy has resulted in bodies "of democratically elected representatives responsible for political supervsion of service delivery in a given geographical or administrative area" (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2014, p. 38). These bodies define Elected Local Councils at different levels of the administration in Rwanda. Elected Local Councils are composed of democratically elected men and women. They constitute the supreme decision-making organs of all decentralized administrative entities, whether with legal personality (Districts) or without legal personality (Sectors, Cells, Villages). Indeed, Egner *et al.* (2013, p.12) stress that Elected Local Councillors are considered as symbols of the personification of local representative democracy. Equally, they form a crucial element of the local representative democracy as they bridge a link between ordinary citizens and local decision-makers.

Good governance implies that Elected Local Leaders be held accountable to the communities they serve (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.7) and to the central level authority. Performance contracts are privileged tools for accountability in the framework of good governance. They are taken to be commitments or high-level targets leaders make at different levels of governance to implement high priority actions designed to achieve government's objectives at both national and local levels. They are high-level targets whose implementation ideally yields strong impact on livelihoods and development of individual countries. As an implication, these

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[3] This study is using the concept of '*Elected local Councillors*' to refer to Elected Representatives of citizens in different constituencies. They are commonly known as 'Elected Local Councillors' at District, Sector, and Cell levels, respectively, and 'Elected Local Executive Committees' atVillage levels. For the purpose of coherent reporting,the concept of 'Elected Local Councillors' applies to all of these levels.

15

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

contracts "accelerate [the] implementation of local development plans by giving high political and financing attention to these results areas." (Kingdom of Lesotho 2014, p.20)

In the context of Rwanda, Nsanzabaganwa (2012, p.3) refers to these performance contracts as Imihigo.[4] Mayors, who are initially part of District Elected Local Councils, represent the citizens to sign performance contracts with the Head of State. The office of the President avails the material resources and the legal framework required to implement the perf of local development plans by giving high political and financing attention to these results areas ormance contracts. There is double accountability involved in this process. For example, "maintaining effective functional and mutually accountable linkages between Central and Local Government entities" (Republic of Rwanda, 2012g, p.8) remained an important aspect of the overall objective of the National Decentralization Policy. Successful implementation of this policy marked a new political era whereby good governance is an operational response to all forms of misuse of power that had previously characterized highly centralized systems of governance. Clear separation of powers and institutions of strong checks and balances are now strong pillars that support the trust in principles of good governance.

The policy framework generally captures this innovative idea of good governance, as embedded in political decentralization. For instance, "the Government of Rwanda (GoR) believes in the ethos of good governance. Its Vision 2020 highlights good governance and a capable State while the EDPRS (2013-2018) is built on, among other pillars, accountable government" (Never Again Rwanda & Interpeace, 2016, p.5). In this context, good governance is, at least partly, portrayed as synonymous to accountability. Alternatively, it is taken as "a State respectful of democratic structures and processes and committed to the rule of law and the protection of human rights in particular" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 18). In all, good governance is perceived as strong cover under which local communities are empowered with decision-making skills, and enabled to address the issues that they are faced with (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.18).

Through the Vision 2020, the Government of Rwanda is committed than ever to ensuring good governance characterized by transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, as well as responsiveness to the needs of people. As a

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[4] Imihigo is a Rwandan cultural concept of auto-target-setting performed by a subject in front of his master, usually done in a competition style. Since 2005, that value-based concept was transformed into a modern tool of management whereby the Mayors of District and the Mayor of Kigali City, in the name of the population and all stakeholders in a district, sign performance contracts with the President of the Republic. Imihigo is a performance-based, result-oriented statement of priorities that a district sets to achieve within a period of one year in alignment with national objectives. A grand evaluation takes place annually whereby districts are ranked by performance and best performers are awarded publicly.

16

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

result of this move, democratic structures and processes, the rule of law and the protection of human rights have increasingly became important leading features of good governance. Hence, the decentralization process is firmly growing mature to open the ground for strong citizens' participation at grassroots level. At the same time, local communities are being empowered with decision-making skills and can relatively address daily issues that affect their lives (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, pp.17-8). This is a clear indication of paradigm shift from highly centralized towards decentralized governance.

Indirect citizens' participation greatly aided this shift do develop at different levels of administrative entities. It resulted in Elected Local Representative referred to as Elected Local Executive Committees at Village level and Elected Local Councillors at Cell, Sector District and City of Kigali levels. With the spirit of indirect democracy, local government shared among Local Councils members. Instead of having only one Governing Person, the National Decentralization Policy's innovation suggested the government of a number of persons collectively governing. Originally, these persons or Elected Local Councillors formed basic structures (or grassroots bases) at Village, Cell and Sector levels (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, pp. 42-3) that latter expanded to the level of District.

At Village level, the *Village Executive Committee* is the lowest level oversight and decision-making body. It mobilizes, sensitizes and supports the population to collectively define and resolve their economic and social problems. It oversees the collection of basic data and information from the community and its transmission to higher administrative levels for further analysis and utilization to inform policy and administrative decisions (Republic of Rwanda, 2008, p.18).

At Cell level, the *Cell Council* coordinates all activities of Villages in the entire Cell and links them to the Sector. The Cell Council assists the Villages in realizing their community development objectives. It links the Village level of administration with that of the Sector. It collects and harmonizes basic statistics from Villages for transmission to the Sector (Republic of Rwanda, 2008, p.18; 2013, p.20).

At Sector level, the *Sector Council* coordinates all activities of its Cells. It harmonizes the data collection from Cells for onward submission to the District. It oversees the provision of basic community services and is in the frontline for participatory problem posing or analysis and solving. It sensitizes the population to implement Government programmes and to be patriotic. It ensures proper management of public resources. Finally, it coordinates specific Government Programmes and promotes ICT (Republic of Rwanda, 2008, p.18; 2013, p.20).

At District level, the *District Council* ensures urban, economic and demographic development, builds the capacity of Sectors to provide better services to the population as articulated in the District Development Plans. The District Council

17

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

makes decisions on the implementation of the Action Plan prepared by the District Executive Committee. It advises the Executive Committee on matters pertaining to community development. It controls the budget of the District and advises the Executive Committee on financial and activity execution. The District Council also coordinates and analyses vital statistics of socio-economic development of the population. It emphasizes transparent management of public resources, mobilizes funds to invest in the District, and puts emphasis on scientific research in the District's development. Finally, it promotes ICT and social welfare of the population, and mobilizes other resources that promote development (Republic of Rwanda, 2008, p.18; 2013b, pp.20-1).

The fact that Elected Local Councilors[5] collectively govern each of these Local Councils it is all about a paradigm shift from centralized government to 'good governance'. Rwanda successfully made use of this shift to shape pro-people policies in different fields. Soon after genocide, Rwanda embarked on this policy move to curbe all forms of discriminatory practices in various spheres of life. Good governance was made one of the leading principles of the post-genocide Government of National Unity. It was taken as an ideal that drove Rwanda from ashes resulting from genocide to peacebuilding. Initially, good governance was designed to be participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and to follow the rule of law (UNESCAP, undated, p.1). Since genocide was brought to an end, Rwanda tirelessly engaged in this good govenance with the view of translating the above-mentioned principles into action.

The Village Urugwiro consultations, as inclusively organized at the national level, were made the starting point. Different stakeholders were brought together to reflect on the most desired and shared understanding of future for Rwanda. The idea of people-centred Government of National Unity emerged from this process to later on champion the National Decentralization Policy. Under the same government, "the people and their interests become the basis for whatever is to be done" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.37). Obviously, these consultations have regulated the relationships between the ruling and governed people through democracy informed by the Rwandan culture and customs. Three important pillars are considered, at least to give support to good governance.

First, *participation or ownership* made citizens primary responsible actors for "controlling their own problems, and take strategies of finding solutions to them" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.37). Thus, participation of both men and women was

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[5] The Concept of Elected Local Councilor is only valid for Cell, Sector and District Councils. Contrary to Cell, Sector and District levels, the inhabitants of the Village form the Village Council or 'Community assemby', also known as 'Inteko y'abaturage. The jargon of this study identifies Elected Local Councilors as 'Elected Local Representative' of the Village. The latter form a body or institution known as 'Elected Local Committee' at the Village level.

18

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

an opportunity to make sure citizens understand the real problem they face and they are invited to take the lead in finding appropriate solutions. Second is *representation* through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. In this regard, the "Government-based on democracy must enable the people to be represented (…) in the institutions which take decisions concerning them" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.39). Representation bears a fundamental idea that takes away the authority from representatives to oppress citizens they represent. Instead, citizens should be empowered with necessary skills[6] (through training and awareness raising) to control and supervise their representatives. With this statement, there is a meeting point between representation and participation/ownership. Representation appears as enabling factor to genuine participation. Also, it has close link with *accountability*, here understood as third pillar. An enhanced popular participation would follow only "if citizens are sensitised, are given information and their self-confidence to hold leaders accountable, is developed" (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2014, p.12). In this respect, accountability becomes a higher level of popular participation.

In general terms, accountability involves not only governmental institutions. Equally, it engages the private sector and civil socity organizations. Both government and private-led institutions, on the one hand, and civil society organizations, on the other, are expected to be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. This idea is summarized as follows: "In general an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions." (UNESCAP, undated, p.1) By the means of deduction, accountability implies that "any person in charge of a given work at any level must have a way of being accountable or explaining his working procedure…. So that it becomes clear that he is performing well or wrongly" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.39). The idea of transparency is a result of this process.

This brief background indicates that popular participation/ownership, representation, and accountability are extremely interwoven pillar in the context of good governance. They are relevant enough to support the strategic objectives of the National Decentralization Policy. The latter shows key areas of interest from which the pillars for good governance functions. They included, *inter alia*, "initiating, making, implementing and monitoring decisions and plans that concern them taking into consideration their local needs, priorities, capacities and resources by transferring

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[6] In representative democracy, training and awareness raising should not here be understood as monopoly of the citizenery. Equally, leaders need such an empowerment. The national-level consultations, in crafting the future of Rwanda, found leaders with many responsibilities for the people. On this basis, they suggested that tranings for leaders should be prepered and take the format of 'cadreship development' and of 'political schools'' (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.40). Trainings are taken as appropriate tools through which both Elected Local Councillors may improve their awareness of individual responsibility in the wider framework of representative democracy.

19

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

power, authority and resources from central to local government and lower levels" (Republic of Rwanda, 2012g, p.10).

To sum up, it is worthy highlighting that both legal and policy frameworks strongly support good governance, which is also closely linked to fundamental transformation of interactions between local leaders and citizens. The translation of these frameworks into practice has made impressive progresses. However, there is little knowledge about the level to which fundamental changes in these interactions have so far been effective. Hence, there is a need to investigate the dynamics of these interactions in order to build fact-based ideas about the state of interaction between Elected Local Councilors and their respective constituencies.

The study problem, Rationale and Questions

Since Rwanda embarked on the road to decentralization, in 2000, elections of Elected Local Councillors were organized four times. These elections have taken place under the framework of the general local government elections. The latter occurred for the first time in 2001, then 2006, 2010 and 2016. By voting Elected Local Councillors into office, citizens from various constituencies renounced to their ruling power. They confide to Elected Local Councillors as their legitimate representatives who can make political decisions on behalf of the social collective (Hearfield and Dolley 2009, p.63). This means that Elected Local Councillors have the mandate to act on behalf of citizens who legitimated them to do so through elections.

Put differently, Elected Local Councillors were entrusted with all the abilities it requires to reflect the views and needs of their respective constituencies. To illustrate, Elected Local "Councillors have adequate authority and influence to make decisions on behalf of the local population without undue pressure from the central government or political parties or individual political heavy weights" (Republic of Rwanda 2013, p.4). On this ground, they form legitimate bodies free from the pressure of centralized institutions during the exercise of their councillorship duties. The law also provides the conditions under which Elected Local Councillors may be removed from duties in case of failure in exercising their mandate.

Ideally, Elected Local Councillors are expected to always strive to pursue and materialize the developmental aspirations, needs and choices of the citizens whom they represent. According to Sawer (2003, p.39), Elected Local Councillors can only achieve this ideal if they have, among others, the capability to make informed decisions through the exercise of their independent judgment. This requirement does not come as a surprise. The National-level consultations that gathered a number of stakeholders in the aftermath of genocide made it a fundamental objective while electing and selecting Elected Local Councillors. This objective portrays these Councilors as, "… people who are competent in solving arising problems which are shared (the problem of water, security, waste in places where people are living, etc,

20

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

etc.) by the whole people (Community…)" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.42). To this end, they are given two important mandates. One is to make people understand that they should do it freely in order to solve their problems themselves. Second, to make people understand that they are concerned with their bad consequences or their advantages (Idem). These two mandates mostly aim at forging the collective conscience about self-relience.

This view leads to understanding that Elected Local Councillors are not merely passive actors meant to collect raw views from constituents and to attend Local Council's meetings. Rather, they need capacity to lay strong foundation for pro-active interventions. In particular, constructive and regular interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their constituencies are of paramount importance in order to be successful in their mandate. In this regard, success consequently ensures effective accountable local governance. One of the justifications for strengthening citizens and community participation is the need to understand and develop the critical connections between participation, accountability and quality and sustainability of service delivery (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.79).

Interactions between Elected Local Councillors and respective constituencies imply favourable space for inclusive dialogue and accountability. Thus, the voice of the people, including the marginalized and the vulnerable social groups, is heard and met by responsive authorities and service providers. Against this brief background, the interest of this study is *to assess the state of interactions between local councillors and their respective constituencies in Rwanda since 2009 onward and its implications for downward accountability*. To go about this overall study aim, the following are specific objectives established to this end (See the Terms of Reference):

- To gauge in light of applicable legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, constituents' awareness and understanding of the responsibilities of their Elected Local Councilors at all layers of local governement;
- To assess, from a multi-stakeholder's perspective, the regularity of interactions between Elected Local Councilors and constituents over the period ranging from 2010 to present with a focus on good practices and their enabling factors;
- To establish, from a multi-stakeholder's perspective, the value and assess the practicability of regular interactions between Elected Local Councilors and their respective constituencies, with a strong focus on enabling and hindering factors;
- To identify and explain the implications of the current state of interaction between Elected Local Coucnilors and constituencies for downward accountability and recommend policy actions to improve on current practices.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

The interest in attaining these study objectives finds support in strong rationale. In the first place, a handful literature available has consistently pointed out to limited interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their constituencies (NAR, 2016, pp.49-50, RGB, 2015, p.56, and RGB 2016). The turn up in the 2010 series of election depicted as high (97% and 93% for Presidential and for local elections, respectively) only indicates that Rwandans have gained their vote power. In addition, leaders have increasingly become more sensitive to their electorates. However, wide distance between people and their Elected Local Leaders remains a serious challenge" (Republic of Rwanda, 2012g, p.7). This fact does not take away the fact that the last decade of decentralization implementation has recorded impressive developments in participatory democratization and local accountability. However, the common trend is that "Rwanda is still far from where it wants to be in terms of democratic, participatory local governance, and effective citizen-centred service delivery" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 11). If this is true, the above statements equally hold true for the implications of such a state on downward accountability.

If this study is to be successful in measuring the state of interactions that inspires accountability in local government settings, there is a need for clear benchmark or baseline. In this context, the overall idea is all about an ideal type of Elected Local Councilors' interactions to constituencies for an accountable local government. These interactions portray two-way processes aimed to bridge strong link between Elected Local Councillors and respective onstituencies. The *Revised Decentralization Policy* (2013) advocates for 'sufficient knowledge' of individual commitment among Elected Local Councilors and constituencies to be the starting point.

Among these actors, individual assignments constitute the primary concern to the Government of Rwanda. With this, the same Government committed to ensuring "*the roles and responsibilities assigned to each level are clear, and that all actors have a common understanding of what is expected to be performed by each level*"(Republic of Rwanda, 2012g, p. 27). This idea was fully captured in the *Vision of Decentralization Sector*. Under this Vision, all efforts of empowerment (through citizen's participation) are dedicated to enabling citizens to determine how they are governed, and to feel responsible for, and active participants in, their wellbeing. This political will was meant to lay strong foundation for an accountable governance and effective citizen-centered service delivery in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.8). Important benefits of this government-led empowerment are that the Government of Rwanda transfers powers to local communities (encompassing different constituencies), which they utilize while playing their roles.

The first way of interactions' processes emerges from this empowerment process. Powers transferred to local communities cover different areas such as "problem analysis, priority setting, planning, and constantly demanding accountability from their local leadership or any governance actor at the local level. This is about political

decentralization most perceived as complex and which takes enough time before it materializes. Possible weaknesses in political decentralization probably link up to 'relatively moderate' performance in civic participation (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 11). To believe in the Rwanda Governance Score Card 2010, at least, there are relevant avenues through which citizens' participation takes place.

At local government level, they included Community Assemblies (*Inteko z'abaturage*), public accountability days or open days, Collective work (*Ubudehe)* aimed to support vulnerable people, Community works (*Umuganda*), and regular free and fair elections among others (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.15). The preparation and evaluation of performance-based contract (Imihigo) is another field of citizens' participation and is widely associated with impressive results (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, pp. 29-30). Though the above avenues have been operational, "participation through decision making and demanding for accountability from leadership is still low" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 29). To refer to the same source, for instance, the CRC 2012 indicates that the involvement of citizens in the monitoring of services and holding the leadership accountable is estimated to 44.7%. This figure is relatively small. Two years later, there were visible improvements in the area of decision-making. At the national level, for example, good appreciation and participation in decision-making scored 54% in the 2014 CRC (RGB, 2014, p.188). At the same time, the level of accountability was higher in numbers. An estimate of 81.4% was recorded in the 2015 CRC (RGB, 2015, p.35).

The second aspect of these interactions' processes involves the role that Elected Local Councilors are invited to play. For instance, "Local governments must align themselves in such a way that they are legally obliged to seek and promote the participation of the local communities in setting priorities, planning and making decisions that the local governments will implement in a whole range of socio-politico-economic activities" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 11). To draw from this source, Elected Local Councillors are not passive actors that only collect data from their Constituencies. They are also expected to build the capacity of those they represent in different levels of Local Councils. Alone, this aspect is not exclusive. Elected Local Councillors have an obligation to be accountable to their respective electorates. As policy documents indicate, accountability at local government level was to "be promoted through means like the open days, pre-budget hearings, publication of relevant data and reports, and regular dialogue between the Elected Local Leaders and the local communities" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 31). Among other things, the use of social media platforms, and strengthening community radios were selected to be useful tools to relay on" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.30). The Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) is one of the most privileged fora of which Elected Local Councilors make use to fully interact with their respective constituencies:

> The JADF is a powerful instrument for leaders who cultivate good relations with citizens, promote participation and know how to value the viewpoints and inputs of different actors. It has provided a space for inclusive dialogues and accountability where the voices of the people, including the marginalized and the vulnerable [groups], is heard and met by responsive authorities and service providers (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 15).

This is an important avenue *par excellence*, which provides Elected Local Councilors valuable opportunities for a two-way process of interactions with citizens. Not only they collect priority needs or viewpoints and inputs from different stakeholders or constituents. Also, they account for their daily assignments.

In line with this logic, RALGA has designed and implemented a 5-year joint program (2013-2018) known as 'Deepening Accountable Local Governance in Rwanda (DALGOR). It was initiated with a purpose to deepen democracy and strengthen citizen participation and accountable governance. Elected Local Councillors were made privileged target groups and given support to ensure they perfectly interact with their respective constituencies. The program is aligned to Rwanda's priorities: EDPRS II (2013-2018) and Vision 2020 with regard to its pillar of 'accountable governance', along with the United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) (RGB, 2016)[7].

In line with the rationale of this study, there is insufficient knowledge about state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their respective constituencies and its implications for accountable local governance in Rwanda. Simply, this state has so far received little attention among both scientists and practitioners. As a matter of fact, the handful literature available (NAR, 2016, pp.49-50, RGB, 2015, p.56) has not drawn an exclusive research interest this particular subject. The state of the interactions and of the implications for downward accountability has always been considered trivial detail. To put it differently, research did not dig into this subject. Hence, there is huge knowledge gap in matters regarding the extent of regularity in the interactions between these political actors and their impact on accountable local government.

A systematic study on the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their respective constituencies is designed to learn more their impact on accountable local governance. For the purpose of deep exploration, the overall objectives of this study were broken down into operational questions formulated as follows:

1. What are the mechanisms or processes through which Elected Local Councillors interact with their constituencies?

2. What are the tools through which Elected Local Councillors and their Constituencies interact?

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[7] Available at: http://www.rgb.rw/index.php?id=26

24

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

3. What is the Constituents' level of understanding of the responsibilities of their Elected Local Councillors?

4. What is the Elected Local Councillors' level of understanding of their responsibilities?

5. What is the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their respective constituencies?

6. What is the state of accountability of elected local Councillors toward their respective constituencies?

7. What is the value and practicability of regular interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their respective constituencies?

8. To what extent is the regularity of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their respective constituencies?

9. What are the major challenges hindering the optimal and regularity of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and their Constituencies?

10. What policy actions worth recommending for the improvement of the current practices on the interactions between Elected Local Councillors and constituencies?

To ease the reading of this report, the next paragraphs conceptually discuss some key technical terms used.

Conceptual clarification

A conceptual clarification of key concepts covered by this study is paramount. Key concepts most concerned include, for instance, 'representative democracy', 'constituency', 'participatory governance', 'interactive governance' or 'integrative decision and 'accountable governance.'

Representative democracy

Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to point out that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision-making (UNESCAP, undated, p.2).

This opening quote stands for the alternative to the classical understanding of democracy. The World has always been dynamic and underwent different transformations at different fronts of life. This dynamism and transformations equally apply to the concept of democracy. For Robert A. Dahl (1989), on the one side, there was emergence of the classical model of democracy in Greek city-states, which is in Athens during the fifth century BC. The exercise of democracy was through citizens' direct participation in decision-making in popular assemblies. This style of democracy

25

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

was successful enough in connection to some enabling factors. One is the scale of state: the Athenian democracy was only flourishing in small city-states. The second factor is the conceptualization of citizenship. In the Athenian democracy, only small portions of adult males were citizens and had an exclusive monopoly over political rights. In addition to being fewer in numbers, finally, these eligible adults to political rights were, to a large extent, freed from productive labour. Therefore, they could secure enough time and energy to dedicate to politics (Stälä, undated, pp.151-2).

The second transformation marked the emergence of modern representative democracy in nation- states in the timeframe of late 18th and 19th centuries. Compared to small city-states, firstly, nation-states involved large geographical areas and huge numbers of population. Second, the scope of citizenship and political rights extended to all adult males and more females located in particular geographical areas. Because of technological development coupled with economic and social complexity of the modern era, citizens became too much busy with other businesses than politics in large-scale-societies. Combined, all these conditions made large-scale democratic systems unfavourable setting for citizens' direct participation (Stälä, undated, pp.151-2).

Hence, representation was made necessary in modern democracies. Large-scale states, which delayed shifting to indirect citizens' participation, fall vulnerable to criticisms of different natures. For instance, Satori (1997) argues that voters are not competent to decide on complex issues in direct democracy. Switzerland is taken as an illustrative example as follows: "Swiss voters know very little about policies and politics. This, however, is the same whether they vote on policy issues or parties. As they do in elections, voters nevertheless find means of making up their minds on different policy issues" (Goerg Lutz 2006, p.54). This is an indication that states in different geographical settings did not integrate the transformation in democracy on the same pace.

The model of representative democracy, first practiced in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century, has generally been accepted as that most suitable for preserving the democratic principle of political equality. First, the English-born Thomas Paine (1969) was the first to support the American model of representative democracy. He put it as follows: "[b]y engrafting representation upon democracy, we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and population" (Hearfield and Dolley 2009, p.63). This debate implies the idea of inclusivity which emphasizes the expression of 'various interests' to imply inevitable social categories we associate with human beings. Though they are many in numbers, they also belong to various geographical settings. The 'democratic' rule is to engage all of those categories (also taken as Constituencies) in decision-making process. To underpin democratic theories, the theory of justice goes far to equate this inclusion to justice making

26

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

(Dobson, undated, p.138). In line with the subject matter of this report, to draw from the same source, Elected Local Councillors drive the representative democracy and ensure direct representation of legitimate interests of their respective Constituencies.

Further prominent advocates of representative democracy included the American James Maddison and the Englishman Edmund Burke. Burke maintained that elected representatives should be entrusted to make informed and independent judgments in the best interests of their Constituents. In other words, freely elected representatives should have the requisite knowledge and character to make such judgments, and, by virtue of election, are authorized to formulate policy and establish strategic directions on behalf of the social collective. The fact of having 'requisite knowledge', however, does not turn Local Councils into elite-driven institutions. Elected Local Councillors urgently need this knowledge to be able to articulate citizens' views about priorities and possible solutions into strategies and policy formulations. Hence, the proponents of representative democracy put strong emphasis on consultations, as first step that Elected Local Councillors make to interact with their Constituents.

A third form of representation is known as the mirror form. Later on, J.S. Mill advocated for this form in the second half of the nineteenth century. He argued that the electoral system should make it possible for minority interests and opinions to be represented or mirrored on a proportional basis according to their numbers within an electorate (Hearfield and Dolley, 2009, p.64). There is wider agreement among the proponents of representative democracy over considering minorities in the process of decision-making. The implementation of representative democracy, they advise, should exhaustively include all the minority groups available to ensure justice is made to all. Attention is made on cases where "women's (or at least wives') interest were said to be indirectly represented through the votes of their husbands in that their (the wives') interests nestled within, and coincided with, the interests of their spouses" (Dobson, undated, p.128). The same would apply to children and parents who, nevertheless, are prone to disagree with their parents over priorities. On this basis, the existing knowledge advises the proponents of representative democracy to ensure the maximum coverage of social groups within the population.

In many respects, this theoretical debate guides the democracy in the post-genocide Rwanda. Being a complex concept, however, democracy adjusts to the context not only of post-genocide. Equally, it adjusts to the existing culture and customs. Along those lines, the national-level consultations or Village Urugwiro consultations has come to understand democracy as "the relationship between the citizen and Government" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.39) whether it is direct or indirect (or representative) democracy. Using both direct and representative democracy, democratic elections are increasingly becoming a culture that Rwanda associates with. As a matter of fact, according to the same source, any individual is entitled the constitutional right (See Constitution, art.8) to elect and hold a vote at both Village

27

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

and Cell levels (direct democracy). At Sector level, there are people representing the population (Electoral College) elected at Cell level who, in turn, elect leaders. The driving idea is that "All those elected in lower levels would elect, among themselves, leaders at a higher level" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.45). This is all about 'representative democracy', which materializes through 'indirect elections'. In Rwanda, representative democracy is selected to be an option not for the purpose of logistics arrangements as it happens in bigger states. Rather, it is a means for holding Elected Local Councillors accountable.

To sum up, the most important principle in a democratic society is that all social categories, no matter how small is their respective numbers, have an elected representative. Moreover, decisions affecting their lives are informed by consistent consultations actively engaging elected representatives and their respective constituencies. Elected representatives have the responsibility to understand the problems, concerns and priorities of their constituents, and to ensure that the government delivers coherently with their interest. It is only from this perspective that they can fulfil their responsibilities, and, as a result, they ensure constituents are not denied their democratic right to representation. In other words, constituency outreach is an essential part of their job.

The concept of Constituency

In Rwanda, like anywhere else, the decentralization paradigm aims to bring government near the people and make decision-making an easy process. The Village Urugwiro consultations depicted the structures that are near the people as most eligible actors to make such decisions and initiate people-centred actions or effort (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.40). The establishment of constituencies assures that "the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voice of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making (UNESCAP, undated, p.2). The idea of Constituency, at least in the Rwandan setting, emerged from this background. In its article 75, for instance, the Rwandan Constitution refers to the concept 'constituency' as 'categories' from which deputies are selected. Political organizations, women, the youth, and persons with disabilities are major categories or constituencies most considered. These categories vary depending on on people being elected. The article 80 stipulating the composition of the Senate is hold as an illustrative example. This study draws from the same background to elaborate on the concept of Constituency.

The previous paragraphs alluded to Constituency as an expression of 'various interests' (Hearfield & Dolley, 2009), which specifically correspond to different social categories. Andrew Rehfeld equally stresses that the way democratic institutions define constituencies determines whose interests are catered for and whose interests are ignored (Dovi, 2006, p.763). To his observation, representative democracy requires a close relationship of authorization and accountability between

those who make collective decisions and those affected by them. The way constituencies are defined is not only a central, but also foundational, element in a theory of representative democracy. Because constituencies define the kinds of interests worthy of public attention, constituency definition has to be placed among other familiar institutions that increase or lessen a government's legitimacy. Constituencies define the inclusions that are necessarily part of bringing different collectivities into existence so that elected official could represent them (Warren, 2006, p.140). This definition fits very much with the conceptual understanding of the concept 'Constituency' much as it builds on different interests people normally have. They are the same interests that serve as driving forces for social categories distinction. Also, this study has a lot to learn from Michael Rabinder James. He distinguishes two conflated concepts of constituency: objective Constituency (the grouping of citizens into geographic or other electoral rolls) and subjective Constituency (the interaction between constituents and candidates in order to form cohesive voting blocs to elect a representative) (James, 2015, p.381). Through objective Constituency, this source recognizes the 'unique' character of social categories that need representation to the Council at different levels of local government settings. This character marks a demarcation line between peoples' interests that inevitably have to be represented if the 'democratic' rule is considered. Similarly, the subjective Constituency is consistent enough with the format that local representative democracy is meant to take to make sure each individual social category entrusts its power with a representative of their choice through free and transparent elections.

To draw from this conceptual discussion, this study operationalizes the concept of 'Constituency' to signify citizens and other social categories including the youth, women, persons with disabilities, teachers, non-government organizations, the private sector, and health professionals. They are distinct social categories that represent different and unique interest in the particular context of Rwanda. Strong emphasis is put on innovative governance that aims to make the variety of interests of these categories at better use in the process of making decisions. The surrounding idea involves the shift from the governance based on one individual the benefit of an elected team of people commonly known as Elected Local Councillors. The latter emanate from the resolutions of the national-level (or Village Urugwiro) consultations according to which "there would be elections for basic structures…those structures would be based on Committees instead of being based on one individual" (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.46). Among other benefits, this paradigm change translates the idea of 'shared government' whereby checks and balances enlighten consensual decisions.

Participatory governance

Previous paragraphs described decentralization as an overall policy framework closely related to good governance. The concept 'governance' was used as compounded with 'good' to highlight a people-centred state strikingly associated with an accountable government. In other words, to refer to the national-level consultations held in 1998 up to 1999, good governance is an important pillar for a government most concerned with its people and their interests (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.37). In the framework of 'participatory democracy', it is the government that "makes Rwandans really participate in their way of being governed and in determining the actions concerning them…"(Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.38). The search for consensus among many participants is taken as leading idea in the framework of 'participatory governance.

Thus, 'participatory' is being as another qualifier that brings an important nuance to the concept of governance – that is citizens' active participation in the search for solution to emerging problems. To refer to Brian Wampler & McNulty (undated) at least, participatory governance is going to be understood as a subcomponent of good governance:

> It consists of state sanctioned institutional processes that provide effective avenues to citizens to exercise their rights to voice their ideas, to vote constantly, directly and indirectly, and to contribute to the formulation and implementation of public policies and programs, which in turn, produce substantial changes in their lives (Never Again Rwanda & Interpeace 2016, p.5).

Both direct and indirect elections remain valuable mechanisms through which citizens exercise this constitutional right and contribute to the destiny of their lives.

This study focuses on both direct and indirect participation in local governance. Also known as 'representative democracy', direct elections result in a Council. Conceptually, a Council defines "a body of democratically elected representatives responsible for policy formulation and delivery of service in a given geographically defined area. Councils are constituted at Cell (for all residents), Sector and District level" (Republic of Rwanda 2012g, p.5). As per the legal framework,[8] they were put in place to smoothen consultation with and representation of citizens together with strategic decision-making in decentralized entities. The fact that this form of indirect citizen participation is regularly run, the Council has become a familiar concept in the jargon of Rwandan citizens. Elected citizen representatives at Cell, Sector and District levels are a result of indirect citizen participation. Direct citizen participation

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[8] See the Ministerial order instituting the internal rules and regulations of the Council of the Decentralized Entities, 2013; Law N° 87/2013 of 11/09/2013 determining the organization and functioning of decentralized administrative entities.

30

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

concerns only elections of members of the Executive Committee at Village level (Republic of Rwanda 2013, p.7).

Whether established through direct or indirect citizen participation, this study aims explore the interactions that mark daily relationships between elected local Representatives (at Village and Cell levels) and elected local Councillors (at Sector and District levels), and respective constituencies. If local Councils are set to serve citizens, they ideally have to be aware of what is being done for them. To the CRC 2015, for instance authorities are invited "to update the public about government programs and community priorities and generally exhibit their activities at the key levels of the process, in social, economic and governance since the activities are to benefit [citizens]" (RGB, 2015, pp.45-6).

Despite this normative understanding, empirical tests have shown gaps in knowledge about local Councils. The same source reports 54% of respondents who did not know the Council. Only an estimate of 33.9% knew about it and its members, that is, local Councillors. At the same time, 12.1% knew the local Council but did not unfortunately know its members. With no doubt, this situation has strong impact on citizen satisfaction about local Councillors. The CRC 2015 hypothesized strong need for service beneficiaries to voice their priorities and mechanisms for improvement. There is an important trend to highlight in the empirical data. The lowest net satisfaction (very satisfied and satisfied cumulated) is with the District Council, which scored an average of 21.6%. The Sector and Cell Councils respectively scored 34% and 41.9%. Obviously, these scores are comparatively lower against citizen's satisfaction with local Councillor (RGB, 2015, pp. 46-7). Of recent, the 2016 CRC only corroborated this trend. It emphasizes that the level of citizens' awareness of local councils at District, Sector and Cell levels is respectively estimated as 36.3%, 55.2%, and 72%. It is established that the same trend informs the level of citizens' satisfaction about the delivery of Local Councillors. In an ascending order, the level of satisfaction departs from the Cell, Sector and District levels. Estimates of these levels are respectively established as follows: 61.3%, 48.6% and 32.5% (RGB, 2016, pp.37-8). The 2016 CRC went on to suggest that raising awareness about Local Councils and their mandate needs more attention.

Drawing on these figures, two major findings attract the attention from observers. One, the level of citizen's satisfaction goes decreasing as we move from one to another level of local government. Second, the measurement of citizen's satisfaction with local Councillors produced lower scores comparatively. This fact came to back up a gap in the interactions that engage both local Councillors and respective constituencies. This gap only comes to support the argument by Andrew Dobson according to which "…representatives will not always make the decision their electors would have made …" once they are consulted (Dobson, undated, p.127).

31

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

This brief description offers valuable opportunities to this report to reflect on different angles to look at to gauge the levels of interaction established between local Councillors and their respective constituencies.

Interactive governance/ Interactive decision-making

Interactive governance and *interactive decision-making* are concepts that are often used interchangeably. They refer to "a way of working in which citizens, users, interest groups and public and private organizations that have a stake in a decision are involved in its preparation. It is aimed at creating support for policy proposals, improving the quality of decisions by mobilizing external knowledge and expertise, and enhancing the democratic legitimacy of decisions" (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000, as in Hambleton and Sweeting, 2003, p.239).

In this regard, governance "is the whole of public as well as private interactions that are initiated to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them" (Bavinck et al., 2005, p.30). The most important part of the above definition is the term interactions, which stands at the heart of the proposed interactive governance approach. For the moment, it is sufficient to understand an interaction as a specific form of action, undertaken by actors in order to remove obstacles and tread new paths. The definition of what constitutes a 'problem' or 'opportunity' depends on the issue and the position and understanding of the viewer (idem).

 The adjective 'societal' is best understood by way of its opposite, 'private', and is often replaced by the word 'public'. 'Societal' is everything that is common, social, and collective. The definition refers also to the importance of institutions in governance. Institutions offer structure, order and predictability in human relations such that social actors would know how to interact, what is expected of them and what they can expect from others. Thus caring for institutions is a part of governance. The same applies to principles. When governors try to solve problems or create opportunities, they inevitably bring to surface fundamental assumptions, worldviews and ethical values for discussion and examination (Bavinck et al., 2005, p.31).

Modern governance has indeed increasingly proven to be beneficiary-centered. This fact is an answer to the why question of public participation, in general, and citizen engagement in particular. As the scholarly literature supports, "populations at last have a strong interest in the outcomes of policy choices, and of the design and implementation of a variety of public policies and of the institutions that have to deliver them" (International Peacebuilding Advisory Team, 2015, p.1). This recurrent question is an indication of low levels in participation and engagement. The same source argues that citizens have little information about what is being discussed and decided in various decision-making spheres. And yet, it is supposed to be in their

legitimate interests. Similar situation can only translate strong disconnection between leaders and citizens they are supposed to serve. In line with the International Peacebuilding Advisory Team (2015), the next paragraphs explore some of the normative principles to consider while benchmarking the interactions of local Councillors vis-à-vis their respective constituencies. On the empirical grounds, the same themes help to address the question related to the trend these interactions have been taking since local Council found recognition in Rwanda legal frameworks:

Better sense of people's priorities – In highly centralized governance, capital-city based elites of different horizons often pretend to know what the people want. Even if elites are related to citizens there are significant nuances that only participatory exercises can offer. Top-down approaches of centralized governance fail to capture this reasoning and, therefore, increase the risk of failure.

Better understanding of the problem – To address people's priorities, governance actors will necessarily need to seek common understanding of the problem. The more common is the understanding, the more consensuses around solutions are likely to be.

More ideas about how to address the problem – External observers find out what a problematic situation is. However, they cannot 100% have the same feeling as people who are directly affected. Bottom-up approaches widely support that victims of a problematic situation have better ideas on patterns that solutions may take. Therefore, relying exclusively on ideas of local Councillors has numerous side effects. Such practice may deprive the local decision-makers of 'a great reservoir of potentially creative ideas and suggestions.'

Reduce(d) risk of domination by 'elite interests' or 'special group interests' – Elites or group interests have perspectives that may conflict with those of the citizenry. Always, the former tend to dominate the policy priorities and the shape of the public policies. Participatory exercises offer valuable platforms to consider the voice of citizens. In so doing, they dilute elite-based dominations.

Public support for implementation – Daily experience shows that decision-making over new policies, policy changes or reforms is one and easiest step. Implementation remains the second step and most challenging, as a result of a number of factors. The new policies, policy changes or reforms take a format of solutions to 'well-established problems'. Public support for implementation will depend much on how 'broad public involvement in the understanding the 'problem' and the process to decide a 'solution'. The same involvement is important in that it concurrently 'builds a broad support base for 'implementation''.

Build (s) trust in the authorities – Building trust in the authorities draws on the conviction according to which 'Governing' is easier when the authorities by and large can trust the citizens' and verse versa. In turn, a reciprocal feeling of trust among both authorities and citizens builds 'consent'. And 'consent' defeats policy changes or

33

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

reforms whatsoever. Dysfunctional relationships follow when there is lack of trust in the authorities. Lack of communication, of perceived transparency, responsiveness and accountability is held to an important explanatory factor of dysfunctional relationships. Communication-related concerns can only be addressed through extensive public participation that bears the seeds of building trust.

At this level, this description cannot exhaust these normative principles. It would be about pretending! At least, those ones described above serve as significant instruments about direct representation of legitimate interests. These principles will be lenses from which to feel the extent to which the interactions of local Councillors "most involve the regular accountability of representatives to their Constituents, whoever they may be" (Dobson, undated, p.128).

Accountable governance

Rwanda is recovering from a system where no governing person was requested to account for ways in which he or she carried out his/he duties. The move to decentralization made it mandatory that governing persons have to give an account of their activities: "The elected have to be accountable to their electorate" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.30). Under the framework of decentralization, compliance of elected leaders and people themselves to ordinary laws regulating this move was mostly requested (Republic of Rwanda, 1999, p.38 & 42). This obligation is being implemented within the overall objective of the accountable governance thematic area aimed "to ensure that citizens are effectively involved in both planning and implementation process and hold leaders accountable to better service delivery" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p. 31). This study finds it important to discuss accountable governance drawing on the fact that citizens' participation through decision making and demanding for accountability from leadership has been dynamic.

As we refer to the 2012 Citizens Report Card, participation through decision making and demanding for accountability from leadership is still low. For instance monitoring of services and holding leadership accountable is at 44.70% while the formulation of District Development Plans is at 26.7% (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.17). These statistics are perfectly coherent with one of the findings highlighted in the 2014 Citizen Report Card according to which "local government leaders do not organize meetings and seek the citizens' opinion only when a particular activity is to be carried out" (RGB, 2014,p 67). The same trend is captured in the areas highlighted in the most recent Citizens Report Card. The Citizen Report Card (2016) advocates for the establishment of regular mechanisms or strategies for local leaders to constantly avail themselves to citizens and, as a result, timely find solutions to their problems (RGB, 2016, p.38).

Though more need to be done, net levels of satisfaction by citizens is optimistic and encouraging. It is all about an achievement closely linked to certain levels of respect

34

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

in a social contract that binds both Elected Local Leaders and their respective Constituencies. Through this social contract, leaders cease to be appointed and to account to the appointing authority, the case used to be prior to decentralization. It is in this context that the 1999 elections of Cell and Sector Councils inspired "confidence to democratize fully by 2003 when all local leaders from cell to district level were elected …" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013b, p.11). Different Constituencies consequently entrusted Elected Local Councilors with power to decide on their behalf. Strict respect of this social contract determines whether Elected Local Leaders would be successful in seeking re-election or whether Constituents should choose new representatives:

> (…) the idea is that elected representatives will in principle represent the interests of their Constituents more effectively than appointees because of the need to submit themselves to re-election. If representatives have been remiss in their representative duty, this element of accountability gives Constituents an opportunity to choose new ones (Dobson, undated, p.138).

This quote perfectly highlights the importance of Constituents' interests. In their delivery, Elected Local Representatives are expected to make these interests a primary focus. They can properly carry out their mandate only if the same interests are binding through democratic processes. To agree with the same source, "representatives should be democratically elected rather than appointed" (Dobson, undated, p.128). The surrounding idea is that elected local representatives are inclined to ensure that interests are effectively represented and, most importantly, they report back to the appointing authority. In this case, the appointing authority remains the Constituencies they represent. Elections by means of which Elected Local Councillors are appointed need to be free, fair and transparent enough if the interaction is deemed accountable (idem).

Accountability refers to the obligation on the part of public officials to report on the usage of public resources and answerability for failing to meet stated performance objectives (Armstrong, 2005, p.1).

Accountability takes many forms. They include political, managerial, fiscal, legal, and other dimensions. This study focuses on public accountability, which depends on transparency referred to as the "unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable information on decisions and performance in the public Sector" (Armstrong, 2005, p.1). As such, it has two dimensions. One refers to having to provide information about one's actions (answerability). The other dimension refers to having to face consequences from those dissatisfied either with the actions themselves or with the rationale invoked to justify them. Accountability is really about calling and holding institutions and officials to account in undertaking their functions or duties (Mulgan, 2003). Increasingly, the consequences for performance are also being invoked. In this sense accountable governance is linked to responsive governance. Accountability for

35

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

performance facilitates checks and balances from internal and external stakeholders and serves to guide, monitor and evaluate public institutions and programmes, and informs improvements. Hence, accountability denotes responsibility for results and outcomes. When operating effectively, it serves to ensure that public governance can flourish, related institutions can perform well and services are delivered to citizens effectively and efficiently (UN, 2015, p.52)

In Rwanda the objective of accountable governance, for EDPRS II, is to "Enhance accountable governance by promoting citizen participation and mobilisation for delivery of development, strengthening public accountability and improving service delivery" (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.78). The specific objectives, or priority areas, of accountable governance in Rwanda are twofold:

– To *maximize citizens' participation and ownership of the national development process and strengthen demand for accountability*. In this regard, one of the justifications for strengthening citizen and community participation is the need to understand and develop the critical connections between participation, accountability and quality and sustainability of service delivery. Citizen participation in decentralization includes consulting and listening to local people and being open to local innovation. It is also about letting citizens participate directly in decision-making at their local level. Citizen participation in development projects generates better outcomes, because of increased ownership, and improved conceptualization and implementation of projects. Accountability is reinforced when there is better understanding of development programmes, hence the need for enhanced information and communication mechanisms (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, p.79).

– To ensure *quality service delivery* through providing appropriate feedback from citizens to support growth and poverty reduction. Rwanda is targeting this area to improve its standing as a regional hub of excellence for service/customer care. Rwanda takes the issue of service delivery seriously in recognition of the fact that public service delivery is the most important function of government officials, who must be accountable to the citizens that they are employed to serve (Republic of Rwanda, 2013, pp.80-1).

Methodology of the study

This section summarizes the study design, the type of data, the population and sampling procedure, data collection and analysis procedure and methods, as well as the ethics and quality assurance.

Study Design and type of data

An inquest into the "*State of Elected Local Councillors & Constituency Interactions in Rwanda: Implications for Accountable Local Governance*" called upon the

36

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

combination of different epistemologies, approaches, and methods. Epistemologically, this study was both *positive* and *interpretive*. The *positivistic* dimension endeavoured to explore *objective* facts regarding indirect citizens' participation in Rwanda's local governance. The approaches set to collect *observable* data were *quantitative*, where a *survey-based questionnaire* was predominant. The *interpretive* dimension was interested in *subjective* opinions or testimonies from key informants. The latter were expected to disclose personal *subjective* opinions and experiences towards citizens' participation in Rwanda's local governance. On this basis, subjective data was *qualitative* whereby data collection used (focus) *group discussions* and personal *interviews*.

In line with the methodological design, the study was limited to the collection of first hand information, here referred to as 'primary data'. It deliberately chose to rely on primary sources to focus on different actors engaged directly or indirectly in the 'interactions' and related 'accountability' in local government settings. This choice was motivated by a desire to access updated feelings or perceptions about those interactions and accountability. Thus, this study intended to analyze field data and discuss the findings in close reference to the study research questions. Equally, however, the discussions were connected to other findings explored in the literature available in order to identify possible gaps and/or significant lessons learnt.

Study Scope and Limitations

This study covered five Districts beneficiaries of 'Deepening Accountable Local Governance in Rwanda' (DALGOR). They include Burera, Nyamagabe, Nyamasheke, Gasabo, and Ngoma.

To start with, DALGOR is a pilot project primarily designed to serve a baseline for further initiatives. Therefore, the initial purpose of this study is not to rigorously generalize and extrapolate empirically findings. Findings from the Districts subject to this study, though arguably, appear not strictly represeting Rwanda. However, they shade a general picture, which depicts how the situation looks like in Rwanda. Each province and the City of Kigali are represented and the study involves both urban and rural areas. It follows that findings from these Districts are thus likely offer a general trend and picture. This trend gives thus an indication of what the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and Constituencies and how this state impacts on accountable local governance in Rwanda.

Study population

The study population included the following categories:

- Ordinary Citizens or Constituents: they are drawn from different Constituencies

- Elected Local Councillors (ELC): they are members of Local Councils at District, Sector, and Elected Executive Committee at Cell levels. Beforehand, it is worth

emphasizing that this study equally extends to Elected Executive Committees at Village levels for three major reasons: (1) They are locally elected; (2) They represent citizens, and finally (3) The study is about the interactiosn between citizens and those who represent them. The study is thus about Elected Local Councillors with extension to Elected Executive Commitees at Village levels, in line with the above-three major reasons highlighted.

- Village Executive Committee members: they are Elected Representatives at Cell level.

- Key informants: they are "people who can speak knowledgeably about" (Bernard, 2000, p. 192) the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and Constituencies, on the one hand, and the accountability it brings with it in local government. At the central government level, key informants have included officials from MINALOC, RGB, RALGA, and Civil Society Organization.

Taken as the smallest administrative unit, the Village serves as the unit of observation. This implies that the citizens that this study was targeting are, in the first place, households' member drawn at Village level whose data are disaggregated to their Districts, Sectors and Cells of origin.

Sampling procedure

In the first place, the determination of sample size follows the social categories (that is, subpopulations or subframes) in the study population (or sampling frame). The sampling frame is divided into 'Constituents', 'Elected Local Councillors', 'Village Executive Committee members', and 'key informants', which are more and more homogeneous. To each subframe, there was a corresponding sample. The sum of these subframes has resulted in the total sample for the entire study. In view of the strata above identified, the strategies for samplings were different.

The sampling frame is made of different strata, which also vary in size. Some strata (e.g. women, youth, people with disability) might be underrepresented, or not represented at all for many reasons. There is a need for an appropriate sample design to take care of such a risk. To this end, the *disproportionate stratified random sampling* procedure is selected to ensure a minimum number of respondents in each stratum of the research design (Bernard, 2000, pp.152-3). This sample design is most appropriate to Constituents and Elected Local Councillors, privileged targets of the survey questionnaire.

As far as key informants are concerned, the criteria for eligibility were prior set. The most leading criterion was the expertise that made these informants a body of knowledgeable people about 'interactions' between Elected Local Councillors and Constituents and about implications of these interactions on accountability in local government. This is the purpose for which this study wanted the informants to serve. This was about purposive or judgment sampling. In a view of *purposive or judgment*

sampling, the research relied on personal judgement to select key informants for an intensive research inquiry (Bernard, 2000, pp.176-7). Purposive or judgement samples are expected to serve to complementary ends. First, their use is methodologically advised in pilot studies. In the particular case of this study, the purposive sample design is selected in order for the research team to get a feel "for pretesting questionnaires to make sure that the items are unambiguous and not too threatening" (Bernard, 2000, p.178). The pilot phase of this study allowed for necessary adjustments on questionnaires before they were submitted to the entire study sample.

Sample Size for ordinary Citizens

As far as terminologies are concerned, the concept of 'ordinary citizens' defines the Constituents. For the purpose of ethical considerations, the Constituents eligible for this study respected the age group of 18 years and above. To determine the sample size of ordinary citizens, this study suggested 5% margin of error and an interval of confidence of 95%.

The Fourth Population and Housing Census 2012 (Republic of Rwanda, 2014, p.14) gives statistical figures on the basis of which the sample size is determined in the Districts of research interest. Out of the total population of each District, subpopulations (or subframes) aged 18years and above are presented as follows:

1. *Burera* district: 164,549 (out of a total resident population of 336,582) (Republic of Rwanda, 2012b).

2. *Gasabo* district: 317, 646 (out of a total resident population of 529,651 residents) (Republic of Rwanda, 2012c).

3. *Ngoma* district: 175,327 (out of a total resident population of 336,928 residents) (Republic of Rwanda, 2012d).

4. *Nyamagabe* district: 173,537 (out of a total resident population of 341,491 residents) (Republic of Rwanda, 2012e).

5. *Nyamasheke* district: 196,655 (out of a total resident population of 381,804 residents) (Republic of Rwanda, 2012f).

The scientific Sample Size Calculation used the services of Creative Research Systems.[9] In line with these services, SurveyMonkey provides the statistical table (see Table 1 further) of sample size determination.

Within the range of an interval of confidence of 95% and a margin of error of 5%, the census bears an important observation. Each of the Districts of research interest counts more than 100,000 individuals. Equally, each District falls into the category ranging from 100,000 plus and 1,000,000 plus, at least to read from Table 1.

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[9] See the online software for the calculation procedure at: http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Table 1: Statistical table of sample size determination

Population	Margin of Error			Confidence Level		
	10%	5%	1%	90%	95%	99%
100	50	80	99	74	80	88
500	81	218	476	176	218	286
1,000	88	278	906	215	278	400
10,000	96	370	4,900	264	370	623
100,000	96	383	8,763	270	383	660
1,000,000+	97	384	9,513	271	384	664

Source: SureyMonkey 1999-2016.[10]

Since the total population of each District aged 18 years and above, the beneficiaries of DALGOR project is beyond 100,000 people, Table 1 shows the sample size as **384** for each District. Given that the study covered 5 Districts, it follows that the total sample size was **1,920** (that is, 384*5) respondents. This sample size was distributed over 40 Villages set as major units of intervention for DALGOR project. They were found in 8 Villages of each of the 5 Districts of interventions (See Appendix 2 for more details). Respondents were drawn from respective households. Assistant researchers were expected to visit at least 48 households (1920/40) from each Village to administer a questionnaire. Neverthless, fortunately, as it turned to be (and as indeed explained at the beginning of findings presentation, see The Figure 1) respondents increased by 10.6%.

Sample determination for key informants

The determination of sample size for key informants is different. As discussed earlier, this determination follows the spirit of judgmental sample design. In line with the expert knowledge of key informants, researchers are expected to go out to find some. The interest is not in 'representative numbers.' To draw from Bernard (2000, p.178), this study consistently bore in mind that "all samples are representative of *something*. The procedure was to make them representative of what you want them to be." With regards to the total of respondents and informants for this study, see figure 1.

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[10] Available at: https://www.surveymonkey.com/mp/sample-size/

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Data collection instruments

This study report suggested meeting respondents in person. Venues for meetings were either their respective households, offices or any other place they could prefer. To organize Focus Group Discussions, participants were organized to gather on one site to meet ETP researchers (See the list of of participants in the Appendix). On individual or group basis, the study made sure it collected data using two important data collection tools—questionnaire and interviews. The procedure was to first collect quantitative data. Salient findings from quantitative data were deeply explored, afterwards, with the use of the qualitative approach.

1. Survey questionnaire – A pre-agreed upon survey questionnaire, with close-ended questions in both Kinyarwanda and English, was administered to all respondents. This was a self-administered questionnaire whereby researchers were in direct contact with respondents. The purpose was to make sure that respondents answer all questions. It was an opportunity to provide respondents with additional explanations if need was. Also, it was helpful for respondents who did not know how to read and write. In this case, researchers interacted with them while asking questions and filling in the questionnaire on their behalf. The use of tablets in data collection was a useful mechanism to ensure transparency and rapidity in data entry.

2. Individual and (Focus) groups interviews – Empirical data were also collected through personal interviewing and Focus Group Discussions in each target District. Using an interview guide pre-agreed upon with the client and other relevant stakeholders, researchers involved having direct face-to-face interactions/contact with informants. While doing so, researchers also kept taking field notes on relevant behaviours or facts observed to harmonize words and body language.

Individual interviews, undertaken on basis of the voluntary consent principle, offered valuable opportunities for interviewees to open up and provide researchers with sensitive/confidential information. Equally, they helped the researchers not only to be free in asking questions and to properly probe for more clarifications. Also, researchers were given opportunities to interpret the likely validity of what interviewees said (tone voice and body language). To this end, qualitative open-ended questions were developed. Interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda language, to record the information (with permission of interviewees) using tape recorders. Afterwards, researchers transcribed and translated interviews into English. The study made sure it conducted interviews in order to collect data on consensus, as far as mainstream opinions are concerned.

Selection and training of enumerators

Before the fieldwork took place, assistant researchers or enumerators were selected on the basis of their competence in the use of technological devices, such as tablets or smart phones, to collect data. The next step was about familiarizing these enumerators

41

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

with data collection instruments, as well as with research ethics. Also, the period of training was an opportunity given the research team to review the survey instrument (questionnaire) and, later on, incorporate necessary inputs that the pilot study suggested. Together with the statistician, IT expert took this opportunity to improve and finalize the digitalization of data collections tools, the cleaning and analysis tools in close collaboration with the entire research team.

After enumerators were familiarized with the context of the study and the research instruments, the training served the purpose of providing key advice likely to add value on the process of data collection. Hence, the training was designed to give a summary of briefing on cautious behaviours that enumerators needed to observe in order to be successful in the data collection process:

1) Researchers shared the relevance of the study (to both respondents/informant and the country) to entice the interest for every respondent/informant to freely participant. At the same time, they ensured anonymity and confidentiality of respondents' information.

2) Researchers had to be aware that some respondents, if not all, may be reluctant to the use of a tape recorder to collect qualitative information. When respondents failed to convince respondents/informants about confidentiality they resolved to take field notes. They did not use recorders until respondents had given their consent.

3) Researchers were trained on the following strategies aimed to find out respondents/information:

> (….) not to choose respondents who are pretty much like themselves; not to select only people whom they would enjoy interviewing; not to avoid people whom they would find obnoxious or hostile; not to avoid people who are hard to contact (busy people who are hardly ever at home, or people who work nights and sleep days); and not to favour people who are eager to be interviewed (Bernard, 2000, p.175).

4) Researchers made sure their behaviour/conduct is friendly, courteous, conversational, cooperative and unbiased enough. This practice is important to put respondents/informants at ease so that they talk freely and fully.

5) Researchers were required to be attentively listening to respondents' opinions, rather than forging their own opinions. Therefore, researchers made sure they do not possibly suggest answers to respondents/informants. Instead, they were encouraged to probe.

42

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Strategies for sample selection

The selection of both informants and respondents[11] has to consider some important elements. They include classical socio-demographic characteristics such as age, sex, education and marital status, various categories of constituents. To ensure inclusivity, the selection has taken into account special categories such as women, the youth, people with disability and the vulnerable, health professionals, teachers, the private sector and the civil society.

To start with, it was decided that the Village is the unit of observation for methodological convenience. Following the same logic, the data collection process gave primacy to visits to households or working place. An Elected Local Representative[12] at Village level served as a guide toward the first interviewee. Alternatively, enumerators used the Village notebook (*Ikayi y'Umudugudu*) to select the first interviewee on a random basis. To give equal chance to all households in the Village selected, the next interviewee was selected in the fourth household from where the enumerator started. Households' selection went on following this periodicity until the process of data collection takes an end. It was all about *random or probability selection*.

A non-probability spirit was set to drive the identification of interviewees. Upon arrival at the household, interviewers have grabbed "whoever will stand still long enough to answer [their] questions" (Bernard, 2000, p.178), provided that s/he is eligible, as per the criteria prior set. This is going to be a combination of *convenience and judgement-based strategies for selection*.

Though these strategies for selection were appropriate enough, they did not give enough assurance on whether special groups (such as, women, youth, people with disabilities, and members of the Private Sector Federation) necessarily featured in the sample. The use of social networks was of great help. To go about this, enumerators were advised as follows: "you locate one or more key individuals and ask them to name others who would be likely candidates for your research" (Bernard, 2000, p.179). This was all about *snowball selection*. The same selection strategy applied to locating Elected Local Councillors targeted for quantitative data collection.

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[11] There is clear distinction between 'informants' and 'respondents' respectively used by anthropologists and sociologist. The difference lies on the nature of field data they generate. This particular study subscribes to Lavy & Hollan's (1998) distinction formulated as follows: " When people describe their culture, they are informants. When they talk about their own characteristics, their own beliefs (opinions, preferences, values, ideas) and their own experiences and behavior, they are respondents" (Bernard, 2000, p. 192). It follows that informants generate 'qualitative data' while respondents provide the study with 'quantitative data'.

[12] As much as possible, enumerators are required to avoid the possibility of interference that the presence of the Elected Local Representative may exercise. It is a noble practice that will definitely ensure research ethics. S/he should leave enumerators work alone and independently decide who is going to be the next interviewee.

43

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Data collection process

Starting already from the design of data collection tools to the exercise of data collection and analysis, well-adapted technological devices, such as the tablets and/or smart phones, were used. This strategy has quickened the exercises of data collection and analysis. Also, it offered the advantage of minimizing issues of data fraud or forgery as the location for every enumerator could be remotely traced by use of geo-location technologies such as GPS. This has had the benefit of relatively maximizing accountability of enumerators before data collection supervisors and most importantly before the lead researcher who, overall, assumes primary responsibility for high quality deliverables.

With today's IT tool, there was no need of operating with manual or semi-manual systems of data collection. Efficient use of technology helped to reduce costs and improve efficiency. On this basis, an online platform (Survey software solution) was designed to significantly increase performance, resilience and capacity processing, compared to the paper-based data collection. With the online platform hosted on live server, online questionnaire was administered to enumerators through different devices (Mobile phones, tablets and/or computers) at their disposal within minutes. As a result, they collected data in very little time amounting to four days. After the sample population responded, almost immediately data were automatically uploaded into the server because of this rapid distribution. With the web-based survey, this study accommodated multiple choice questions, single-response questions, list questions, and grid questions.

The online platform technical operation was based on a high degree of automation to reduce human operator errors and simplify the manageability of the infrastructure. In addition, this platform demonstrated a good level of controllability and audibility (confidentiality, integrity, identification/authentication and access rights permission). To preempt accessibility issues in rural areas, an offline mode was put in place and synchronized with the server once enumerators were connected to Internet. The system and sftware application software were kept updated in the two areas by means of hardware feature (asynchronous remote copy). This made the system restart with the same customization (i.e. naming convention, security policies, management rules, etc.) after rotation.

As Microsoft.NET and other programming languages evolve, so did this study's services. This study has considered mobile applications, which so far keep on top of all the latest technological shifts in the Internet landscape. This was the case while Microsoft Windows runs on over 95% of all enterprise computers worldwide. It made sense, therefore, for this study to focus on using Microsoft's.NET Framework for development. Though other frameworks have their benefits, NET was taken to be an ideal for building applications. Working with NET meant the core technical approach evolves around three major areas:

44

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

- *Development platform*: MVC Microsoft .NET 4.6 (and subsequent upgrades)
- *Development languages*: Primarily C# (as well as Javascript)
- *Database platform*: Microsoft SQL Server (Implementations from SQL Server 2005 to 2014)

Of course, this online tool has offered fully compliant HTML and CSS coding according to W3C Standards. Also, this study has taken accessibility seriously and ensured that this tool application measures up to the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 (WCAG 2.0). It used a three-tiered development framework, with dedicated staff for each tier. Each stage was unit tested, as well as being fully tested at the Alpha, Beta and Gold release stages. Finally, it uses the AGILE philosophy for all development work.

Strategies for data presentation and analysis

The study analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data in a complementary manner. Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative analyses have applied.

To remind, quantitative data were collected using electronical data collection tool. We counted down 57 categorical questions for citizens and 50 questions for Elected Local Councilors. The quantitative analysis has used some Computer Aided Programs, such as SPSS and Excel. In so doing, data were separately codified, labeled and analyzed (database for citizens and ELC) using statistical software, SPSS 17. The sample was n=2512, that is 1954 citizens against 558 Elected Local Councilors was saved in an excel sheet.

A univariate descriptive analysis was used to describe the distribution of a single variable. It included frequencies, presented in the form of tables, figures/charts. To try to respond to the research questions, this study performed some cross tabulations were specific variables were compared to all socio-demographic categories. In other words, the presentation and analysis of data was particularly made in a disaggregated manner, notably with regard to age, sex, marital status, education, etc.

Qualitatively, data was presented in the form of text. During data presentation, concepts and themes, as used by individual informants and Focus Groups, were examined across different interviews. This exercise aimed to combine the material into a coherent whole that described what was going on around the interactions between constituents and Elected Local Councilors. After field testimonies were established in this analysis, qualitative data thus portray the shades of meaning through the words of respondents.

Research Ethics

Ethical considerations involve standards of conduct of social researchers. Research ethics are closely associated with 'morality', which raises the right/wrong concern. The idea is to exercise the right to the search for truth but not to the expense of the

45

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

rights (to privacy, for instance) of other individuals (respondents/informants) involved in this study (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 520). The primary interest in ethical considerations was to pre-empt, to the maximum, the risks for potential harm to research subjects here understood as respondents/informants (Bernard, 2000, p.21). In view of this brief background, this study kept close eye on a number of important research ethics as further summarized.

Informed consent – It is formerly captured in the ethical norms of voluntary participation and no harm to participants. *Voluntary participation* draws on the idea that social research may represent an intrusion into people's lives and involves an activity (of revealing personal information) that the respondent has not requested (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 521). In most cases, respondents/informants are reluctant/hesitant to disclose 'private' information to strangers. To kick off an impetus to voluntary participation (without any special rewards), ETPM researchers have attracted the interest of respondents through an argument according to which "that the research effort may ultimately help all of humanity" (Idem) in general and, Rwandans, in particular. Equally, they have ensured there is no harm to participants – that is, "an information that would embarrass them or endanger their home life, friendship, jobs, and so forth" (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p.522). Thus, this was an expression of a need to minimize the risk of being injured through strong mobilization of Elected Local Councils around the relevance of this study to dispel the risks of misleading rumours and speculations.

Anonymity – The empirical part of this study was designed to be 'self-administered questionnaire' and face-to-face interviews. In both cases, respondents could not be considered anonymous, at least to assistant researchers. To some extent, they could identify a given response with a given respondent. Equally, an interviewer personally collected the (qualitative) information from an identifiable respondent (Babbies & Muton, 2001, p.523). Regardless of the case, anonymity aimed at "the protection of the subjects' interest and well being" (Idem). There were some important strategies to protect respondents/informants' identities. First, the survey questionnaire did not include identity details of respondents. Second, the planned sample was big enough (2, 342) and did not allow for the memorization of respondents' details. Thirdly, data increasingly became anonymous because of long labour chain between the process of data collection and data reporting. Finally, the reporting process made sure field testimonies taken to illustrate quantitative data are rather associated with the 'social positions' of informants than their identity details.

Confidentiality – In many respects, confidentiality is very much close to anonymity. The protection of research subjects remains the meeting point. On this basis, field information needs "at least be kept confidential" (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p.524). Bernard (2000) goes far to hold researchers responsible for any harm respondents/informants may undergo in case the information leaks: "*you* are

46

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

responsible for what is done with that information, and *you* must protect people from becoming emotionally burdened for having talked to you" (2000, p.201).

There were important strategies put in place to ensure confidentiality in this particular study. First, training weres planed for interviewers and enumerators on the management of respondents' identifications and ethical responsibilities. Second was to protect raw materials against any people who may divert from the purpose for which the information/data was collected. In this way, interview booklets/raw data have to be handed in to RALGA for safe filing.

Quality assurance and control

Sound methodological approach is a good start to ensure quality control. It uses multiple sources of evidence coupled. In all, the approach comes to add up to an effective mastering of the art of doing research featuring an accurate listening. Further level of quality control was steadily involved in continuous and close contact with RARGA focal point person (or team) for the purpose of advice and guidance.

Sharing the inception report, and most importantly, sharing early findings with RARGA experts and partners was at the core of qualty assurance and control. Inputs of different backgrounds played an important role to streamline the study focus and, therefore, back up the study progress. Discussions meetings, for this purpose, took place in both informal settings and in formal workshops. All of these processes played a crucial role in assuring and assessing the quality of this study before final results are presented in formal validation. The report was first proofread and edited before the submission of the final copy.

Empirical findings

This section is about empirical findings on the interactions between constituents/citizens and Elected Local Councilors (ELC), as well as their implications for accountable local governance in Rwanda. These interactions generally refer to a two-way process involving both citizens/constituents and Elected Local Councilors. The first way consists of ELC collecting views or opinions on constituents/citizens' priority needs, as well as their proposals for solutions. The views and proposal for solutions are brought to Local Councils that make final decisions after discussions. The second way consists of ELC reporting back (feedback) to citizens/constituents about the Local Councils' final decisions. At the same time, ELC provide citizens/constituents with necessary explanations on decisions made at the level of Local Councils. Since Village Executive Committee members are elected to represent citizens/constituents, they also play the same role as Elected Local Councilors. Unlike Elected Local Councilors, however, they report back to the Village Council[13]. Hence, citizens, Village Executive Committee members, and Elected Local Councilors, have been important units of analysis in this stuy. In other words, they provided valuable information of which the findings are further presented.

Before getting to empirical findings, the brief description of respondents/informants is paramount. In this particular context, strong emphasis is being put on these units of analysis, whose role was instrumental in providing the study with quantitative and qualitative data. This description aims to ensure consistency with the methodology earlier discussed.

Size of respondents

Initially, the study had planned a sample size amounting to 1,920 respondents to provide quantitative data. While in the field, the survey reached 1954 citizens, which thus implies an increase of 1.7%. With regards to Elected Local Councilors (ELC), the plan was to reach 350. After the fieldwork was concluded, 558 Elected Local Councilors were reached, thus implying an increase of 59.4%. In total, the size of survey respondents increased by 10.6% (from 2270 respondents, initially planned, up to 2512 respondents who participated in providing field information). In addition to the total of 2512 individuals who have been subject to the survey, 155 informants (that is, 50 individuals from each of the five Districts of interest to DALGOR, and 5 experts at national level) have also been subject to interviews (see details in Appendix 4). Hence, an important amount of qualitative data was collected. As the Figure 1 portrays, the total of respondents has increased up to 2,667 individuals.

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[13] Actually, the Village Council is an institution composed of all citizens aged 18 and above. There are 5 members elected from the VillageCouncil to form a 'Village Executive Committee', which represent and report back to the Village Council.

Figure 1: Respondents' size

STUDY RESPONDENTS

	Respondents planned (for quantitative data)	Respondents reached(for quantitative data)	% of respondents (for quantitative data)	Informants (for qualitative data)	Experts (for qualitative data)	GRAND TOTAL OF STUDY RESPONDENTS
Total of respondents	2270	2512	110.60%	150	5	2667
Elected Local Councilors	350	558	159.40%	100		
Ordinary citizens/Constituents	1920	1954	101.70%	50		

As the Figure 1 shows, there has been an increment in the size of respondents (10.6%), who were subject to the survey in the five Districts investigated. Although the plan was to only meet 2,270 individuals, there have been legitimate reasons to support this increment. The use of tablets and smart phones in data collection process is relatively a new undertaking in Rwanda. Enumerators are likely, by mistake, to load invalid scripts into the server hosting data. This is usually the case in areas with no total coverage of Internet connection. Power interruption was also identified as an intensifying factor for the possibility for invalid scripts to be sent into the server. In addition to human errors, with the help of IT advice, these factors prompted the study to investigate more respondents than earlier planned. The idea behind was to compensate invalid scripts afterwards. After invalid scripts were compensated, this study was left with an increased number from 2,270 up to 2,512 respondents subjected to the fieldwork survey.

Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

The Figure 2 portrays a variety of socio-demographic characteristics of respondents involved in this study. Variations in these characteristics constitute a clear indication of efforts made to include important social categories and different aspects of life that may influence councillorship categories in this study.

The Figure 2 shows that different socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, such as: age, sex, marital status, education, standards of living, physical ability, as well as membership to pressure groups, have been taken into consideration in this study. It emerges that gender representativity is respected among both citizens/constituents and Elected Local Councillors. There are 50.15% of male citizens against 55.7% ELC males. Females follow the same pattern (49.8% and 44.2% of citizens and Elected Local Councillors, respectively).

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 2: Respondents' socio-demographic characteristics

Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (%)

Legend: Citizens/Constituents, Elected Local Councillors

Membership to pression groups
- Other: 41.5 / 17.5
- Syndicates: 4.7 / 8.8
- Cooperatives: 30.2 / 50.2
- Private Sector: 15.2 / 15.3
- Civil Society: 8.4 / 8.2

Physical Disability
- Without disability: 89.1 / 93
- With disability: 10.9 / 7

Employment status
- Other: 10 / 3.6
- Student: 7.1 / 3.1
- Retired: 2.1 / 0.4
- Employed: 52.3 / 87
- Unemployed: 28.5 / 6

Marital status
- Separated: 0.1 / 0
- Widowed: 9.2 / 3.7
- Divorced: 1.6 / 0
- Maried: 59 / 85.5
- Single: 25.2 / 10.8

Education
- None: 14.4 / 0.9
- University: 6.7 / 39.1
- Secondary: 16.8 / 28.2
- Professional: 7.9 / 7.5
- Primary: 54.2 / 24.3

Sex
- Male: 50.2 / 55.7
- Female: 49.8 / 44.3

Living standards categorie (cyiciro cy'Ubudehe)
- 4: 0.6 / 13.4
- 3: 38.4 / 55.2
- 2: 47.5 / 29.1
- 1: 2.3 / 13.5

Age group
- 61+: 11.7 / 0.9
- 31-60: 54.1 / 85
- 18-30: 34.2 / 14.1

Against the residence of citizens and ELC, it emerges that the majority of respondents (68.1% and 49% of citizens and ELC, respectively) have a rural background. Against the age group, the majority of respondents (54.1% and 85% of Citizens and ELC, respectively) are found in the age group of 31-60. Also, the majority of respondents are 'married' (59% and 85.4% of citizens and ELC, respectively. The majority of respondents are citizens (54.1%) with 'primary level' of education, as seconded by 39.1% of ELC with 'University level' of education. The majority of citizens come from 'Category two' (47.6%) of Ubudehe while 38.4% belong to the third category. Equally, 55% of Elected Local Councilors belong to the third category. Characteristically, this sample extended to both respondents 'with' and 'without' physical ability. Estimates of 10.9% and 6.7% are citizens and ELC, respectively, 'with' physical disability. Against the membership group, the majority of ELC belong to 'Cooperatives' (50% against 30% of citizens) while the majority of citizens (41.4%) belong to any pressure group.

50

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

This diversity in socio-demographic characteristics aimed to access a variety of information from different backgrounds of respondents. This attempt was with a view that those backgrounds differently influence councillorship interactions.

This statement equally applies to the 'employment status' of respondents. Details for the employment status are portrayed in the Figures 3.

Figure 3: Employment status of respondents

The Figure 3 shows different domains related to the employment status of respondents. As the Figure 3 shows, only 52.3% of citizens are 'employed'. At the same time, 87% of respondents are 'self-employed'. On the other hand, 87% of ELC are 'employed' while 62% of the same ELC are 'self-employed'. It is important to observe, from the Figure 3, that those respondents employed work for the government at different levels. They belong to the 'public service'. As a matter of fact, 29.6% of ELC against 5.4% of citizens 'employed' belong to the 'public service'. Civil society is the least to employ respondents (3.9% and 2.2% of ELC and citizens, respectively) and comes after the private sector (4.4% and 5.3% of ELC and citizens, respectively).

There are also variations in educational backgrounds. The overall view of the results in the Figure 4 shows that Local Councils are dominantly composed of ELC with 'University' education. Along, to illustrate, the five Districts investigated have 218 ELC scattered at different levels of Local Councils and Village Executive Committees. This pattern applies to all levels of Local Councils, except the level of Cell Local Councils (69) where most ELC hold secondary education level. The same exception also extends to the Village Executive Committees. It has emerged that the majority of Village Executive Committee members are with no formal educational background (69). They are opinions leaders elected for their ascendacy over citizens. ELC with professional or vocational educational backgrounds are still fewer.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 4: Education of ELC per Constituency and Council levels

Education Frequencies of ELC per Constituency and Council Levels

In the Figure 4, details show that 4 Elected Local Councillors and 1 belong to the Village Executive Committee and the Cell Local Council level, respectively, and have no formal education. At the Local Council levels, 5 Elected Local Councillors with no formal education are respectively at the level of Village Executive Committee (4) and of Cell Local Council (1). As far as the constituency is concerned, 5 ELC with no formal education are at Village level (4) of whom 1 represents the National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD).

As far as the description of respondets is concerned, it is important to observe that the Elected Local Councilors investigated are unequally distributed in the study sample. As it appears in the Figure 5, the Cell and Sector levels of Local Councils are more or less equally represented (29.4% and 29.6%, respectively). The District level of Local Council (18.5%) is the least represented after the Village Executive Committee (22.4%).

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 5: Distribution of ELC by Local Councils

Citizens' level of awareness of ELC (%)

No matter how uneven numbers are distributed, the Figure 5 shows no big gaps or differences in the representativity of each level of Local Council and Village Executive Committee in the sample. They are represented in this study at more or less similar proportions. Therefore, the same proportions are anticipated in the information that respondents provided this study with.

Figure 6: Geographical location of Respondents

The Figure 6 shows that the majority of respondents (63.9% and 49.1%) were, respectively, based in the rural area. The rural location of these respondents indeed reflects the geographical location of targeted Districts in this study. This is not surprising since, apart from Gasabo, the rest of Districts (4) are dominantly rural. Consequently their respective Sectors, Cells, and Villages, are comparatively much

more rural. This calls for another concern of whether ELC reside where they have been assigned to carry out their responsibilities. Details are captured in the Figure 7.

As the Figure 7 shows, the majority of Elected Local Councilors (91.7%) live where they carry out their councillorship responsibilities. However, the comparisons between the three levels of Local Council and Village Executive Committee indicate that few are the Elected Local Councilors (27%), who live where they carry out their responsibilities. It was established that the majority of Elected Local Councilors (58.7%) live away from where they are supposed to carry out their councillorship responsibilities.

Figure 7: ELC Residence vs. Councillorship place

At District level, for instance, the number of Elected Local Councilors who reside where they carry out their responsibilities, and the number of those who do not do so, are more or less equal (18.6% and 17.4%, respectively). Between the Elected Local Councilors at Cell level and Village Executive Committee members, the trend is simply that the majority are those, who reside at the place of their councillorship responsibilities.

In addition, Elected Local Councilors, as well as citizens, provided the general picture about the residence of councilors vis-à-vis the place of their councillorship, as shown in the Figure 8. As the Figure 8 shows, the majority of respondents (73.6% of ELC and 59.7% of citizens) live where they carry out their councillorship duties. In this regards, respondents had to also explain whether it is worthwhile that ELC actually

reside where they are supposed to carry out their responsibilities of councillorship or not.

Figure 8: General picture of ELC Residence vis-à-vis their place of councillorship

Empirical findings indicate differences in opinions, though not with the same proportion. Some respondents did not find it necessary for ELC to reside where they carry out councillorship responsibilities. However, the general consensus among many respondents was that Elected Local Councillors should reside where they carry out these responsibilities.

Qualitative findings collected by the means of individual and Focus Group Discussions provided strong support to this consensus. As informants accounted, to illustrate, the more ELC reside where they carry out their councillorship duties, the more citizens' *trust* in them increases. Equally, the more they reside where they carry out their councillorship duties, the more citizens' real problems and needs are easily *noticeable to* ELC through personal observation. Also, informants indicated that ELC are more responsive when they reside in their respective constituencies. As they argued, problems get solved before they reach higher levels of administration. In this regard, illustrative accounts read as follows:

> " If we elect a [Local] Councilor from our Village, it will be easy to find him/her because we share the same problems as citizens of the same village. But if s/he

55

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

resides far from our Village, I have a feeling that s/he can't solve problems or timely give us advice in our Village." (A citizen, during a FGD held in Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

"I belong to the third standards of living category [Ubudehe]. When problems arise, like in the last days, the weather was not good enough. [Elected Local] Councilors and the Executive [Secretary] at Sector and District levels brought food to us. But, I am telling you, had not been the presence of Councilors, strong men would have taken that food to the detriment of weak people. As a result, conflicts would have happened. But Councillors convinced us that the food is for people belonging to the first and second standards of living categories [Ubudehe] and we understood. The point is that if Councilors are not around, we can't have peace." (A man from the 3rd socio-economic category (Ubudehe), attending a FGD held in Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

"Local leaders provide good services because of the presence of a Councilor. There cannot be corruption because they know that the [Elected Local] Councilor can immediately report any single mistake they can make. In other words, the Councilor is there like a monitor, and this prevents local leaders from engaging in malpractices." (A youth attending a FGD held in Gihombo Sector, Nyamasheke District)

"It is important that Councilors reside where they carry out their responsibilities, otherwise they miss many things. When a Councilor is around, s/he can easily know the problems without any mistake; this means that the consequences are good because we live with people whom we represent, and we get to know problems quickly and we solve them quickly and easily; in fact it is good to live together with people whom you represent." (An Elected Local Councilor attending a FGD held in Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

These accounts stress respondents' considerations about the benefits they acquire when ELC reside where they carry out their councillorship responsibilities. As respondents also emphasized, it is when councilors do not reside where they have to carry out their duties of councillorship that arising problems may not timely intervene. As further discussed, poor interactions with constituents were mostly reported in places where Elected Local Councilors do not stay closer to citizens. Informants stressed that citizens actually want to meet an ELC whenever deemed necessary. This seemed difficult or simply impossible when s/he does not reside in the place where s/he was elected to carry out councillorship duties. Field testimonies are also put to illustrate:

"When [Elected Local] Councilors live far from their councillorship places, they do not regularly interact with citizens. Citizens will have to wait until they meet in a meeting." (A citizen, during a FGD held in Gihombo Sector, Nyamasheke District)

"When s/he [ELC] does not reside in the place of councillorship duties, citizens who elected him/her do not see him/her as they wish. As a result, they fail to express their problems while they need his/her advocacy in the Sector Local Council." (A citizen attending a FGD held in Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

> "An Elected Local Councilor who does not reside where s/he carries out his/her responsibilities cannot take care of citizens the same way as a resident Elected Local Councilor would do… You can't find him/her when you need him/her. S/he can't know people whom s/he is supposed to lead, and they can't know him/her either. Therefore, they can't trust him/her; and with this, s/he is not fulfilling his/her duties." (A citizen attending a FGD held in Rugarama Sector, Burera District)

On the other hand, some other informants did not find it necessary for an Elected Local Councilor to always reside in the places of their councillorship. For these informants, what matters is to solve citizens' problems. Thus, they stressed that only ELC at the lower levels mostly close to citizens (such as Village and Cell) are the ones who should reside close to their constituencies. Illustrative testimonies read as follows:

> "I think that it is not necessary that [Elected Local] Councilors always reside [where they carry out their duties of councillorship]. What matters is that they successful do what they are supposed to do in accordance with scheduled meetings." (A citizen and mediator attending a FGD held in Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

> "From Village up to Cell levels, the consideration that an Elected Local Councilor resides should be mandatory. As we move from those levels up to higher levels, it should not be necessary to reside in the place of councillorship. I think that it is only enough for [ELC] to come to them [onstituents], to participate in organized meetings [with constituents], and get to know the problems that constituents are faced with." (A President of Local Council attending a FGD held in Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

Similarly, an expert from the civil society stressed that ELC's physical residence in their places of councillorship is not what matters. He made it clear that only ELC at lower levels (Village and Cell) should normally reside in proximity with citizens. As per the structure, the expert indicated, what matters most is consistency and regularity in *physical presence* of ELC, as well as their performance:

> "I don't think that residing there [place for councillorship] is what is most important. I don't think that it is necessary for an Elected Local Councillor at District Local Council level to reside in that District. Even if s/he tryies to do so, s/he may only reside in one Sector, one Cell and one Village; s/he can't reside everywhere. I think that what is important is the existence of a law that stipulates how s/he [ELC] interacts with citizens. Therefore, ELC's residence in their constituencies does not matter. What matters most is their presence." (A key informant from the Civil Society Organizations during an individual interview)

If there are disagreements among informants, as indeed discussed later, it is an indication of lack of a regulatory framework of councillorship interactions. Therefore, there is no clear benchmark against which to establish the truth in these field testimonies. Whether they reside in the place of councillorship or not, Elected Local Councilors involved in this study differ very much from the perspective of terms/mandates they have served (See the Figure 9).

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 9: Elected Local Councilors' Terms and Years of service

This Figure 9 shows that the majority of ELC (54.2%) are serving in the current term, since March 2016, while 40.6% served in both terms. The majority of ELC (57.1%) have also served for between 5 and 10 years. Therefore, there are variations in ELC who took part in this study. Some have served as Elected Local Councillors for less than a year while others have served more than ten years. The next discussions are intended to assess the extent to which Elected Local Councilors are known by their respective constituents.

Citizens' awareness of the existence of Elected Local Councilors

Theoretically, actors' interactions are likely to be successful when they know each other. In this perspective, citizens were asked whether they are aware of the existence of ELC, elected to represent their interests. The Figure 10 shows the level of citizens' awareness.

Figure 10: Citizens' awareness of the existence of ELC

The Figure 10 shows that, cumulatively, 93.1% of citizens are well aware of the existence of ELC. However, only 35.4% of citizens are *very much aware* of their existence. Likewise, only 42.3% and 15.4%, respectively, are *much aware* and simply *aware* of their existence. Citizens' level of awareness (6.9%) of this existence is thus not satisfactory enough. There are 3.9% of citizens who are *less aware* of the existence of ELC while 3% are *not aware* of them at all. It goes without saying that even though the satisfactory majority of citizens are well aware of the existence of ELC, the situation would be better if they knew them '*very much*'. Had that been the case, there would be visible implications for the interactions between them and accountable governance. This observation led the study to explore, in details, citizens who exactly know ELC. The Figure 11 portrays necessary details to this end.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 11: Citizens' Awareness on ELC existence disaggregated

Disaggregate of Citizens' level of wareness of ELC' existence (%)

This Figure 11 shows that citizens, following different socio-demographic characteristics, are generally aware of the existence of Elected Local Councilors. Their general level of awareness is more than 70%, in average. However, there are variations in respondents' levels of awareness of ELC. An estimate of 70.8% of people who separated in their marital status, students (75.6%), people with disability (80.3%), people aged 61 and above (80.4%), and people with a university education (80.9%), are comparatively less aware of ELC' existence. Drawing on the general assumption that citizens ought to '*very much*' know all Elected Local Councilors, the next discussion is a step futher. It touches on the level of knowledge of Elected Local Councilors by citizens. Significant details are presented in the Figure 12.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 12: ELC mostly known by citizens

The left part of Figure 12 indicates that only 46.8% of citizens know *'all members* of ELC. Citizens (82.6%) argued that they mostly know Village Executive Committee members. On the other hand, 49.3% of them only *know some of* ELC. As the right part of the Figure 12 also shows, ELC at Cell, Sector and District levels are comparatively less known by citizens. The reason empirically supported is that ELC at Cell, Sector and District levels are not living in close proximity with citizens as Village Executive Committee members do. Field testimonies to illustrate are voiced and read as follows:

> "Those [Executive Committee members at Village levels] are in close proximity with citizens and are always together with them. So they are always together and share problems and activities, as they are always together." (A citizen attending a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

> "Actually, it is the Village [Executive] Committee, which knows how a citizen lives and how s/he sleeps and wakes up. Because that [Executive] Committee is much in proximity, one can approach it and express her/his concerns. Actually the Village Executive Committeel is the only body able to know how citizens live and solve their problems quickly." (A citizen attending a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

> "Actually, it is because citizens elect Executive Committee members from their Village; they can't vote for people who do not belong to their village." (An Elected Local Councilor participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

A key informant from civil society organizations emphasized that the fact that citizens do not know ELC of higher levels of Local Councils is due to ways in which Local Councils are designed, within the perspective of effective decentralization. His argument found the support of another expert working for Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) who viewed this situation as an indication of successful and effective

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

decentralization. Their respective accounts complementarily made this situation self-explanatory:

> "I think that [the fact that citizens do not know ELC of higher Council levels], it is by design. That is is how it is planned. If you read the law [governing the functioning of Local Councillors], this is how it is structured. The way it is structured, citizens are not supposed to know much about [Elected Local] Councillors of higher levels of Local Councils levels. For example a Councilor at the level of District Council may not even be residing in that District! There is even nothing, which binds and obliges him/her to visit all Cells in the District! This would be a mistake to think like that. So the reason [behind the fact that citizens do not know ELC of higher Council levels] is how the structure [through indirect vote] is built; citizens cannot know all of them given the way the system is structured." (A key informant from civil society organizations participating in an individual interview)

> "The trend is progressive because when you consider those [citizens/constituents] who affirm that they know [Elected Local] Councilors, their number increases as you move from the Cell up to the District. So saying that they know them means that they see them. So I think that this is good; the story is good… if they [citizens/constituents] know the Council of the Cell more than how they know the Council of the Sector or the District. The Council of the District is not much known [by citizens/constituents]… the further you go deep into communities the more they get recognized. That trend is understandable; the decentralization is to empower citizens. In doing so, people are away from them [Councillors of higher Council levels]. So, it is self explanatory that the more you go to the communities, the more the interactions exist. If, for instance, a youth represents the youth, definitely the youth goes back in different fora. So councillorship is to represent different constituencies. So the more you move from the Cell going up the less you need Councilors at higher levels. It would instead be abnormal if citizens knew much Councilors at District level than ELC at Cell level!" (A key informant and former Elected Local Councillor currently working with RGB)

It follows, therefore, that the more Elected Local Councillors live in close proximity with citizens, the more citizens get to easily know them (…). Elected Local Councillors at higher levels of Local Councils increasingly make less sense to citizens. Through indirect democracy, citizens participate in the election of ELC mandated to to represent them and their interests at higher levels of Local Councils. The higher ELC go, the more proximity with citizens dries up. Similarly, trust in Village Executive Committee members greatly increases. An illustrative testimony reads as follows:

> "We elect them [ELC] and, in turn, they elect other Local Councillors sent at higher levels of Local Councils. Thus, there are those [Local Councillors] who are elected at higher levels and who do not thus come back to us, citizens, at lower level. This is the reason why [citizens] only know those [Local Councillors] at the lower level whom we directly elected." (A citizen of the 1st standards of living category participating in a FGD held at Gikomero sector, Gasabo District)

With all these details on who of ELC citizens know most, the next step was to explore additional details on socio-demographic characteristics of respondents associated with these views in both qualitative and quantitative data. These details are portrayed in the Figure 13.

Figure 13: Disaggregate of Citizens mostly knowledgeable of ELC

The Figure 13 shows that relative majority of citizens (60%) satisfactorily know the Village Executive Committee members. However, citizens belonging to the fourth category of standards of living (33.3%), citizens from syndicates (46.7%), as well as

citizens with university education (54.2%), are comparatively the least knowledgeable of ELC at Village level. This situation sounds paradoxical much as these categories have more potentials (i.e., wellbeing, education, and belonging to a labor syndicate) than any one else to know ELC given their comparatively high socio-demographic characteristics.

Factors that motivated people's competition for Councillorship

Different factors that drove/drive citizens into competition for councillorship were considered important elements to inform the nature of councillorship's interactions between citizens and Elected Local Councilors. The data presented in Figure 14 picture different opinions in this regards.

Figure 14: Factors that incited people to become Councilors

The left part of the Figure indicates that 49.5% of Elected Local Councilors were '*willing to represent citizens*. In this perspective, Elected Local Councilors were consistent with citizens (51.6%) who gave the same reason. Another factor that was more or less equally indicated by 50.2% of ELC was that they *were requested by citizens to represent them*, which was however only confirmed by 38.7% of citizens. The fact that people requested their fellow citizens to compete for councillorship bears an empirical explanation. In further illustrative testimonies, this request indicates that Rwandans have reached a satisfactory level of understanding the expectations from councillorship. It is also an indication of maturity in decision-making and of active citizens in the governance of Rwanda. Here are some field testimonies to illustrate:

> "There are some [citizens] who express their desire to be elected and become [Elected Local] councilors; but there are others whom citizens request to compete

64

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

to become councilors. So, I see both aspects there. During the electoral period, some express their desire to compete and you could realize that they truly wanted that. But there are others whom you could find hesitant and citizens had to push them saying: 'we see in you capabilities' and then they requested them to compete." (A citizen with disability participating in FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

"This shows that citizens are no longer afraid; they have now internalized democratic principles to the extent that they now feel responsible for the governance of their country." (A teacher participating in FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

During an interview with an expert from the Ministry of Local Government, *uncertainty* stood as the major factor behind citizens' initiatives requesting their fellows to represent them. Citizens prefer to request, or to keep, the person who so far has served them satisfactorily or whom they know and trust. They are thus hesitant to replace him/her by, or to listen to, someone else whom they are not sure about his/or her potentials for future performance. In addition, findings indicate that a person who has been encouraged or requested, as a result of trust, to compete for councillorship is likely to strive for the wellbeing of fellow citizens who showed trust in him/her. This trust becomes a basis for social contract, which ends up regulating positive councillorship interactions. In other terms, effective councillorship interactions come back as a return or reward to the trust:

"When constituents encourage and elect the councilors of their choice, it is a sign of improvement in democracy in Rwanda. The constituents feel genuinely represented. As a result, [Elected Local] Councilors feel happy and much concerned with the development of the constituents." (A citizen participating in a FGD held at Gihombo Sector, Nyamasheke District)

In addition to these described factors, the fact that 5.6% of citizens indicated that some candidates compete for councillorship '*while targeting other higher positions*'. Some Elected Local Councilors (0.4%) also subscribed to this contention, though the percentage of their opinions may obviously look less significant. Nevertheless, this was boldly emphasized during an interview with one representative from the civil society, who contended that "most of people strongly fight to become [Elected Local] councilors as a strategy to access higher political positions; because chances of accessing higher political level increase if one has gone through lower positions of governance."

Awareness of Councillorship responsibilities

Respondents' level of awareness of ELC's responsibilities was also important in the interactions between citizens and ELC as indeed a key basis for accountable local governance. Citizens/constituents and ELC's respective levels of awareness of ELC responsibilities were thus one of the aspects at the core of this study. It is worth emphasizing beforehand that, as found, the responsibilities provided by the law refer

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

to the functions of ELC in general, which is different from their responsibilities within their interactions with constituents.

At satisfactory level, the Figure 15 shows that both ELC (98.7%) and citizens (84.4%) know the duties assigned to ELC in councillorship interactions. This is a good starting point for accountability that is only made possible if citizens/constituents better know their expectations from councilorship interactions. Similarly, this accountability is made an easy process when ELC have better understanding of obligations vis-à-vis their respective constituents.

In line with this quantitative stand, this study organized a series of interviews in different areas. Unanimously, respondents indicated gaps in the law governing the functioning of local councils. As they established, the law clearly stipulates different functions of ELC but remains silent on councillorship interactions. It does not clearly regulate on the content, how and when councillorship interactions ought to take place.

Figure 15: Awareness of ELC responsibilities

As findings indicate, citizens informally get an idea of ELC responsibilities through local leaders' communications while participating in some platforms. Examples include community assemblies (*Inteko z'abaturage*), civic education academy (Itorero ry'igihugu), community works (*Umuganda*), and particularly different spaces organized for electoral campaigns. Before candidates are voted for councillorship, citizens undergo a series of educational programs on councillors' duties. In addition to the knowledge acquired from these programs, ELC have more sources of knowledge. They have access to the law governing Local Council and guiding documents are

handed in to them, as their councillorship effectively commences. More importantly, Elected Local Councillors undergo some induction periods before they take up their duties. One ELC accounted as follows, to illustrate: "Before ELC begin their work, they receive trainings on their responsibilities. Traings are good opportunities in as much as they serve valuable spaces to ask questions on many other things they may not understand well" (A Cell leader participating in a FGD held in Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District). Elected Local Councillors considered this induction period as very important. One Councillor accounted that trainings organized during the induction period "equip Elected Local Councillors with skills in good governance and in interactions with respective constituents" (Youth participating in a FGD held in Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District).

Along with empowering communications during electoral campaigns and training that induction periods offer, there are also personal abilities to consider. An expert from civil society organizations stressed the merit as an important aspect on the basis of which candidates for councillorship are contemporary elected. Nowadays, this expert strongly emphasized, ELC know their responsibilities since they are elected on merit. Unlike ordinary citizens, they have wider potentials to make use of available sources to acquire sufficient knowledge of councillorship responsibilities. The explanations made are captured in the testimony below:

> "I think that Elected Local Councillors know their responsibilities… nowadays Councillors have been elected basing on their capabilities. They are educated and even partake in induction, whereby their responsibilities are well explained to them (…). However, citizens don't know them [ELC's responsibilities]. Those [citizens] with whom we interact and meet in different forums and groups do not know well [Elected Local Councillor's] responsibilities. They only know that the District is governed by the Mayor and the Executive [Secretary]. They don't truly know the Council very well. Here, there is strong need for sensitization for citizens to know what the Council's responsibilities are." (A key informant from Civil Society organizations attending an individual interview)

Despite this variety of sources of knowledge, respondents pointed out the silence about councillorship interactions in the law governing the functioning of Local Councils. Ways in which these interactions ought to take place are not clear enough. This weakens and, consequently, makes it difficult, or even impossible, to ensure accountability. Taken positive, however, this situation may commendably give room for more creativity in areas most concerned with innovative ways of interactions and accountability. Conversely, it may regrettably open wider ground for ineffective councillorship interactions. The silence on how Elected Local Councillors and constituents ought to interact, as observed in the existing legal frameworks, increasingly makes councillorship interactions a less binding endeavor. At the same time, accountability is likely not to effectively take place. Though there are gaps in levels of knowledge of councillors' duties, there was an interest in investigating those who claimed to know the responsibilities of Elected Local Councillors (See the Figure 16).

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 16: Disaggregate of ELC level of awareness of their responsibilities

The Figure 16 shows that ELC at all Council levels and constituencies are aware of their responsibilities. The level of knowledge of these responsibilities is very satisfactory. Comparatively, however, ELC at Cell levels (79.8% and 82.3%, respectively) have a low level of knowledge of their responsibilities. Similarily, Elected Local Councillors at the level of District Council rank high (98%), as far as their responsibilities are concerned. The same high-ranking level of awareness is found with Elected Local Councillors (96) for the National Council for Women (CNF). As a result, high-ranking Elected Local Councillors are visibly expected to implement their responsibilities at a comparatively higher level than those who relatively ranked low at both the levels of Local Councils and constituencies.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Though both constituents and Elected Local Councillors demonstrated higher levels of knowledge in councillors' responsibilities, the knowledge was still informally acquired, to a certain extent. Thus, it was important to investigate whether existing laws ever feed these levels of knowledge. In this regard, findings presented in the Figure 17 disaggregate different views in line with some socio-demographic characteristics.

Figure 17: Disaggregate of ELC level of knowledge of their duties as provided by the law

Disaggregate of ELC level of knowledge of their duties as provided by the law (%)

Even though the Figure 16 has shown that ELC satisfactorily know their responsibilities, their level of awareness of their duties as provided by the law is

somehow different, if reference is made to the Figure 17. At the level of District Council, for instance, ELC (88.3%) indicated that they know all their responsibilities as provided by the law. Their level of knowledge is comparatively the highest. The same goes for Elected Local Councillors with university education (74.8%) and Elected Local Ccouncillors (74.4%) for the National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD). Elected Local Councillors in the age group of 18-30 also indicated that they know these responsibilities (71.8%). Also, Elected Local Councillors (71.4%) for the National Youth Council (CNJ) claimed to have acquired such knowledge. Likewise, the score found with Eelected Local Councillors who claimed to know their responsibilities as provided by the law is comparatively low. This low level of score applied visibly to Electeds Local Councillor without formal education (40%), as well as those for the Private Sector Federation (PSF) (40.5%) and the Cell constituency (54.4%). The same goes for ELC of the level of Cell Council (54.3%) and ELC with disability (51.4%). In view of this brief description of findings, it is follows that Elected Local Councillors do not know all their responsibilities as provided by the law. Therefore, strict compliance with regulatory framework is strongly lacking while it is a prerequisite for ELC to effectively represent citizens.

Activities carried out within the councillorship responsibilities

Previous descriptions (See Figure 15, for instance) indicated that both citizens and ELC are comparatively knowledgeable of councillorship responsibilities. However, the same discriptions do not demarcate planned or normative responsibilities from the real practice of these responsibilities. The Figure 18 comes to summarize different views of both citizens and Elected Local Councillors about these two components.

The Figure 18 shows that, comparatively, both citizens and ELC have particularly highlighted *three major activities* as mostly carried out by ELC within the perspective of their councillorship responsibilities. First, both citizens (25.6%) and ELC (32.1%) highlighted 'consultations of citizens before decisions are made' as important responsibility that ELC ought to consider. In real practice, again, both citizens (32.6%) and ELC (38.8%) marked positive impression about this responsibility. The second activity invites ELC 'To interact with constituencies/citizens over their needs'. Both citizens (11%) and Elected Local Councillors (18.8%) recognize this responsibility at different levels. In real practice, however, both citizens and ELC found this responsibility as translated into practice respectively at the level of 19.2% and 34.2%.

Finally, efforts 'to provide feedback to constituencies' is considered as key responsibility to care for in this study. Citizens poorly expressed their opinions (15.7%) comparatively to Elected Local Councillors (43.1%). Despite some levels of progress found in the Figure 18, however, ELC are still lagging behind in matters pertaining to feedback to constituencies. Opinions made by citizens (2.7%) and Elected Local Councilors (4%) themselves are alarming.

Figure 18: ELC's activities within their councillorship responsibilities

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Opinions of citizens and ELC about what ELC do in real practice (%)

In real practice

Category	ELC	Citizens
Do nothing	0	11
To provide feedback to constituencies	2.7	4
To interact with their constituencies/citizens over their needs	34.2	19.2
To bridge a link between citizens/constituencies and local leaders	8.6	8.9
To impose decisions on citizens/constituencies	7.7	5.2
To represent the will of citizens/Constituents	5.4	4.6
To make decisions without first consulting citizens/Constituents	1.6	2.8
To serve their own interests	7.2	5.5
To Consult citizens before making decisions	32.6	38.8

Planned responsabilities

Category	ELC	Citizens
I have no idea	0.0	5.2
To provide feedback to constituencies	43.1	15.7
To interact with their constituencies/citizens over their needs	18.8	11.0
To bridge a link between citizens/constituencies and local leaders	4.7	4.5
To impose decisions on citizens/Constituencies	1.4	9.0
To represent the will of citizens	2.9	13.7
To serve their own interests	3.4	9.0
To consult citizens before making decisions	25.6	32.1

■ Elected Local Councilors ■ Citizens

Finally, efforts 'to provide feedback to constituencies' is considered as key responsibility to care for in this study. Citizens poorly expressed their opinions (15.7%) comparatively to Elected Local Councillors (43.1%). Despite some levels of progress found in the Figure 18, however, ELC are still lagging behind in matters regarding feedback to constituencies. Opinions made by citizens (2.7%) and Elected Local Councilors (4%) themselves are alarming.

In other terms, Elected Local Councillors are poorly providing citizens with feedback on final decisions made at the level of Local Councils. As earlier mentioned, this situation could be linked to the fact the law regulating feedback giving in the councillorship interactions is silent or simply absent.

Whether ELC feel having enough power in decision-making

Legally, Elected Local Councilors form Local Councils that have the supreme powers required to make decisions aimed at transforming the lives of citizens.

Transformations in citizens' lives depend much on decisions that Local Councils make over citizens' priority needs.

In connection to this brief background, this study has investigated the extent to which the supreme powers of Local Councils are balanced with powers held by 'Executive Committees'. The District Executive Committee was made a privileged target for the purpose of illustration. The Figure 19 gives an overall idea of this balance and informs on the implications the same balance brings with it in the decision-making process.

Figure 19: ELC's level of feeling of having power to make the Council consider constituents' priorities

The Figure 19 shows that 94% of Elected Local Councillors feel having enough power to make Local Councils consider constituents' priority needs without any interference of the District Executive Committee. To illustrate, the next field testimony is selected and an illustrative account in this regards reads as follows:

> "We all know that the [Local] Council is an organ that has power over the [District] Executive [Committee]. The [Local] Council is an organ that was elected by citizens. Nowadays, the needs of citizens are the ones leading [its decision-making process]. So the [District] Executive [Committee] has only to implement the decisions of the [Local] Council. This is the reason why the [Distric] Executive [Committee] reports to the [Local] Council. When the [Local] Council finds things that were not implemented as planned, then the [District] Executive [Committee] gives explanations. On the basis of the explanations, the Local Council can even blame or punish the [District] Executive [Committee]." (An Elected Local Councillor participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

However, respondents generally indicated that the power of ELC is only a legal principle. It remains theoretical much as it is often not translated into practice. The common contention was that, in real practice, Elected Local Councillors are not visibly active in their councillorship. As emphasized by an informant, Elected Local Councillors at District level are mostly seen when "they receive resignations of some members of the Executive [Committee]" (A key informantt from Civil Society Organizations during an individual interview). With this consideration, Elected Local Councillors were taken as less effective in their councillorship duties. As a matter of fact, field accounts established, citizens report their problems to the Sector's Executive Secretary instead of Elected Local Councillors. In this regard, a citizen argued as follows: "I consider the [Sector] Executive [Secretary] to be more powerful than Elected Local Councillors because s/he is the one who helps us most. If Elected Local Councillors had power, citizens wouldn't be going to the [Sector] Executive Secretary when they have problems." (A citizen participating in a FGD held at Rugarama Sector, Burera District)

The above details are only put to draw the attention of relevant actors for further improvements. Otherwise, the level of satisfaction about performance in councillorship responsibilities is encouraging.

Citizens' general level of satisfaction about ELC's performance

In connection to various responsibilities, citizens expressed their level of satisfaction about the performance of Elected Local Councilors. Opinions about these levels of satisfaction are further summarized in the Figure 20.

As the Figure 20 indicates, the level of satisfaction ranges from 'very satisfied' (23.3%), 'satisfied' (44.5%) and 'fairly satisfied' (22.1%). Cumulatively, citizens' levels of satisfaction amounted up to 89.9%. While this is the case, however, 10.1% of citizens' opinions indicated that there are citizens who fall in the category of dissatisfaction; that is, 'less satisfied' (7.9%) and 'not satisfied' (2.2%).

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 20: Citizen's level of satisfaction about ELC performance

Though there are cases of dissatisfaction, the Figure 20 is not clear about who among citizens are satisfied with ELC performance. The Figure 21 is further established to disaggregate the general level of satisfaction.

Figure 21: Disaggregated levels of citizens' satisfaction of ELC's performance

74

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

As the Figure 21 indicates, citizens' level of satisfaction is more or less evenly distributed among citizens in their socio-demographic characteristics. The majority of citizens expressed satisfaction to the level beyond 70%. Only few citizens scored less than this level of satisfaction. In an ascending order, 'syndicates' – membership of pressure or interest group – (58.5%), 'separated' and 'divorced' people – marital status – (53.9% and 69.6%), respectively, students (71.8%), citizens who have university education (75.6%) and citizens aged 61 and above (74.3%), are illustrative examples of social categories who comparatively expressed lower levels of satisfaction.

Against the levels of satisfaction, this study investigated possible links to the amount of time being devoted to councillorship.

ELC's opinions about the amount of time devoted to councillorship

The legal principle emphasizes that councillorship is carried out on a voluntary basis.[14] In line with this principle, Elected Local Councilors should not expect any material or financial return against the time they offer to the smooth running of their respective local Councils. This principle was widely emphasized during the qualitative investigation. For example, an Elected Local Councillor expressed: "A Local Councillor is a person elected by citizens and to secure enough and appropriate time to devote to councillorship on a voluntary basis. It is not an activity for which a salary is provided. Elected Local Councillors only get money [for facilitation] and transportation [to the venue] for [Local Councils] meetings. That money is not a salary." (An Elected Local Councilor participating in a FGD held at Gikomero Sector).

This study carefully investigated the perceptions of Elected Local Councillors about the amount of time that councillorship requires. In doing so, some guiding questions were given due attention: How do Elected Local Councillors view the amount of time they devote to their councillorship? Do Elected Local Councillors have enough time for councillorship? Does councillorship take much of Elected Local Councillors' time? Is the amount of time councillorship requires acceptable? These questions have resulted in perceptions further presented in the Figure 22.

As the Figure 22 indicates, 27% complains that 'councillorship takes much of their time' while 51.8% found the time required for councillorship as 'relatively acceptable'. On the other extreme, 21.2% of Elected Local Councillor invoved in this study indicated that they always have 'enough time for councillorship'.

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[14] According to the Presidential order determining the structure and functioning of Village, Cell and Sectors in its *Article 58 on Voluntary services*, "the members of the Village… Executive Committee and members of the Evaluation Committee carry out their work voluntarily in the framework of self-development, good governance and social development. " The Presidential order determining the structure and functioning of Village, Cell and Sectors in its *Article 2 on Voluntary Services* also stipulates that "Sector Council members shall be credible persons of integrity whose services shall be voluntary; They shall be elected for a mandate of five (5) years. When that period expires, other elections shall be held. The serving Council members can again stand for elections."

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Cummulatively ('relatvely acceptable' and 'enough time for councillorship'), 73% of Elected Local Councillors did not experience time constraints to properly carry out their councillorship duties.

Figure 22: Opinions of ELC on the amount of time devoted to councillorship

An estimate of 73% of Elected Local Councillors is an impressive statistical figure. There was an urgent need to establish those Elected Local Councillors who did not feel time constraints in their councillorship duties. Thus, this study report makes the socio-demographic characteristics an entry point to disaggregate this overall perception about time devoted to councillorship (See the summarized information in the Figure 23).

The Figure 23 establishes that the perceptions over 'relatively acceptable' amount of time are evenly distributed among Elected Local Councillors in their respective constituencies. Only a few Elected Local Councillors have scored less than 50% of their perceptions. As per observation from the Figure 23, Elected Local Councillors at the level of District Local Council scored higher (80.6%) than the rest levels of Local Councils. Similarly, Village Executive Committee members comparatively recorded the least score (35.6%). Equally important, the Figure 23 puts strong emphasis on key social categories that always 'have enough time for councillorship'. In a descending order, they include people aged 60 and above (100%), students (70.6%), and retired people (50%). These social categories share the conditions of being non-employed.

Finally, the marital status, the constituency, and the level of Local Council emerged as explanatory variables of the amount of time that Elected Local Councillors devote to their councillorship duties. As the Figure 23 shows, widows (57.1%), Village constituency (50.8%), and Village Executive Committee members (48.8%) scored higher among those elected local representatives who viewed councillorship as 'taking much of their time'. This situation may find support in the fact that the Village level of decentralization is associated with heavy workload, and is yet poorly staffed.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 23: Disaggregated ELC's opinions on the time devoted for councillorship

The employment status of Elected Local Councillors was taken care of to test empirically what could be the correlation between ELC professional duties (and pertaining 'monthly income') and their perceptions towards time devoted to councillorship.

Impact of ELCs' monthly income on Councillorship performance

Whether the level of satisfaction about ELC monthly income has any implication on councillorship performance was considered as also an important question to explore empirically. As it emerged in the Figure 24, there are various levels of satisfaction among Elected Local Councilors. Some Elected Local Councilors are 'very much satisfied' (21.9%), while others are just 'satisfied' (56.4%) with their monthly earnings. Cumulatively, to highlight, 78.3% of Elected Local Councillors are satisfied with their monthly income. In parallel, 17.1% and 4.6% of Elected Local Councillors are respectively 'less and not at all satisfied' with their monthly income.

Figure 24: Impact of ELC's monthly income on Councillorship performance

In view of this brief description, there are important and empirically-informed observations pertaining to the imparct of monthly income on councillorship performance. An estimate of 86.2% of Elected Local Councillors argues for positive impact of monthly earnings on their councillorship. As compared to the cumulative number of Elected Local Councillors (78.3%), there is an increament of 7.9% of non-satisfied (with monthly earnings) Elected Local Councillors who argued for positive impact, anywhere. That is why the cumulative number of (less & not at all satisfied) Elected Local Councillors (21.7%) visibly exceeds those Councillors who argued for negative impact. Thus, the impact of the Elected Local Councillors' monthly income on councillorship is positive, no matter how satisfactory they perceive their monthly income. This important finding invites an empirical explanation.

Qualitative data collected, to this end, widely highlighted some culturally informed values to explain the above findings. Most informants involved in both individual interviews and Focus Group Discussions indicated that Elected Local Councillors demonstrate higher levels of "citizens' patriotism", at least to refer to a citizen who represented the persons with disability in a Focus Group held in Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District. Informants widely linked 'citizens' partriotism' to the value

78

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

embeded in what is known as *'Ubutore'*[15] in the Rwandan cultural setting. It refers to an intrinsic feeling that intensifies the willingness to serve the country without expecting material rewards. Thus, it encourages patriotism, among other positive values, citizen responsibility and altruism. Field accounts associated these values with accelerated progress, social cohesion, peace and reconciliation, and democratic governance.[16] Illustrative field testimonies made it clear as follows:

> "An Intore never laments. Instead s/he finds solutions. It means that we should do things without expecting financial reward. We should rather focus on collective interests." (A local mediator participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

> "As [Elected Local] Councillors, we don't work for salary. We voluntarily accepted to be [Elected Local] Councillors happily and knew beforehand that there would be no salary. So as [Elected Local] Councillors, we accepted the councillorship with a good heart of loving the country and a desire to serve those who elected us." (A Sector-level Elected Local Councillor participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

To some extent, the voluntary basis of councillorship has inspired the level of trust that constituents have in their respective Elected Local Councillors. This study dedicated a deal of time to measure this trust.

Trust between Constituents and ELC

In line with the process of councillorship interactions, this study carefully explored the level of 'mutual trust' between constituents and Elected Local Councillors. The views of both citizens and Elected Local Councillors are further summarized in the Figure 25.

At the very first glace, in the Figure 25, the findings indicate a very satisfactory level of mutual trust between Elected Local Councilors and citizens. As a matter of fact, the same Figure 26 potrays citizens' level of trust in Elected Local Councilors as higher. It goes up to 90.2% of views expressed by citizens. The cumulative level of citizens' 'distrust' in Elected Local Councillors only equals to 9.8% of the views of citizens involved in the quantitative study. In higher proportions, Elected Local Councillors (99.6%) visibly demonstrated strong trust in their constituents.

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[15] The 'Ubutore' a value reflected in the civic education academy also known as *'Itorero.'* It is a homegrown initiative that takes roots in the Rwandan culture, and is used to instill patriotic and moral values, and actions to deal with societal problems. Each individual mentored through *Itorero* is called *'Intore'*. Obviously, s/he is identified with *'Ubutore'* here understood as value characterizing individuals who have undergone the civic education academy or '*Itorero'*.
[16] NURC (2012). *National Itorero Commission Strategy*, July, Kigali; NURC (2014). Avilable at: http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=77

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 25: Level of trust between Constituents and ELC

As the pattern in mutual trust is strongly supported on both the side of citizens and Elected Local Councillors, it is important to establish details on the most concerned socio-demographic categories (See the Figure 26).

Figure 26: Disaggregated citizens' levels of trust in ELC

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

At the very first glance, the Figure 26 indicates that 'separated' (48.3%) and 'divorced' (30.3%) people, respondents affiliated to with 'syndicates' (41.3%), citizens belonging to the fourth category of the standards of living or *Ubudehe* (33.3%), students (29.6%), people with university education (25.9%), and people age 60 and above, are comparatively the most identified with low or no trust in ELC.

Following the same exercise, this study disaggregates the levels of trust in constituents by Elected Local Councillors. In line with the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, the Figure 27 presents further different field views.

Figure 27: Disaggregated ELC levels of trust in citizens

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

As the Figure 27 portrays, an overall observation is that Elected Local Councillors have higher levels of trust in their respective consitituencies. Viewed from their socio-demographic characteristics, it appears that the majority of Elected Local Councillors have scored at least 70% of views about trust in constituents. Some Elected Local Councillors went up to the maximum of views about the same trust. To illustrate, ELC aged 60 and above, ELC undergoing studies, and professionally 'retired' ELC scored 100% of that trust.

In line with socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, a decreasing order shows that Elected Local Councillors' opinions vary as follows: widowed Elected Local Councillors (95.2%), District-level Elected Local Councillors (92.2%), Elected Local Councillors for the National Council for Women (87.9%), Female Elected Local Councillors (82.5%).

Though the level of ELC trust in their respective constituencies is highly recorded, it has emerged that some ELC ranked relatively low. Example boldly highlight ELC for NCPD (69.2%), ELC for PSF (67.6%), ELC for Village constituency (62.9%), ELC at the level of Village Council (59.2%) and with ELC with abilities (54.1%).

To sum up, previous discussions have centred due attention on constituents' awareness and understanding of the responsibilities of their elected local councilors. Enough empirical information was presented and can support further discussions on the interactions established between constituents and Elected Local Councillors.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Interactions between constituents and Elected Local Councils

In previous discussions, citizens and Elected Local Councilors were consistent about the existence of mutual trust in councillorship.

This fact leads to empirical deductions according to which high levels of mutual trust between citizens and Elected Local Councilors forms a good basis for interactions to flourish.

It is assumed that the high level of mutual trust in councillorship is likely to lay a favorable ground for interactions to flourish. At the very beginning, this study seeks to report on individuals or institutions from which citizens prefer to seek support. The Figure 28 summarizes different views collected from both citizens and Elected Local Councillors.

Figure 28: Opinions of ELC and citizens about whom constituents prefer for support

As the Figure 28 indicates, there is consistency among both citizens (85.5%) and Elected Local Councilors (49.7%) that the first preference of citizens goes to Village

83

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

leaders. In a hierarchical order, Cell 'Executive Secretary' (23% and 6.2%, respectively voiced by ELC and citizens), and Sector 'Executive Secretary' (16.5% and 1.5%, also voiced by ELC and citizens) were given the next preference. Local Council members (0.4% and 0.7, respectively voiced by ELC and citizens) have poorly scored.

The fact that Village leaders are given the first preference about support seeking was consistent with interviews and Focus Group Discussions. The dominating explanations focused mostly on their close proximity with citizens. In addition to close proximity, they are given to handle emerging issues before they get to higher levels of administration. Thus, respect of hierarchy of administrative levels is expected to avoid overloading higher levels of administration.

To enforce this principle, citizens are always asked to prove that they have respected the hierarchies of the administration. The answers to such questions would then serve as a starting basis for the claimant to be referred back to lower levels of administration or insitution. In case s/he has respected the hierarchy, the higher administration would base on the decisions of lower levels to give additional help. Illustrative field testimonies read as follows:

> "In few words, citizens' level of understanding has increased. Citizens know how the administrative levels relate to each other in hierarchy. They know that the Village level comes at the bottom level of higher levels of administrative hierarchy. They [citizens] elect [Local] Councilors for these levels in decentralized administrations. Citizens know that they can't get to higher levels [of administrative hierarchy] unless their problems were not solved at Village level." (A DASSO (*Inkeragurabara*) participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

> "In the perspective of decentralization, you can't short-circuit the lower level of administration and access the higher level. Thus, you can't access any higher level and have your query understood if you did not get to the village level first."(A youth participating in FGD held at Gihombo Sector, Nyamasheke District)

> "I think, if all citizens come to the Cell every day, this will prevent [citizens] from obtaining [expected] good services as they will be many and difficult to serve. Therefore, they should first go through the Village administrative. This would ease the burden to us." (A Cell Executive Secretary participating in a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

The above field testimonies claimed to find support in the Rwandan culture. A religious leader who participated in the same interviews boldly emphasized that seeking an advice starts from a neighbor or a close friend. In the past, he argued, individuals could seek the intervention of formal administration only after informal mechanisms have failed to settle the issue at dispute.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

In line with this particular context, the study also sought to investigate individual whom among Elected Local Councillors mostly do citizens go to while seeking for support.

Figure 29: ELC whom citizens mostly seek support from

As the Figure 29 portrays, citizens and Elected Local Councilors (68.4% and 39.5%, respectively) depicted 'Any member of the Council' as the one whom they mostly seek for support. At the same time, citizens and Elected Local Councilors (17.2% and 40.4%, respectively) selected 'the Chairperson of the Council' as an exclusive Council member from whom support is mostly sought. 'The President of the appropriate Commission' was mostly the least chosen for support (14.4%) and Elected Local Councilors (20.1%).

In a descending order, to sum up, the Figure identified these individuals as any member of the Local Council (68%), the Chairperson of the Council (17.2%), and the President of appropriate Commission (14.4%). As it appears, higher recurrences go for 'Any member of the Council' (68.4%).

The necessity for interactions between ELC and citizens

In the first place, the interactions between Elected Local Councillors and citizens or constituents defined 'concillorship interactions' in this study report. It is referred to signify a two-way process where, on the first way, Elected Local Councillors get back to respective constituencies to collect views or opinions on constituents/citizens' priority needs and proposals for solutions. They are the same views, which are taken to Local Councils for consideration. On the other hand, Elected Local Councillors report back (feedback) the Local Councils' final decisions to citizens/constituents. At

the same time, ELC provide citizens/constituents with necessary explanations on decisions made at the level of Local Councils.

To empirically measure the necessity of councillorship interactions, this study considered a number of variables. In this regards, the Figure 30 provides this report with an overall view of the value or necessity that respondents associated with councillorship interactions.

Figure 30: The necessity of councillorship interactions

Opinions of ELC and citizens about the necessity of interactions between them (%)

As presented in the Figure 30, there are variations in levels of opinions. Cumulatively, however, that figure shows that all Elected Local Councillors and citizens (100% and 91.1%, respectively) consider these interactions worthwhile. Lower percentages of citizens (3.9%) who considered their interactions with ELC as less and not worthwhile may have close link to the trust that some citizens claimed to have in the Executive Leaders than Elected Local Councillors.

Initiating the interactions between Citizens and Elected Local Councilors

One of the important questions investigated aimed to know individuals or institutions that initiate councillorship interactions. In both quantitative and qualitative aspects of this study, respondents/informants made different views, as summarized further in the Figure 31.

The Figure 31 shows that different actors initiate an interaction in the councillorship process but not in some different proportions. Citizens (39.4%) and Elected Local Councillors (58.2) consider 'Local authorities' as leading actors in this process. In line with previous discussions, the primacy here recognized to local authorities is an indication that executive leaders still dominate in the context of representative democracy in local government.

Figure 31: The initiator(s) of interactions between ELC and Constituents

Elected Local Councilors take advantage of strong ascendancy that local authorities have over citizens to effectively play their role. As side effect, however, this situation increases the risk for local leaders to overshadow the Elected Local Councilors. For

87

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

instance, an educationist and Elected Local Councilor found it inappropriate that local leaders call for community meetings on behalf of Elected Local Councilors:

> "The fact that it is the Executive [Committee] which takes a lead in facilitating the interactions between citizens and [Elected Local] Councilors (…) this is not good. Instead the [Local] Council is supposed to facilitate the interactions between citizens and the Executive [Committees]. The fact that the Executive [Committee] comes to citizens to seek for their needs should rather be the other way around. Actually, the [Local] Council should be the one mandated to do so, to come to citizens." (An ELC participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District).

This situation bears an important implication. To the benefit of the Executive Committee, citizens will always loose confidence and trust in Elected Local Councilors who cannot initiate councillorship interaction oth their own. Trust and confidence will only go to Local Leaders who almost daily interact with citizens. This might have close link to why the Village Executive Committee has increasingly won credits among the informants to this study. An Elected Local Councillor for CNF put it as follows, to illustrate:

> "Myself, as an Elected Local Councillor, I cannot go to citizens and tell them that the [Local] Council is convening a meeting. None would accept to attend. Always, citizens have strong trust in Village Executive Committee members than any other Elected Local Councillor. If the latter calls for a meeting, many citizens will attend than they would do if the same meeting was convened by an Elected Local Councillor..." (An Elected Local Councillor attending a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District).

On this basis, informants widely contended that the initiation of councillorship interactions should not be the sole monopoly of local leaders. Elected Local Councilors were invited to take up their Councillorship responsibilities. Some field testimonies are further mentioned for the purpose of illustration and read as follows:

> "[Elected Local Councillors] should be finding time to convene meetings, and not only rely on meetings that Executive Committee members call for. If the Executive Committee successfully calls for meetings, Local Councils can also do so." (A citizen of the Ubudehe third Category 3 attending a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

> "This [failure for Elected Local Councillors to initiate meetings with constituents] may hinder the fulfillment of councilors' responsibilities. Otherwise, its difficult for citizens to know who, between the Executive Committee and Local Council, has convened the the meeting they are attending." (An Elected Local Councillor for CNF attending a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

Apart from 'local authorities', who won most credits among both quantitative and qualitative accounts, there are more actors involved in the initiation of councillorship interactions. According to both citizens and ELC, 'Local Council' (21.6% and 9.7%

respectively), 'Local Councilors' (12.3% and 0.4%, respectively), and 'Citizens/Constituents' (12.5% and 21.1%) come after. As per cumulative data, both citizens (46.4%) and Elected Local Councilors (22,3%) recognize these last three actors as most concerned with the initiation of councillorship interactions. The Figure 32 comes further to summarize important channels used in councillorship interactions.

Figure 32: Channels used in Councillorship interactions

According to the Figure 32, both Elected Local Councilors and citizens agree upon the major channels used in their interactions. The leading channel is *community works* (also known as *Umuganda*), as 30.3% of Elected Local Councillors and 28% of the

citizens recorded. Particularly, Elected Local Councillors put strong emphasis on some other major channels. Respectively, they include *organized community meetings* (16.15 and 20.5%), *board notices on local administrative offices* (20.8% and 14.3%), as well as *Community Assemblies,* known as *Inteko z'abaturage* (11.8% and 16.5%).

Though citizens and Elected Local Councillors indicated the channels they use in the councillorship interactions, these channels are not given equal importance. Some are most preferred than others. The Figure 33 is established to highlight respondents' views on the channels most preferred to be used in councillorship interactions.

Figure 33: Channels mostly preferred by ELC and citizens in their interactions

As the Figure 33 shows, citizens emphasized *household visits* (28%), as their most preferred channel of interactions with ELC. However, Elected Local Councillors gave

comparatively very low preference to 'household visits' (7.7%). instead, they pointed out higher preference to *community works,* known as *Umuganda* (25.8%).

Despite the disagreement of citizens and Elected Local Councillors over 'household visits', qualitative data also gave strong support. Obviously, the support had everything to do with earlier citizens' preference of leaders who are closer to, or in proximity with, them. Qualitative findings indicated that there might be some individual and sensitive issues that require much privacy. In their views, some citizens argued that such issues necessitate household visits to create appropriate spaces or platforms other than open and public meetings. In this regard, illustrative testimonies read as follows:

> "It is true, citizens' wishes should be fully supported. Elected Local Councillors should meet citizens in their households. For example, not all people attend community works (*Umuganda*): some are sick people; others are old enough to attend, while others are completely vulnerable… (A CNJ Coordinator participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District).

> "There might be some sensitive issues that cannot be spoken out in open public. For example, meetings that come after community works (*Umuganda*) are not appropriate forums to openly criticize wrongdoings of local leaders or poor performance of the Executive [Secretary). Elected local Councillors ought to access this information through informal platforms. I think that Elected Local Councillors may be required to visit citizens in their respective households." (A religious leader attending a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

> "It is not everyone who can freely voice thoughts in public. Some people are shy and may wish Elected Local Councillors to visit them in their households so that they express their views freely. At their homes, they can discuss and decide accordingly together." (A citizen belonging to the Ubudehe first Category participating in a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

Therefore, households' visits have been suggested by informants as new channels that may give a chance to people who cannot attend public gatherings or who would need privacy to express their problems or any controversial issues arising in the community. In other terms, 'household visits' constitute an alternative that needs exploring among other channels set to interact.

Apart from households' visits, as the Figure 33 shows, ELC and citizens' also emphasized five major channels in their interactions. These are *community works* (15.2% and 17.7%), *Community assembly* (14% and 17.5%), *Organized community meetings* (19.3% and 17.7%), as well as board *notices on local administrative offices* (15.2% and 8.5%).

Whether they use one or another channel is important. It is even more important when councillorship interactions are made a '*continuous*' process. The Figure 34 further presents the findings collected on *'how often'* the interactions have taken place.

Figure 34: Intensity of interactions between ELC and citizens

As the above figure 34 shows, only 51.5% of citizens indicate that they *'always'* interact with ELC while the later affirm that at 75.2%. An important percentage of citizens (46.8%) indicate, however, that their interactions with Elected Local Councillors take place '*sometimes*'. At the same time, 24.8% of Elected Local Councillors subscribed to this level of intensity in councillorship interactions. Also, more or less half of citizens accounted for an intensity of their interactions taking place as either '*always' or 'sometimes often.*' Similarly, some citizens (1.7%) indicated that they '*never*' interact with Elected Local Councillors.

To draw from these respondents' opinions, the councillorship interactions are visibly satisfactory. The extent to which they are *'regular'* is another attracting aspect of this study to look into. Citizens and Elected Local Councillors' opinions on the *regularity* and *frequency* of councillorship interactions are further presented in the Figure 35.

Figure 35: Frequency of planned interactions between ELC and citizens

To the left wing of the Figure 35, half of Elected Local Councillors (49%) and citizens (50.2%) consistently indicate that they generally interact *'at least once a week.'* Likewise, 39% of citizens and 45.6% of Elected Local Councillors confirmed that they interact *'at least once a month.'* Upon comparison of both quantitative and

92

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

qualitative data, it was quickly established that conformity, in terms of consistency and regularity, was strongly lacking. To some extent, some citizens suggested that these interactions should take place whenever necessary and, thus, invited Elected Llocal Councillors to always be present in their constituencies.

On their side, Elected Local Councillors suggested a monthly meeting to harmonize with their calendar. This proposal found support in the fact that Elected Local Councillors have other professional duties, in addition to councillorship assignments. Otherwise, it would be difficult or impossible to always be physically present in their respective constituencies. As common ground, it emerged that Elected Local Councillors need to set up well though plans about attending officially organized meetings as much as deemed necessary. Strong emphasis was put on 'community assemblies' (*Inteko z'abaturage*) that weekly take place and monthly meetings organized after 'community works' (*Umuganda*).

However, informants were very much cautious about any plan that might be established. Tough plans may be difficult or impossible to implement, given other professional responsibilities of Elected Local Councillors. The next field account is selected for the purpose of illustration and reads as follows:

> "I am only aware of when Elected Local Councillors meet under the Local Council. But it may not work if a strict number of times was put in place to oblige Elected Local Councillors to interact with citizens. Rather, it could be much beneficial if Elected Local Councillors meet their constituents as many times as they can. It means that Elected Local Councillors have to get back to their constituencies to collect constituents' views to be discussed at the level of Local Councils. Hence, it should be understood that the more meetings organized Elected Local Councillors, the more beneficial councillorship interactions become." (An Elected Local Councillors attending a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

With these field accounts, it is obviously documented that the regulation of consistency and regularity of councillorship interaction is totally absent. In real practice, moreover, it can be difficult to set it up, given the nature of councillorship. This situation leaves a room for variations in councillorship interactions (See the right wing of the Figure 35).

As the right wing of the Figure 35 shows, citizens mostly interact with Village Executive Committee members (81.5% and 48.5%, according to ELC and citizens respectively). Equally, observation from the same wing leads to an important finding: the more one moves from Village Executive Committee up to the higher levels of Local Councils, the more the frequency in councillorship interactions progressively decreases. In line with previous discussions, proximity was key and explanatory factor. With much cautious eye, this consistency can be investigated across two different terms. As shown in the Figure 36, this report indicates some trends in the levels of consistency across the last term (2011-2015) and current (Since March 2016 onwards) term.

*State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance*

Figure 36: Consistency of interactions vs. the current and past ELC terms

The Figure 36 generally shows that the levels of consistency in councillorship interactions across these terms are satisfactory. These satisfactory levels of consistent councillorship interactions qualified, as being *'always'* and *'sometimes'* regular in both the last term (2011-2015) and the current term (since March 2016 onwards). This statement does not aim to compare Elected Local Councillors in different terms. They are different in many regards. For instance, the last term has just started with lower level of experience among many of its Elected Local Councillors. Thus, this report can only highlight one important trend that serves a good basis for predictions. The starting point is being about observing '*sometimes regular*' councillorship interactions across these terms.

In the previous term (2011-2015), citizens and Elected Local Councillors' views about '*sometimes regular*' councillorship interactions respectively scored for 46.4% and 27.5%. In the current term (that is, since March 2016), the same views equally scored 62.7% and 43.4%, respectively. It emerges that there is impressive progress in both Elected Local Councillors and citizens' views about '*sometimes regular*' councillorship interactions. Fact-based lessons can be drawn from this trend. The close to one-year old current term (since March 2016) demonstrates strong indications of potentials for steady progress in councillorship interactions. It is all about a prediction portrayed in the Figure 37.

Figure 37: Comparison between the two councillorship terms on the consistency of interactions between citizens and ELC

As far as consistency is concerned, the Figure 37 indicates, there are visible improvements in councillorship interactions. This statement is only valid citizens and Elected Local Councillors' views about '*sometimes regular*' councillorship interactions across the 2011-2015 term and the current term (since march 2016 onwards). Against the Figure 37, citizens' views range from 46.4% to 62.7% while those of Elected Local Councillors graduated from 27.5% to 43.4%. On both sides, citizens and Elected Local Councillors, there is an encouraging increament of 16.3% and 15,9%, respectively.

Although some individual cases may have decreased, for various reasons, this progress was widely commended. To explain, informants argued, Elected Local Councillors have been increasingly improving in the knowledge of their councillorship assignments. In parallel, some innovations have rather supported visible increases in the regularity and consistency of councillorship interactions. To illustrate, an experienced local leader informed this study as follows:

> Nowadays, you can easily see that Elected Local Councillors are having clear plans for field visits. This improved since a week dedicated to good governance was put in place. During this week, the help of Elected Local Councillors is most solicitated (…). We have realized that regularity and consistency in field visits have gone increasing. Before the week for good governance existed, field visits were almost non-existent. But they exist already. Sometimes, the District or Sector [Executive Committee] liaises between constituents and Elected Local Councillors to make councillorship interactions happen. This never existed before. Nowadays, councillorship interactions have truly increased. (A local leader participating in a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

There are motivations that prompt Elected Local Councillors to plan interactions with respective consitituencies. The Figure 38 further presents a summary of these motivations.

Figure 38: Purpose behind ELC's plans of interactions with citizens over the last five years (2011-2015)

The Figure 38 shows significant divergences in opinions between Elected Local Councillors and citizens about the motivations for planned councillorship interactions over the last five years (2011-2015). To citizens, Elected Local Councillors aim 'to force [the latter] to implement Local Councils' [final] decisions' (34.9%) and to 'explain…why some of their needs were/were [eventually] not taken into consideration…'(38.6%) In sharp disagreement with citizens, Elected Local Councillors stressed that they aimed 'to give them feedback on decisions made at the Local Council level' (56.2%) and 'to collect priority needs expressed by citizens/constituents' (27.2%).

Among citizens, however, the collection of views on priority needs was less considered (16.3%). This sounds controversial while interviews widely confirmed this as usual practice of Sector Local Council: "Always Sector-level Local Council plans field visits to meet citizens at Cell level. While on the site, we listen to our constituents. We work under commission and we may, for instance, deploy the commission for social affairs to follow upon health issues such as malaria infection, among other things. That is the strategy we use." (An Elected Local Councillor participating in a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District). The fact that field visits are organized and still go unnoticed must have a clear link to the absence of regulations about the scope, and coverage, among other things. This study investigated the existing levels of awareness about these regulations (See the Figure 39).

Figure 39: Regulations about the frequency of councillorship interactions

The Figure 39 shows that the majority of citizens (76.2%) are not aware of the existence of legal instrument regulating the frequency of councillorship interactions. Neither, 36.7% of Elected Local Councillors are. Only 23.8% of citizens claimed to be aware of these instruments while 63.3% of Elected Local Councillors are aware. Only 36.7 of Elected Local Councillors claimed being not knowledgeable of these instruments.

After carefull examination, however, it emerged that respondents who claimed being 'aware of these regulations' referred to the 'Law determining the organization and functioning of decentralized administrative entities Nº 87/2013 du 11/09/2013'. It does not regulate the councillorship interactions. It is a gap in the regulatory framework that key informants from Civil Society Organizations perceived as follows:

> "I can say that the law is silent [about] the interactions between Elected Local Councillors and citizens. So being silent is the real gap (…). The law must be clear about the expectations from Elected Local Councillors. Even citizens should know these expectations to the extent that they could even challenge their Elected Local Councillor over their failures. They would say, for instance, 'you did not do this, while this is what you were supposed to do'! But up to today, you can't blame Elected Local Councillors for anything! There is no clear basis on which to challenge an Elected Local Councillor over performance in his/her responsibilities! For example, unless I am mistaken, I don't [know whether] Elected Local Coucillors are mandated to consult citizens before the Local Council makes final decisions on constituents' needs! There are no regulations about this!" (A key informant from Civil Society Organizations and former Elected Local Councillor, participating in an individual interview)

> "There is a problem with the law. There is lack of legal instruments to bind Elected Local Councillors. I think that there is need for something mandatory. Let's say, for example, Elected Local Councillors should meet every six months. If it is not necessary [or possible] to meet with all citizens,

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

let [Elected Local Councillors] at least meet with opinion leaders, Village Executive Committees. If this is the option, let this gathering discuss citizens' problems and needs and discuss ways in which to be addressed! Elected Local Councillors may use existing forums such as 'community assemblies' [*Inteko z'abaturage*] councils', 'parents' evening fora' [*Umugoroba w'ababyeyi*], with clear agenda. Things can work!" (A key informant from Civil Society Organizations participating in an individual interview)

As this debate went, the confrontation of quantitative and qualitative data shed more light on the emphasized regulations. The Figure 40 gives details on particular infividuals who are aware of those regulations.

Figure 40: Awareness about the regulations for the frequency of councillorship interactions

Previously, the Figure 39 had indicated that only 23.8% of citizens and 63.3% of Elected Local Councillors know the regulations for the frequency of Councillorship interactions. As the description went on, it emerged that these regulations instead targeted the functioning of Local Councils.

98

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

The Figure 40 shows that respondents who 'are aware of these regulations' include citizens without disability (34.3%), citizens belonging to the 4th category of living standards (Ubudehe) (33.3%), university education holders (32.8%), and people aged 61 and above. Also, the Figure 40 shows that the citizens' lowest level about their awareness of these regulations is found in the category of the youth (21.3%), citizens without formal education (21.2%), and citizens who belong to the Ubudehe first category (20.9%).

More importantly, there are higher levels of concentrations of respondents who 'are aware of these regulations' among Elected Local Councillors. For instance, the 63.3% of Elected Local Councillors (see the Figure 39) are relatively evenly distributed in different levels of Local Councils and constituencies. Their views scored over 50%. Thus, the Figure 40 stresses that Elected Local Councillors who are 'aware of these regulation' are mostly found at the District level of Local Council (85.4%), the National Council for Women (70.5%), the Sector constituency (67.1), the National Council for Persons with Disabilities (66.7), the Private Sector Federation (62.2%), and the Sector level of Local Council (61.8). Only Elected Local Councillors at the level of Cell Local Council scored least (55.7%).

Level of citizens' engagement in decisions affecting their lives

The exploration of citizens' level of engagement in the decisions affecting their lives focused mainly on their participation in the identification of their priority needs, as well as their say in suggesting solutions. The discussions pointed to the intensity and regularity, as well as the channels used in this process. The entry point for this discussion is about whether Elected Local Councillors support their respective constituencies for the identification of their real needs.

Figure 41: Perceptions on whether ELC help citizens to identify real needs

In line with the Figure 41, both Elected Local Councillors (98.9%) and citizens (86.6%) report high levels of citizens being helped to identify views on priority needs.

This step is strategically of paramount importance much as it feeds Local Council with working instruments. But field concerns are still on important areas that need the participation of constituents before final decisions are made at the level of Local Councils. Views are differently shared among relevant actors and practitioners. Qualitative data collected to this end widely found it important to consult citizens. However, they contend, citizens cannot contribute to each and every decision. As field testimonies supported, there are problems or decisions that may not necessarily require citizens' say. For example, a key informant from Civil Society Organizations put it as follows:

> "This [discussion] brings us back to decentralization and devolution: what is the importance of Local Councils' decisions? Local Councils do not consult citizens in every decision-making process. If decisions are about the budget, this [process] is like an administrative routine that does not necessarily require the consultation of citizens. But if there are decisions to be made, which have direct impact on citizens' lives, it becomes mandatory to listen to, and deeply discuss, citizens' opinions. In this regards, the participation of citizens will be imperative. But other questions involve the way decentralization is structured. For example, to what extent does devolution take place at Districts level? Which decisions are Districts legally accepted to make? You may even find that citizens do not view [Local] Councils as a powerful organ [in real practice]! [Yet, they are legally considered 'supreme organs'] In this context, citizens' participation may loose substance. In all, it depends on the importance of decisions that [Elected Local Councillors] are legally accepted to make and which necessarily require the support of citizens." (A key informant from Civil Society Organizations attending an individual interview)

The Figure 42 is established to indicate the distribution of indivual citizens and Elected Local Councillors who viewed the latter as helping in the identification of real needs. In so doing, the socio-demographic characteristics are made an entry point.

To the Figure 42, all Elected Local Councillors, at the minimum score of 94.9%, reported high-level help to citizens in the identification of their real needs. Very few Elected Local Councillors reported no help to constituents: at Cell level of Local Council (2.4%), Village level of Local Council (1.6%), as well as some Elected Local Council with formal primary education (3.7%). The same applies to some Elected Local Council for NCPD (5.1%) and CNJ (1.8%).

Generally, citizens also reported that Elected Local Councillors are visibly helping though they scored low (at least 70%). Citizens of the age group of 31-60, together with those in the Ubudehe first 'Category' (90% and 88.3%, respectively) have the highest scores. However, a few citizens disagreed with Elected Local Councillors who claimed to provide them with help.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 42: Opinions on whether ELC help citizens in real needs' identification

The Figure 43 shows '*how often*' and '*how regular*' Elected Local Councillors provided advice to, and helped, citizens to identify their priority needs. In this regards, the figure shows very high levels of Elected Local Councillors' opinions as compared with those of citizens. For instance, both ELC and citizens claimed that the advice has been *'always often'* (77.7% and 47.2%, respectively) and *'always regular'* (74.3% and 45.4%, respectively).

Similarly, the Figure 43 also shows the divergence of opinions between Elected Local Councillors and citizens around advice giving. While some of the citizens claimed this advice to be provided *'sometimes often'* (49.6%) and *'sometimes regular'* (48.6%), there is an over self-reporting of intensity and consistency on the side of Elected Local Councillors. They respectively reported their advices to citizens to be rather *'always often'* (77.7%) and *'always regular'* (74.3%).

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 43: Intensity and Consistency of ELC in advising citizens on their priority needs

The Figure 43 has shown impressive levels of intensity and consistency over the current councillorship term (that is, since March 2016). The Figure 44 is further designed to help this study about the ways in which these level have been consistent across the two consecutive councillorship terms (that is, last term (2011-2015) and the current term dated from March 2016).

Figure 44: Regularity of ELC to collect citizens' opinions on priority needs

Through the Figure 44 it is impressive to indicate that the levels of intensity were fairly satisfactory. Opinions of Elected Local Councillors and citizens around '*Always regular*' (58.9% and 29.3%, respectively) indicate that Elected Local Councillors were helping and advising citizens during the last councillorship term. Though the current councillorship term (since March 2016) is still at its begining, there is a trend that inspires hope for progress in the future. As far as '*Always regular*' help and advice are concerned, the opinions made by both citizens and Elected Local Councillors (42% and 77.2%, respectively) have remarkable increased. These levels of improvements are captured in the Figure 45.

Figure 45: Improvements in ELC's regularity to collect citizens' opinions

As the Figure 45 shows, both Elected Local Councillors and citizens agreed upon the fact that there have been considerable improvements as to the help by Elected Local Councillors to constituents in the collection of priority needs. Across the two councillorship terms, the improvement respectively moved from 58.9% up to 77.2% among Elected Local Councillors while the same improvement ranged from 29.3% up to 42% among citizens. At a certain point, this study was interested in investigating possible explanatory factors for such an improvement.

As qualitative data indicate, the current councillorship term (since March 2016) is characterized by a number of innovations. The latter consist of platforms or spaces for

103

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

councillorship interactions, which never existed before. They only came to add up to the existing ones known as 'Community works' (*Umuganda*), 'parents' evening forum' (*Umugoroba w'ababyeyi*), and 'community assemblies' (*Inteko z'abaturage*). New forums emerged to be the '10-15 households' also known as (*Isibo*), as well as informal 'advisory committees' (or *utunama ngishwanama*). These innovations are increasingly gaining the ground across Rwanda. These forums are reported to have helped Elected Local Councilors to carry out their councillorship duties than ever before. Somme illustrative testimonies are selected to support this explanation:

> "In this [councillorship] mandate there is a 'parents evening forum' every second week of every month. [It helps] people to meet with Elected Local Councillors. Also, there 'Community assembly' that gathers every Tuesday where [Elected Local] Councillors [take an opportunity to] meet with citizens. They even meet during community works.' (An Executive Committee member who attended a FGD held at Rugarama Sector, Burera District)

> "The day where officials listen to citizens' problems was decided upon. Actually, this is the secret [for the improvement]. In the past, things could not move effectively because people couldn't know when or on which day people's problems would be heard. Nowadays, a specific day for that [listening] is well known. Everyone knows when to express his/her problems or ideas in the presence of [Elected Local] Councillors." (A citizen who attended a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

As these testimonies highlight, community assemblies or '*Inteko z'abaturage*' and 'parents' evening fora' (*umugoroba w'ababyeyi*) are spaces that enabled citizens and Elected Local Councilors to regularly interact. Elected Local Councillors have considered these spaces as important channels through which they empower and advise citizens. Equally, the same channels are used to not only collect citizens' opinions on their needs and proposal for solutions. Also, they are significant tools for feedback on Local Councils' final decisions. Local Councils' different commissions are eventually deployed in Cells and Villages to discuss problems facing citizens and eventual solutions.

However, interviews highlighted important gaps in the use of these channels. As a key informant put it, "[the use of these channels] is not yet satisfactory. There is remarkable lack of clear plan of action on the side of Elected Local Councillors to make maximum benefits from these forums. Elected Local Councillors wait for individuals' problems to be spontaneously expressed. As a result, such problems always lack the collective character they are expected to bear." (A key informant from Civil Society organizations and former Elected Local Councillor attending an individual interview)

In this regard, well-thought and implemented capacity building was reported as an important mechanism that would lead Elected Local Councillors into higher performance levels of councillorship interactions. Thus civic education academy (*Itorero ry'igihugu*) was reported as relevant tool for success in this endeavour. In

reference to the training that Elected Local Councillors acquired through civic education academy, one interviewee formulated the following views to illustrate:

> "People have been trained, [as] they took part in civic education academy (*Itorero ry'igihugu*). It plays a very important role in raising the understanding of people. It also provided [the trainees with] guidelines on how people should perform their [councillorship] responsibilities. [As a matter of fact]: I personally view the civic education academy as a mechanism that brought about change in (…) the institutions (…) elected to govern people." (An Elected Local Councillor attending a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

The help or advice to identify and collect views on priority needs are some of the key pillars for councillorship interactions. At this point, the particular interest is on whether both citizens and Elected Local Councillors *'ever reach any concensus about real needs'*(See details in the Figure 46).

Figure 46: Level of consensus between ELC and constituents over their real needs

The Figure 46 indicated that citizens and Elected Local Councillors reach consensus once they discuss citizens' real needs. They only differ in the intensity of of their opinions (See different scores over 'Always', 'Sometimes', and 'Never').

To illustrate, citizens and Elected Local Councillors confirmed that they *'Always'* reach consensus (46.5% and 79.2%, respectively). Similarily, some citizens and Elected Local Councillors contend that they 'Sometimes' reach consensus (49.3% and 20.8%, respectively). Elected Local Councillors scored the highest record against '*Always*' (79.2%) while citizens highly scored 49.3% against '*Sometimes*' reaching consensus. There is relatively an even distribution of citizens around *'Always'*

(46.5%) and *'Sometimes'* (49.3%) to report this consensus-reaching phenomenon. Contrary to the Elected Local Councillors, there is unequal distribution (79.2% and 20.8%, respectively) probably due to an over self-reporting.

Through the question 'who makes priority after the consensus is reached?' this study has established that priority making is performed through the hierarchy of local governance. As interviews reported, the process of priority making starts at the level of Cell where Village Executive Committee members represent citizens.

To refer to one Elected Local Councillors, field testimonies accounts as follows: "We seat together as [Elected Local] Councillors at the level of Cell. One by one, we go through all the problems expressed at the level of Villages. Citizens do not join us because they are represented by the Executive Committees of Villages" (An Elected Local Councillor attending a FGD held in Mugesera Sector, Ngoma district). With this spirit, to recall a key informant from the Ministry of Local Government, the priority to make priority follows the principle of "unitary system" where the distribution of resources harmonize with the overall national agenda. That it is why, according to the same informant, a priority need at one Village level may not be considered as such at the global level of priority making (A key informant from MINALOC, participating in an individual interview).

Not only Elected Local Councillors collect citizens' priority needs. Also, they are are expected to listen to citizens' proposal for solutions to those needs. The intensity at which Elected Local Councillors do so indcates ways in which citizens transform from passive to active actors in the framework of local governance. The Figure 47 gives details on 'how often' citizens suggest solutions to felt problems.

As the Figure 47 indicates, there are some disagreements in opinions to consider between citizens and Elected Local Councillors. Disagreements link to whether Elected Local Councillors *'Always often'* or *'Sometimes often'* came to collect citizens' proposals for solutions to felt needs over the last five years. On the one hand, Elected Local Councillors (59.5%) assert that they *'Always often'* engaged citizens. On the other hand, citizens (55%) indicated that Elected Local Councillors did so *'Sometimes often'*. Despite of this disagreement over the intensity in collecting proposals for solutions, there are some citizens and Elected Local Councillors who reported a total absence of intensity. As they put it, Elected Local Councillors *'never'* came to collect proposals for solutions to citizens' felt needs (7.7% and 9.4%, respectively).

To some extent, these quantitative figures are consistent with field testimonies. A female youth was pessimistic about opportunities given to citizens to voice proposals for solutions. She linked this gap to the fact that meetings after community works (*Umuganda*), which always have heavy schedules and fail to go deeper into specificities.

Figure 47: Intensity at which ELC collected Citizens' proposal for solutions to their priority needs (2011-2015)

How often Elected Councillors came to collect Citizens' proposal for solutions to their needs over the last 5 years (%)

Always: Citizens' 35.6, ELC's 59.5
Sometimes: Citizens' 55, ELC's 32.7
Never: Citizens' 9.4, ELC's 7.7

Legend:
- Citizens' opinions on how often ELC came to collect proposed solutions on their needs over past 5 years
- ELC's opinions on how often they engaged citizens while searching for solutions to their needs over past 5 years

To her, Elected Local Councilors should diversify the spaces for interactions. She put it as follows: "[Elected Local Councillors] should be organizing household visits to offer opportunities for citizens to disclose their concerns. Otherwise, Elected Local Councillors do not dedicate enough time to citizens' problems during the meetings organized after community works." (A youth participating in a FGD held in Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

No matter how the level of records that Elected Local Councillors and citizens made is, the Figure 48 captures specific individual who subscribed to these records in line with different socio-demographic characteristics.

To observe the Figure 48, there are specific categories of Elected Local Councillors who actively engage citizens in the search for solutions to their needs more than others. For instance, it is established that Elected Local Councillors at the level of Sector Local Council (68.3%) *'always often'* engage citizens. At the same time, Elected Local Councillors at the level of District Local Council have recorded the least score (41.7%).

Figure 48: Disaggregate of how often ELC collect citizens' proposal for solutions to their problems (2011-2015)

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Disaggregate of how often Elected Councillors came to collect Citizens' proposal for solutions to their needs over the last 5 years (%)

Category		Level	Never	Sometimes	Always
Councillors	**Local Council level**	Village Executive Committee	4.3	34.2	61.5
		Cell Council	12.8	33.1	54.1
		Sector Council	2.2	29.5	68.3
		District Council	19.4	38.9	41.7
	ELC's Constituency	Sector	4.1	29.7	66.2
		Cell	4.1	33.8	62.2
		Village	4.1	30.9	65
		PSF	15.6	34.4	50
		NCPD	8.1	27	64.9
		CNJ	16.3	40.8	42.9
		CNF	14.3	34.7	51
Education		None	16.8	36.6	46.6
		University	11.5	43.5	45
		Secondary	15	60.4	24.5
		Professional	3.2	58.1	38.7
		Primary	6.4	56.2	37.4
Sex		Male	10.6	52.5	36.9
		Female	8.1	57.5	34.4
Standards of living		Four	11.1	44.4	44.4
		Three	9.8	50.9	39.9
		Two	8.6	55.8	35.6
		One	11	63.5	25.5
Age group		61+	13	42.6	44.3
		31-60	8.4	55.4	36.2
		18-30	9.6	58	32.4

■ Never ■ Sometimes ■ Always

This pattern of low scores similarly applyies to Elected Local Councillors for the National Council for the Youth (40.8%). This low level of score equally compares with the the level recorded in the age group of 18-30 that also corresponds to the youth (32.4%) and in the secondary level of education (24.5%). These data prompted this study to investigate both the intensity ('how '*often*') and the consistency ('*how regular*') Elected Local Councillors engage' citizens in the search for solutions to felt problems. Details are further summarized in the Figure 49.

Figure 49: Intensity and Consistency of citizens in suggesting solutions to their problems

The Figure 49 indicates very high percentages of Elected Local Councillors' opinions about engaging citizens in the search for solutions to felt problems. Comparatively, citizens' opinions rate low. For instance, Elected Local Councillors' self-report says that they *'always often'* (77.2%) and *'always regularly'* (80.8%) engage citizens in this process. Consistent with these opinions, they highly claimed to '*give an opportunity to citizens to suggest solutions to their problems*' (85.9%). However, opinions from citizens about being engaged rated low: *'always often'* and *'always regular'* process (43.6% and 42.2%, respectively). They went on to comparatively rank low the opportunity they are given to suggest solutions to problems (50.5%).

Also, the Figure 49 shows divergence of opinions between Elected Local Councillors and citizens, on whether former *'always often'* and *'sometimes regular'* actively engage citizens in the search of solutions to their problems. Citizens confirmed that they *'sometimes often'*(52.5%) get involved and are *'always regular'* (51.1%) in the search for solutions. Likewise, Citizens argued that Elected Local Councillors *'sometimes often'* (45.9%) give an opportunity to suggest solutions to their problems. This rating is low, as compared to the self-reporting found with Elected Local Councillors. They claimed to *'always often'* (85.9%) give that opportunity to citizens.

To draw from the above quantitative description, it is obvious that citizens scored low as compared with Elected Local Councillors. Only interviews have an explanation. As of recent, interviews clearly say, there are many platforms for interactions. However, the use of these spaces was still found ineffective. Field testimonies have already bodly highlighted less, if at all, opportunities given to citizens to raise sensitive issues during the same spaces. Strong emphasis was put on meetings organized after community works (*Umuganda*). Among many other things, poor planning of

councillorship interactions is held to be key explanatory factor. This is all about specific channels used to ensure intensity and consistituency in councillorship interactions. These channels are preseented in the Figure 50.

Figure 50: Channels ELC use to collect citizens' opinions on priority needs

Channels ELC use to collect citizens' opinions on priority needs (%)

The Figure 50 indicates that the majority of citizens (41.9%) reported that Elected Local Councillors mostly use board *notices on local administrative offices* (41.9%) and *community assemblies* also known as *Inteko z'abaturage* (13.1%) to collect citizens' views on priority needs. On the side of Elected Local Councillors, they

110

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

recorded *community assemblies* (73.8%) as the most used channel to collect these views.

Citizens highlighted some more channels that Elected Local Councillors use to collect citizens' views on priority needs. These channels include 'organized community meetings' (10.3%), 'community works' or *Umuganda* (11.2%), and household visits (10%). Though with slightly low rating, Elected Local Councillors also selected these channels as significant tools for the collection of citizens' views. An exception goes to 'household visits' (0.5%), which was almost not stressed as useful channel.

Feedback to Constituencies

Feedback or reporting back to constituents is considered as one of the two important pillars supporting councillorship interactions. The study's interest in feedback to constituents originates from gaps established in practice. To refer to an official in the Ministry of Local Government, "there are obviously strong weaknesses. The accountability day was put in place as an interaction framework to support the reporting back in our [Rwandan] culture." (A Key informant attending an individual interview) This idea of reporting back to constituents was fully supported among different interviews. To illustrate, for example:

> "An Elected Local Councillor (…) must go back to people whom s/he represents and report about the Local Councils' conclusions and final decisions. If it s/he is an Elected Local Councillor at the level of Cell or Sector Council, for example, s/he has to provide feedback to [constituents]. S/he should be given time to report to citizens the problems that were solved or not. So it is imperative for Elected Local Councillors to give feedback to citizens who voted for them." (A citizen attending a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

In connection with these illustrative accounts, the next discussions present various views on the implementation of the above principle of reporting back. To begin, the Figure 51 portrays the levels of feedback to constituents.

The Figure 51 indicates very high levels of Elected Local Councillors' opinions, if comparisons of citizens' views are established between the last (2011-2015) and current (since March 2016) councillorship terms. The highest general level of opinions informs that Elected Local Councillors *'Always'* give feedback to citizens *(*82.6% against 43.5%, according to ELC and citizens, respectively) . The same practice is comparatively supported in both councillorship terms. Like in the last term (80.6% and 31.4% respectively for ELC and citizens), there is consitent consensus that ELC have *'always'* provided feedback to their constituents satisfactorily (77.2% and 42.9%, respectively for ELC and citizens).

As the Figure 51 indicates, Elected Local Councillors (reference being made to *'Always'* providing feedback) highly scored in views (82.6%, 80.8% and 77.2%), as compared to citizens'views (43.5%, 31.4% and 42.9%). In citizens' opinions, the highest scores considered ELC feedback as taking place only *'Sometimes'* (50.6%,

61% and 53.2%, respectively). Though the *'Never'* option ranks low among citizens (6%, 7.6% and 3.9%, respectively), it was however mentioned.

Figure 51: Elected Local Councilors' level of feedback to citizens

Obviously, Elected Local Councillors (through the *'Always'* option of feedback) appear to have overestimated their level of intensity in feedback to citizens. The Figure 51 bears the same overestimation about whether feedback *'reflected citizens' needs in the last term* (2011-2015)*'*. For instance, Elected Local Councillor (58.3%)

reported their feedback as *'always'* did so while citizens (64%) reported it to '*Sometimes*' have taken place. More importantly, the *'Never'* option of feedback, to both citizens (5.9%) and Elected Local Councillors (7.4%), show that the feedback never reflected citizens' needs in the last term (2011-2015). Certainly, this situation perfectly informs the level of satisfaction about Elected Local Councillors' feedback (See details in the Figure 52).

The Figure 52 gives details on the level of citizens' satisfaction about Elected Local Councillors' feedback. As it indicates, opinions on whether Elected Local Councillors give feedback to their constituents are fairly distributed around '*Always*' (43.5%) and '*Sometimes*' (50.6%) levels. These citizens' views decrease in the '*Very high level*' (15.1%) when it comes to the satisfaction ELC feedback about Local Councils' final decisions. Unlike the right wing of the Figure 52, the levels of satisfaction about this feedback are fairly distributed around '*High*' (32.8%) and '*Average*' (41.2%) levels.

Figure 52: Citizens' opinions and satisfaction on ELC's level of feedback

Cumulated, '*Very high level*' (15.1%%) and '*High level*' (32.8%) of satisfaction about ELC feedback to citizens only amount to 47.9%. These are extremely low levels of satisfactions and reflect the view of one official at the Ministry of Local Government: "Elected Local Councillors have not yet full engaged in providing feed back to citizens" (A key informant participating in an individual interview).

Though the citizens' levels of satisfaction about Elected Local Councillors' feedback rate low, there is a trend drawn from the Figure 51 that needs highlighting. This trend is portrayed in the Figure 53.

Figure 53: Improvement in ELC feedback to constituents

As this Figure 53 establishes, citizens' opinions about the levels of feedback by Elected Local Councillors have visibly increased across the two consecutive councillorship terms. In the the 2011-2015 councillorship term, these levels have increased from 31.4% up to 42.9% in the current councillorship term that started last March 2016. There is a need to keep up the drivers for this improvement to expect more increase in levels of satisfaction about feedback. Various interviews were supportive to this improvement. The following field testimony is only selected for the purpose of illustration:

> "To compare both the last and the current [councillorship] terms, Elected Local Councillors presently know their responsibilities more than [ever] before. In the past, people could be elected without clear knowledge of duties awaiting Elected Local Councillors. Nowadays, they are aware of their responsibilities. This awareness pushes [Elected Local Councillors] to go back to [their constituencies] and provide them with explanations. The point is that when somebody sends you for a mission, in the end, you have to report back to him/her! This fact that [Elected Local] Councillors go back to citizens to provide them with feedback on Local Councils' decisions explains the improvement in the level of satisfaction in the current [councillorship] term." (An Elected Local Councillor attending a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

Bearing in mind this background, there is need to also know whom of Elected Local Councillors, across different levels of Local Councils and constituencies, provide feedback to citizens about councils' final decisions. Different views from Elected Local Councillors are distributed in the Figure 54.

Figure 54: Disaggregate of ELC affirming that they give feedback to citizens

Disaggregate of ELC affirming that they give feedback to constituents (%)

Legend: ■Never ■Sometimes ■Always

ELC's Constituency:
- Sector: Never 0, Sometimes 25.3, Always 74.7
- Cell: Never 0, Sometimes 22.8, Always 77.2
- Village: Never 0, Sometimes 9.8, Always 90.2
- PSF: Never 2.7, Sometimes 10.8, Always 86.5
- NCPD: Never 0, Sometimes 30.8, Always 69.2
- CNJ: Never 0, Sometimes 23.2, Always 76.8
- CNF: Never 0.8, Sometimes 9.8, Always 89.4

Local Council Level:
- Village Executive committee: Never 0, Sometimes 13.6, Always 86.4
- Cell Council: Never 0.6, Sometimes 23.2, Always 76.2
- Sector Council: Never 0.6, Sometimes 13.3, Always 86.1
- District Council: Never 0, Sometimes 17.5, Always 82.5

The Figure 54 disaggregates the distribution of opinions about Elected Local Councillors reporting back to their constituents. The levels of Local Councils and constituencies serve as starting points for the discussions. As the Figure 54 portrays, all Elected Local Councillors claimed to *'Always'* return back to give feedback to

constituents. In general, 69.2% up to 90.2% of all the Elected Local Councillors supported that they *'Always'* give feedback.

Details show that Village Executive Committee members and Elected Local Councillors at the level Sector Councils (86.4% and 86.1%, respectively) scored high in opinions as about *'Always'* giving feed back to citizens. Elected Local Councillors for the National Commission for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD) have comparatively the lowest score (69.2%).

To make sense of these levels of citizens' satisfaction on Elected Local Councillor's feedback about Local Councils' decisions, the Figure 55 explores further '*how often and regular*' Elected Local Councillors provide explanations to constituents. That is, the intensity and consistency in providing feedback.

Figure 55: Intensity and consistency in explanations about Local Councils' decisions

In the Figure 55, both citizens and Elected Local Councillors perceive ELC explanations on Local Councils' decisions about citizens' needs as *'always, sometimes, and never'* taking place. Differences are only found in the proportions of opinions of citizens and Elected Local Councillors. In both last and current

116

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

councillorship terms, for instance, Electec Local Counciollors reported higher levels of the intensity in ELC explanations, as compared with citizens. However, there are exaggerations in ELC self-reporting around explanation viewed as *'Always'* taking place (82.5% and 51.1%, respectively) in the current and last councillorship terms. Citizens were low in voicing the level of opinions about ELC explanations of Local Councils' decisions about their priority needs. Rather, they found these explanations as having '*Sometimes*' taken place (55.6% and 61.1%, respectively in the current and last councillorship terms).

More importantly, there are indications of improvements in the levels of intensity and consistency in opinions about Elected Llocal Councillors' explanations. To consider the *'Always'* levels of Elected Local Councillors' explanations, for instance, citizens' opinions have slightly increased from 24.6% during the last councillorship term up to 29.5% in the current councillorship term. The increase in ELC opinions is comparatively sharp. They have abruptly increased from 51.1% during the last councillorship term up to 82.5% in the current councillorship term. These improvements in the intensity of Elected Local Councillors' explanations are clearly portrayed in the Figure 56.

Prior to the Figure 56, the Figure 55 gave enough details on how *'regular'* Elected Local Councillors explain *'why Local Councils have or have not considered some of citizens' priority needs'*. This was a concern about *'consistency'* in Elected Local Councillors' explanations. Obviously, the Figure 55 demonstrated high levels of consistency across the two consecutive councillorship terms. To illustrate, for instance, Elected Local Councillors' opinions describe their explanations as *'always regularly'* taking place (73.8%). On the side of citizens, they are considered as *'sometimes regularly'* taking place (62.1%).

Despite of the variations in levels of opinions, an important idea is common between citizens and Elected Local Councillors. They have given due attention to the '*never*' option of '*Often*' and '*Regular*' Elected Local Councillors' explanations to constituents. Alone, to illustrate, 14.4% of citizens went for this option in the last councillorship term. At the same time, they have kept the same position in the current councillorship term (14.9%) with small increase. In the last councillorship term, Elected Local Councillors' opinions indicated that 15.5% of Elected Local Councillors *'Never'* provided their constituents with such explanations. In the current councillorship term, however, the number of Elected Local Councillors who failed to do so has tremendously decreased up to 0.4%. This is strong indication of improvements as portrayed in the Figure 56.

The intensity and consistency in Elected Local Councillors' explanations improved from 24.6% to 29.5%, respectively in the last and current councillorship terms. This improvement is also readable in ELC views about intensity and consistency in delivering explanations to their respective constituents. As the Figure 56 indicates, improvements in views about intensity and consistency moved from 51.1% to 82.8%, respectively in the last and current councillorship terms.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 56: Improvements in the intensity of ELC explanations to citizens about Local Cancils' decisions

How satisfactory and convincing have Elected Local Councillors' explanations been is another area that was looked into. In this regard, the Figure 57 is established to serve two complementary purposes. First, it provides data to assess the level of *'satisfactory Elected Local Councillors' feedback'* about Local Councils' final decisions. Second, it assesses the level of *'convincing feedback'* about those decisions.

As the Figure 57 indicates, citizens' views about the level of satsatisfaction with ELC feedback rank respectively as '*Very high*' (15.1%), '*High*' (32.8%) and as *'Average'* (41.2%). The cumulative data ('*Very high level & High level*') on satisfactions amounted to 47.9% while the cumulative data ('*Low level & Very low level*') on dissatisfaction is ranked 10.9%. As per observation, the cumulative level of citizens'satisfaction about ELC feedback is below 50% of the citizens. This fact has direct impact on their level of conviction about explanations they are given.

Figure 57: Level of satisfaction and conviction on ELC's feedback and explanations

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Citizens' level of satisfaction and conviction of ELC feedback and explanations about Local Councils' final decisions about citizens needs (%)

How convincing were ELC explanations about final decisions of the local Council
- Not convincing at all — 1.4
- Very unconvincing — 9.3
- Fairly convincing — 31.7
- Convincing — 37.2

Level of satisfaction of ELC's feedback about final decisions of the local Council
- Very convincing — 20.4
- Cumulative (very unconvincing & not convincing at all) — 10.7
- Cumulative (very convincing & convincing) — 57.6
- Cumulative (low level & very low level of satisfaction) — 10.9
- Cumulative (very high level & high level of satisfaction) — 47.9
- Very low level — 2
- Low level — 8.9
- Average — 41.2
- High level — 32.8
- Very high level — 15.1

As it appears in the Figure 57, for instance, citizens views considered Elected Local Councllors' feedback as '*Very convincing*' (20.4%), '*Convincing*' (37.2%), and '*Fairly convincing*' (31.7%). The '*Convincing*' (37%) level emerged as most competing. the Cumulative data ('*Very convincing & convincing*') scored 57.6% while cumulative data ('*Very unconvincing &Not convincing at all*') amounted to 10.7%. With the score of 57.6%, slightly higher than the average score (50%), the level of conviction about Elected Local Councillors' feedback is more or less on average. This average level perfectly reflects the cumulative level of satisfaction (47.9%) about ELC feedback to constituents.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Citizens/Constituents' Empowerment

Building the capacity of citizens is widely supported as another important key pillar for decentralization. Elected Local Councilors are expected to be active players in this process of capacity building to their constituents. The presentation of data is aimed to give clear ideas on citizens' capabilities required to hold Elected Local Councilors accountable.

In this perspective, the Figure 58 presents significant details on the support rendered to citizens in order to properly translate into action the final decisions made to address citizens' priority needs.

Figure 58: ELC' support to the implementation of Local Councils' decisions

The Figure 58 reports about the levels of support that Elected Local Councillors offer to citizens for proper implementation of Local Councils' final decisions. It has appeared that Elected Local Councillors offer support to their constituents. However, both citizens and Elected Local Councillors slightly differ in the reporting of the magnitude of such support. Observations show that Elected Local Councillors (58.8%) over self-report their views on '*Great extent*' as compared to citizens (23.1%). To '*Some extent*', and unlike Elected Local Councillors (38.5%), citizens (54.4%) highly reported to have been supported.

However, '*Great extent*' and '*To some extent*' levels of Elected Local Councillors' support to citizens, different scores made on either side are relatively low. The highest levels of support are slightly higher than an average level (50%). This level, among many other things, has enevitably something to do with the overall satisfaction about councillorship interactions. Both citizens and ELC opinions about this satisfaction are further presented in the Figure 59.

To the Figure 59, there are higher levels of overall satisfaction among both citizens and Elected Local Councilors. At least to look at cumulative data ('Very high & High level'), quick observations show that Elected Local Councillors (87.9%) are generally more satisfied than citizens (60.3%). As cumulative data for '*Very low level*' and '*No*

120

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

satisfaction at all'), both citizens (4.5%) and Elected Local Councillor (0%) minimally reported overall levels of dissatisfaction.

Figure 59: **Overall level of satisfaction about councillorship interactions**

Despite these encouraging score about the overall level of satisfaction about councillorship interactions, interviews emerged pessimistic enough. In this regard, for instance, an active key informant in matters regarding citizens' participation rather regarded the interactions between citizens and Elected Local Councillors as more or less inexistent. The argument made read as follows:

> "I don't truly see ELC interacting with citizens. You instead realize that local Councils interact with the Executive much more than with citizens. For example, even myself, I have never heard any local Council organizing a meeting with citizens at the level of councillorship. For example, nowadays we assess performance contracts; when we are evaluating the performance contracts you eventually also plan others, and it is at this level that the local Council should interact with citizens and inform them that it is the period of performance contracts and then request them to express their priority needs; or even give this task to the Village committees. I have never witnessed ELC inviting us and requesting us to express our needs. It happens that sometimes after community works, citizens express their needs but this takes place spontaneously, coming from citizens! It is not the local Council that initiates these spontaneous voices of citizens! I truly don't know what should be done; but local Councillors should interact with citizens who elected them." (A key informant from Civil Society Organizations participating in an individual interview)

Though the Figure 62 generally indicates encouraging levels of overall satisfaction, however, it does not include enough details on the distribution of these levels of satisfaction among citizens and Elected Local Councilors. As a result, this study disaggregates the levels of overall satisfaction about councilloraship interactions, with consideration of the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. The Figure 60 presents further the distribution of the overall satasfaction about councillorship interactions.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 60: Disaggregate of the overall level of satisfaction about Councillorship interactions

As the Figure 60 indicates, the level of overall satisfaction is fairly distributed among Elected Local Councilors at '*Very high level*'. To this level, for instance, Elected

Local Councillors for District Local Councils (81.6%), and for the National Council for Women (81.1%), are the most satisfied with councillorshp interactions. Equally important, in average, many of these Local Councillors scored slightly above 50% as very highly satisfied with councillorship interactions.

On the other side, the overall level of satisfaction of citizens is sligly lower, as compared to Elected Local Councillors. The former are generally satisfied at 'High level', though wider majority ranks below 50% in overall level of satisfaction. An exception only goes to the Ubudehe fourth category of respondents who scored (55.6%).

In all, the overall level of satisfaction ranges from 'Very high level' to 'High level', respectively for Elected Local Councillors and citizens.

123

*State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance*

Implications for Accountable Local Governance

After this study provided detailed information on councillorship interactions, it is relevant enough to reflect on their implications for accountable local governance. The next discussions present detailed qualitative and quantitative data to further serve a basis for fact-based conclusions about the implications. In this regard, to begin, the Figure 64 provides details on ways in which Elected Local Councillors 'document and file' constituents'views about priority needs for further advocacy at the level of Local Council.

Figure 61: Whether ELC Document and file Constituents' priority needs

As the Figure 61 indicates, there is an agreement between both citizens and Elected Local Councilors on whether citizens' view about needs are documented and filed. However, it is visibly established that Elected Local Councillors (90.8%) highly scored than citizens (50.8%). There is far big difference in opinions around views' documentation and filing.

Also, 0.7% of citizens reported that Elected Local Councillors '*Never*' document and file constituents' views on priority needs while 15.3% of the same citizens reported having '*No idea*' about these activities. Combined, these two categories of citizens form 16% of citizens who may have no basis for requesting accountability. In size, this is an important number, which prompted the study to investigate the venues where files on constituents' views on priority needs are kept. The Figure 62 further presents detailed data.

Figure 62: Place where files on constituents' priority needs are kept

First, the Figure 62 indicates that administrative offices are privileged venues to keep files on constituents' views bout identified priority needs. Many citizens indicated these venues to be 'Village office' (41.5%), 'Cell office' (39.2%), Sector office (5.5%), and District office (0.5%). Consitent with previous data, the trend is that the higher one goes in administrative hierarchies, the number of citizens abruptly goes decreasing. To this end, for example, one may observe the gap established between Village office (41.5%) and 'District office' (0.5%). With an exception to the 'Village office' (13.8%), this trend equally holds to Elected Local Councillors though the decrease is slightly smooth. In descending order, Elected Local Councillors subscribed to the 'Cell office' (31.7%), 'Sector office' (27.8%), and 'District office' (16.4%), as privileged venues where views on citizens' needs are filed. As the Figure 62 establishes, files are scattered in different places: both citizens (13.3%) and ELC (13.3) consistently go on to indicate that files are available in 'other places'.

The fact that files are scattered in many places of councillorship is rather regarded as a benefit to accountability process. To some extent, as a result, both citizens and Elected Local Councillors widely found accountability worthwhile and a key feature of local governance. They support '*Very much*' the fact that '*Elected Local Councillors should be held accountable for their responsibilitie*s'. Details are portrayed in the Figure 63.

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Figure 63: ELC accountability

According to the Figure 63, citizens (66.6%) argue 'Very much' for holding Elected Local Councillors accountable for their responsibilities. This statement found strong support in qualitative data: "it is imperative that Elected Local Councillors be held accountable [to] citizens as to how they performed their responsibilities because citizens (…) elected them." (A citizen participating in a FGD held in Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District). This interview was very much consistent with Elected Local Councillors' opinions, as one of them indeed contended:

> "It is absolutely necessary that [Elected Local] Councillors be held accountable for how they effectively perform their responsibilities. Citizens trusted and elected [Local] (…) Councillors to represent them in what they could have done themselves. Therefore, [Elected Local Councillors] should be held accountable [for citizens] to make sure they performed their duties to their satisfaction." (An Elected Local Councillor attending a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasaabo District)

Similarly, some citizens (31.3%) viewed that accountability process should 'Sometimes' take place while fewer citizens amounting to 2.1% argued for 'Never' holding Elected Local Councillors accountable. There are explanations to citizens' views on Elected Local Councillors being 'Sometimes' or 'Never' held accountable. On top, there is citizens' confidence in Elected Local Councilors. A youth argued as follows, to illustrate: "*Citizens elected Local Councillors whom they know and trust. Therefore, there is no need to request them to account for their duties.*" (A youth participating in a FGD held at Mugesera sector, Ngoma district).

Equally, the Figure 63 shows that Elected Local Councillors (91.4%) '*Very much*' support the idea of accounting for councillorship responsibilities. Like citizens, some

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Elected Local Councillors thought that accountability for councillorship responsibilities should '*Sometimes*' (8.4%) or '*Never*' (0.2%) take place.

The Figure 63 presents detailed data on accountability for councillorship interactions. However, it does not provide details on individuals or institutions that have the right to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable for councillorship interactions. Only the Figure 64 does further.

Figure 64: To whom ELC account for councillorship duties

As it appears in the Figure 64, there is a variety of individuals or institutions from whom/which respondents were requested choose. Elected Local Councilors listed citizens (70.6%), the Local Council (12.2%), authorities or leaders (9%), and Elected Local Councilors (6.6%). In the first place, citizens are given primary interest (70.6%) for various reasons found in previously presented data. For example, they are the appointing authorities for Elected Local Councilors. Moreover, they are direct beneficiaries of councillorship interactions, and the most engaging actors for these interactions to properly perform.

This position goes with legitimate power that relevant actors feel having. Likewise, citizens (42.7%) considered themselves as having the power it requires to hold ELC accountable. As illustrative field testimonies put it, this power was supported in various interviews:

> "When citizens elect a [Local] Councillor and request him /her to represent them, they are the ones to hold him/her accountable. In so doing, constituents ensure the Local Councillor does not betray their trust." (A representative of the Private Sector Federation attending a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe District)

> "People who should hold [Elected Local Councillors] accountable are citizens. First of all, citizens are the ones who elected and requested [Local Councillors] to stand for them where they do not reach. This is why (…) citizens who elected

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

have to hold [Local Councillors] accountable." (A Cell Executive Secretary attending a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

Besides, local authorities or leaders (29.5%), the Local Council (15.4%), and Local Councilors (10.2%) are also viewed as actors entrusted with the power to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable. In all, these power holders serve as checks and balance for the accountability for councillorship interactions. The Figure 65 reports on how '*often*' and '*regula*r' councillorship interactions are, in real practice.

Figure 65: Intensity and Consistency of ELC accountability

To observe the Figure 65, both citizens and Elected Local Councillors argue for the existence of the accountability for councillorship duties. To the same figure, it is intense and consistent. As far as the '*intensity*' (the '*how often*') is concerned, however, there remarkable differences in the views of citizens (34.4%) and Elected Local Councillors (81.1%). The same pattern in the opinions applies to the '*consistency*' (the '*how regular*') of Elected Local Councillors (68.9%) in the accountability for councillorship interactions to constituents (32.9%). Against the 'Always often'/ 'Always regularly' options, there is over-reporting in Elected Local Councillors' opinions comparatively to citizens.

Opinions on the '*Sometimes often/regularly*' options bear important observations. First of all, citizens (51.3% and 54.9%, respectively) compete Elected Local Councillors (8.3% and 25.9%, respectively) in expressing opinions about the intensity of accountability for councillorship interactions. The same goes for the '*regularity*' in

128

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

the accountability for councillorship interactions. Citizens reported 54.9% against 25.9% of Elected Local Councillors' opinions.

Second, the '*Never often/regularly*' options attract particular attention. Citizens' opinions (14.3% and 12.1%, respectively) about the accountability for councillorship interactions still compete the Elected Local Councillors' opinions (0.5% and 5.2%, respectively). The Figure 66 presents different actions that constituents may take in case of poor performance.

Figure 66: Actions against poor performance of ELC

The Figure 66 shows different measures that constituents use or have used against poor performance of Elected Local Councilors. The majority of citizens (53.4%) emphasized that they use the '*reporting to administrative authorities*'. A considerable percentage of citizens (15.8%) argue for '*removing councillors in the next election*'. Eventually, they sought for Local Councillors' '*removal from the Local Council*

through a vote of no-confidence' (2.9%), *'reporting to the Local Council'* (9.9%) or security organs (5.9%) and even signing petition (2.8%).

This list of measures falls within the existing legal framework. They are an indication that citizens are already knowledgeable of their civic rights: "We know very well that we have the rights to remove an Elected Local Councillor who does not perform [councillorship] duties as required." (A citizen participating in a FGD held at Gasaka Sector, Nyamagabe district). Strong support to general account widely came from Elected Local Councillors. An illustrative example is taken from the youth and is formulated as follows: "Citizens I represent have right to monitor how I perform and report on my [councillorship] duties. Also, they have the right to force me to resign and get out of the [Local] Council. They may then replace me with somebody else [they trust]." (An Elected Local Councilor for the youth attending a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

The accounts are an indication that collective conscience and the understanding of citizens' rights are increasingly gaining wider ground. With reference to the President of the Republic of Rwanda, for instance, interviews repeatedly put strong emphasis on this conscience and understanding. To illustrate, a citizen attending a Focus Group Discussion argued as follows:

> "Even the President [of the Republic of Rwanda] said that if you elected somebody and you realize that s/he is not performing, you can only thank him/her for little things s/he has done and then sack him/her. Therefore when you trusted somebody and realize that s/he is not delivering on his/her responsibilities, you simply sack him/her." (A citizen attending a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

Despite the above accounts, however, some informants conteded that the reality is very much challenging. Obedience to leaders has been key feature in Rwanda's culture. There are still citizens who cannot dare to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable or take any of the above-mentioned actions. To illustrate, an Elected Local Councilor's field testimony reads as follows:

> "Sincerely speaking, it is true, citizens elect [Local] Councillors and are the ones [supposed] to sack them [if need be]. What takes place in real practice is different. Do you think an ordinary citizen living there, in a remote area, can dare request the President of the [Local] Council to resign? This is what is supposed to happen (…). Sincerely speaking, I am not sure citizens even know that they are entitled the right to force Elected Local Councillors to resign! For example, after a [Local] Councillor is elected and reach that level [President of the Council] citizens give too much respect! They even seem not to remember that they are the ones who elected him/her. Instead they perceive him/her as different from them and loose power on him/her to take necessary action when s/he betray them or no longer represent their interestsy." (An Elected Local Councilor attending a FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

130

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

The Figure 67 is more informative about the impact of failure in discharging councillorship duties on the re-election of Elected Local Councilor for the following term.

Figure 67: Connection between ELC's poor performance and their re-election

As the Figure 67 reports, citizens (94.2%) are very much aware that poor performance in councillorship interactions impacts on the re-election of of Elected Local Councillors. As a result of effective performance, a good number of Elected Local Councillors involved in this study had served at least one councillorship term before they were re-elected for the current councillorship term. Some never sought re-election while some others who dared simply lost elections. This being the case, 49.2% against 50.8% confirmed having, at least once, '*refused to re-elect Local Councilors on the grounds of poor performance in their previous term.*' Interviews were widely consistent with these quantitative accounts. Some illustrations read as follows:

"Surely, there are [Elected Local] Councillors who were not re-elected given that they had not performed well during their previous councillorship terms. Therefore, the refusal to re-elect [these Elected Local] Councillors has constituted their punishment." (An Elected Local Councillor for the National Council of Women attending a FGD held at Mugesera Sector, Ngoma District)

"When an Elected Local Councillor fails to fulfill [councillorship] responsibilities, people should not wait for the end of his/her [councillorship] mandate. When we realize that s/he is failing in his/her responsibilities, we (…)

131

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

remove him/her and elect somebody else who is capable to represent us." (A citizen participating in FGD held at Gikomero Sector, Gasabo District)

In connection with previous discussions, it was established that there are Elected Local Councillors and citizens who know less or, simply, are not aware of councillorship duties (See the Figure 15). Against Elected Local Councillors and citizens' level of interactions, empirical findings generally indicated that only 60.3% of citizens are satisfied with these interactions (See the Figure 59). In itself, this described situation has strong implications for accountable governance. Different interviews went on to find it a self-explanatory phenomenon:

"The fact that citizens don't know councillorship responsibilities has a lot of implications. The consequence is that none will hold Elected Local Councillors accountable for their responsibilities. A citizen is [one of people] supposed to hold an Elected Local Councillor accountable and to tell him/her that s/he did not perform well his/her duties! But [citizens] cannot hold somebody accountable if [they] don't know the responsibilities that s/he was supposed to perform! In the last elections, citizens stressed this saying that the last time they saw Elected Local Councillors was the time they elected them. This is the only way citizens hold Elected Local Councillors accountable. They tell Elected Local Councillors that they lost sight of them after election. Citizens complain against Elected Local Councillors and say that they are not even sure if the latter have ever served citizens' interests or not" (A key informant from Civil Society Organizations)

"The problem is that none is there to hold [Elected Local Councillors accountable]. Because, just observe! When we evaluate the performance contracts, we evaluate the Executive [Committee]! We never evaluate the Council! How can you hold accountable a person who you don't see? Where are the mechanisms to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable? What did we actually request [Elected Local Councillors] to do for us and hold them accountable on that basis? Will I just come and request you that you must be held accountable! But on basis of what [would I do so? Even these Elected Local Councillors who resign do not do so because citizens reported them. Instead, they resign after those employing them, have realized that they have misbehaved. Therefore, there is no accountability mechanism in place." (Another key informant from Civil Society Organizations)

132

*State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance*

Conclusions, recommendations and perspectives for further research

Conclusions

The overall purpose of this study was to assess the state of interactions between Elected Local Councilors (ELC) and citizens/Constituencies and its implications for accountable local governance in Rwanda. Thus, the study was built on two major pillars: (1) the state of interactions between Elected Local Councilors and Constituencies, and (2) its implications for accountable local governance. By interactions this study referred to a two-way process involving both citizens/constituents and Elected Local Councilors: (1) Elected Local Councillors were expected to collect constituents/citizens' views on priority needs and the proposals for solutions. Local Councils were expected to make final decisions on the views and proposal for solutions. (2) In turn, Elected Local Councillors were expected to report back (feedback) the Local Councils' final decisions and provide necessary explanations to citizens/constituents.

Awareness of ELC responsbilities

Empirical findings conclude that the level of citizens' awareness of Elected Local Councillors' responsibilities is *simply satisfactory* (59.3%). Also, it is worth emphasizing that 15.6% of citizens denied having sufficient knowledge about councilorship responsibilities.

State of ELC and constituents'interactions

In consistency with existing studies (Example: The Rwanda Governance Board's reports on '*Citizens Report Card*' and '*Rwanda Governance Scorecard*', which respectively emphasized 58.9% and 61.9% of citizens' levels of participation in governance), this study concludes that the *state* of interactions between Elected Local Councilors and Constituencies is simply *satisfactory*. Generally, it has scored an *average* level. This level varies between 50% and 60% for all variables measured in as much as the interactions between Elected Local Councillors are concerned. These variables covered the two-way process, as encapsulated in the definition of councillorship interactions. In the interactions between Elected Local Councillors and citizens/constituents, the overall problem empirically established was the absence of a regulatory framework. There is no legal basis to back up different practices required in councillorship interactions. For example, there are no instruments to regulate how and when councillorship interactions should take place and the channels to use. As established, the regulations determining the organization and functioning of decentralized administrative entities have an exclusive focus on Local Councils. Therefore, these regulations are silent as to how Elected Local Councillors should interact with their constituencies and how they should be held accountable of their councillorship responsibilities.

Implications for accountable local governance

The absence of a regulatory framework on the interactions between citizens and Elected Local Councilors has negative implications for accountable local governance. The fact that the law on the functioning of Local Councils is silent about councillorship interactions makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to hold Elected Local Councilors accountable for how they perform their responsibilities.

Recommendations

Building on the above study's conclusions and the measures that respondents and informants suggested all along empirical investigations, this study recommends the following actions:

1. Given that a considerable number of citizens do not know very well the responsibilities of Elected Local Councillors, capacity building strategies should be put in place. In this regard, measures aimed to raise the levels of citizens' awareness are worth taking. The use of existing formal and informal platforms, such as community works (*Umuganda*), civic education academy (*Itorero ry'igihugu*), community assemblies (*Inteko z'abaturage*), paremts' evening forums (*Umugoroba w'ababyeyi*), among other, could be beneficial, if efficiently put at use.

2. Equally, this study has established that the state of interactions between citizens and Elected Local Councilors is on an average level. Therefore, there is an urgent need to effectively make use of formal and informal platforms or mechanisms to boost councillorship interactions. These mechanisms include *inter alia* the civic education academy, community works, parents' evening forums, and community assemblies, among others. These forums consist of suitable mechanisms or spaces not only for successful interactions between citizens and Elected Local Councillors. Also, they are relevant tools for capacity building (sensitization and the raising of awareness) to be organized to the benefit of citizens and Elected Local Councillors. To this end, they should be used to empower relevant actors with councillorship responsibilities and significant skills on how Elected Local Councillors and citizens ought to interact and engage in the accountability process. Likewise, creativity and innovation in initiating other suitable mechanisms is recommended to various actors and partners most involved in the practice of decentralization and local governance. The '*Isibo*' is a valuable example of innovative initiative empirically found out in this study.

3. Finally, the study pointed out that key hindrances to successful and efficient interactions between citizens/constituents and Elected Local Councilors is the absence of a regulatory framework on these interactions. It is all about total absence of legal grounds upon which to hold Elected Local Councilors accountable. In all, there is total absence of binding mechanisms for councillorship interactions. This fact has negative implications on accountable

134

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

local governance; there is impossibility to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable. Therefore, this study recommends the enactment of regulations on the interactions between Elected Local Councillors and respective constituents/citizens. For example, the regulatory framework should be clear enough about how Elected Local Councillors collect citizens'views on needs and propositions for solutions, when and with what channels. Also, it should bring details on whether Local Councils should have a vision (to ensure continuity at the expiration of councillorship terms) and performance contracts; how and when ELC should provide explanations and feedback to citizens/constituents on councils' final decisions, and channels to be used. Moreover, it should focus on areas such as how Elected Local Councillors at higher levels of Local Councils (the District and Sector, for instance) should organize in the field to meet and interact with citizens, who should hold Elected Local Councillors accountable for councillorship responsibilities, how and when, how creativity in these interactions will look like, and finally how and when to use formal and informal spaces, such as civic education academy (*Itorero ry'igihugu*), Community assemblies, and so on.

Perspectives for further research

This study explored some of the salient aspects of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and constituents (collection of citizens opinions and suggestions on their priority needs, as well as feedback and explanations to citizens about the Councils' final decisions on the needs identified). However, the study did not dig into all the details of councillorship interactions. Examples of these aspects include *inter alia* how many times consituents and Elected Local Councillors interact, how many time constituent's opinions are documented and filed, channels used in holding Elected Local Councillors accountable of their duties, the impact of the the interplay between Elected Local Councillors and Local Executive Committees on Elected Local Councillors' interactions with constituents, the regulatory framework of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and constituents, and channels used, among other things. Further exploration of these aspects is recommended to feed councillorship interactions with more field-based information likely to add much value.

This study was also only carried out in five Districts, established as intervention zones of intervention for DALGOR project. Even though empirical findings portray a general trend about the state of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and constituents in Rwanda, these findings are less worth generalizing. Thus, it is recommended that the similar study involving all the Districts of Rwanda be undertaken. Alternatively, further studies may still be interested in DALGOR areas of intervention. To measure the real impact of DALGOR on accountable local governance, an evaluation design would be the most appropriate. In this case, DALGOR areas of interventions would serve as an'experimental group' while a 'control group' might be selected from Districts, which did not have exposure to DALGOR treatment or intervention.

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136

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

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State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

A. Questionnaire about respondents' identification details / Ibibazo bijyanye n'umwirondoro w'usubiza

Questionnaire addressed to Citizens/ Ibibazo bigenewe abaturage	Questionnaire addressed to Elected Local Councillors / Bigenewe Abajyanama

IDENTIFICATION/Umwirondoro

   1.   **Residence/**Aho umuntu atuye

District	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	
Sector	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	
Cell	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	
Village	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	

   2.   **Characteristics of the residence/ ibiranga aho ubazwa atuye**

Residence	1. Rural / Igiturage	
	2. Semi-Urban / Agasanteri	
	3. r) Urban / Umugi	

   3.   **Residence of Elected Local Councillors /**Aho abajyanama batowe batuye
Indicate the residence of your Local Councillors/Erekana aho abajyanama batuye

Residence of Councillors/Aho Abajyanama batuye	1. They all live where they carry out their responsibilities/Bose batuye aho bakorera imirimo yabo y'ubujyanama	
	2. Many live where they carry out their responsibilities/Abenshi batuye aho bakorera imirimo yabo y'ubujyanama	
	3. Only few live where they carry out their responsibilities /Bake ni bo batuye aho bakorera imirimo yabo y'ubujyanama	
	4. None of them lives where s/he carries out his/her responsibilities /Nta n'umwe muri	

IDENTIFICATION/Umwirondoro

1.   **Place of Councillorship/ Aho yatorewe**

District	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	
Sector	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	
Cell	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	
Village	See list of codes (Appendix 2)	

2.   **Local Council level / Njyanama ubarizwamo**

What Council are you affiliated to?/ Ni uruhe Urwego rwa njyanama ubarizwamo?	1. District Council /Njyanama y'Akarere	
	2. Sector Council/ Njyanama y'umurenge	
	3. Cell Council/ Njyanama y'akagari	
	4. Village Executive Committee/ Komite nyobozi y'umudugudu	

3.   **Characteristics of the place of councillorship/Ibiranga aho umujyanama yatorewe**

The place of Councillorship/Aho Umujyanama yatorewe	5. Rural / Igiturage	
	6. Semi-Urban / Agasanteri	
	7. Urban / Umugi	

4.   **Residence of Elected Local Councillors/** Aho Umujyanama atuye
(a) Indicate your place of residence /Erekana aho utuye

Residence of	1. I live where I carry out my responsibilities/Ntuye hafi n'aho	

140

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

	bo utuye aho akorera imirimo ye y'ubujyanama	
	5. I don't know / Simbizi	

4. **Socio-demographic characteristics** /Ibiranga imibereho

Indicate your socio-demographic characteristics/*Erekana ibigaragaza imibereho yawe*

Sex/igitsina	Male/Gabo	
	Female/Gore	

Age group /imyaka y'amavuko	18-30	
	31-60	
	61+	

Marital status / irangamimerere	1. Single / Ingaragu	
	2. Married / Uwubatse	
	3. Divorced / Uwatandukanye burundu n'uwo bashakanye	
	4. Widow/er / Umupfakazi	
	5. Separated / utabana n'uwo twashakanye	
	6. Other (specify)/Ibindi (sobanura)……………………….	

Employment status/ Umurimo ukora	1. Unemployed/Nta murimo mfite	
	2. Employed/Mfite umurimo	
	3. Retired/Ndi mu za bukuru	
	4. Student/Umunyeshuri	
	5. Other (indicate) /ibindi (byerekane)……………	

the Elected Councillor /Aho umujyanama atuye		nkorera inshingano z'ubujyanama	
	2.	I live somewhere else than where I carry out my responsibilities /Ntuye ahandi hatari aho nkorera inshingano z'ubujyanama	

(b) Indicate your fellow Councillors' place of residence/ Erekana aho Abajyanama bagenzi bawe batuye.

Residence of Fellow Councillors/Aho abajyanama bagenzi banjye batuye	1.	They all live where they carry out their responsibilities//Bose batuye aho bakorera imirimo yabo y'ubujyanama	
	2.	Many live where they carry out their responsibilities/ Abenshi batuye aho bakorera inshingano z'ubujyanama	
	3.	Only few live where they carry out their responsibilities/ Bake ni bo batuye aho bakorera imirimo yabo y'ubujyanama	
	4.	None of them lives where s/he carries out his/her responsibilities / Nta n'umwe muri bo utuye aho akorera imirimo ye y'ubujyanama	
	5.	I don't know / Simbizi	

4. Socio-demographic characteristics/ Ibiranga imibereho

Indicate your socio-demographic characteristics/ *Erekana ibigaragaza imibereho yawe*

S*ex/* igitsina	Male/ Gabo	
	Female/ Gore	

Age group	18-30	
	31-60	

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

/imyaka y'amavuko	61+	

Marital status / Irangamimerere	1. Single / Ingaragu	
	2. Married / Uwubatse	
	3. Divorced/ Uwatandukanye burundu n'uwo bashakanye	
	4. Widow/er / Umupfakazi	
	5. Separated / Utabana n'uwo twashakanye	
	6. Other (specify) / ibindi (Sobanura)……………………	
Employment status/ Umurimo ukora	1. Unemployed/ nta murimo afite	
	2. Employed/ mfite umurimo	
	3. Retired/ ndi mu za bukuru	
	4. Student/ umunyeshuri	
	5. Other (indicate it) / ibindi (byerekane) …………	

If employed, how satisfied are you with your monthly income? / Niba ufite umurimo, wumva unyuzwe n'umushara w'ukwezi bingana iki?	1. Very satisfied/nyuzwe cyane	
	2. Satisfied/nyuzwe biringaniye	
	3. Less satisfied/nyuzwe gake	
	4. Not satisfied at all/ntanyuzwe na gato	

How does your level of satisfaction about your monthly income impact on your Councillorship performance? / Ukunyurwa n'umushahara bifite ngaruka ki ku nshingano z'Ubujyanama?	1. Negative impact/ingaruka mbi	
	2. Positive impact/ingaruka mbi	

Employer (to be answered by those who responded 2) in Question b. (Optional) /Umukoresha	1. Self-employed / Arikorera	
	2. Civil society (NGO….) /Akorera imiryango itegamiye kuri Leta	
	3. Civil servant / Akorera Leta	
	4. Private sector / Akorera ikigo cyigenga	

Education/Amashuri yize	1. Primary level / Amashuri abanza
	2. Professional/ Vocational/ Amashuri y'imyuga
	3. Secondary/ Amashuri yisumbuye
	4. University / Kaminuza
	5. None /Ntiyize

Standards of living/ Icyiciro cy'ubudehe	1. Category 1 / Icyiciro cya 1
	2. Category 2 / Icyiciro cya 2
	3. Category 3 / Icyiciro cya 3
	4. Category 4 / Icyiciro cya 4

Physical ability/ Ubumuga	1. With disabilities/ Uwamugaye
	2. Without disabilities / Udafite ubumuga

Membership to pressure or interest groups/ Ishyirahamwe abarizwamo	1. Civil society / Societe sivile
	2. Private sector / Abikorera
	3. Cooperatives / Koperative
	4. Syndicates/ Urugaga
	5. Other / Ibindi (Specify / Sobanura)…………………

Employer (to be answered by those who responded b) in Question b. (Optional) /Umukoresha	1. Self-employed / Arikorera
	2. Civil society (NGO…) /Akorera imiryango itegamiye kuri Leta
	3. Public service / Akorera Leta
	4. Private sector / Akorera ikigo cyigenga

Education/Amashuri yize	1. Primary level/ Amashuri abanza
	2. Professional/ Vocational / Amashuri y'imyuga
	3. Secondary/ Amashuri yisumbuye
	4. University / Kaminuza
	5. None / Ntiyize

Standards of living/ Icyiciro cy'ubudehe	1. Category 1 / Icyiciro cya 1
	2. Category 2 / Icyiciro cya 2
	3. Category 3 / Icyiciro cya 3
	4. Category 4 / Icyiciro ya 4

Physical ability/ Ubumuga	1. With disabilities/ Uwamugaye
	2. Without disabilities / Udafite ubumuga

Membership to pressure or interest groups/ Ishyirahamwe abarizwamo	1. Civil society /Sosiyete sivile
	2. Private sector / Abikorera
	3. Cooperatives / Koperative
	4. Syndicates / urugaga
	5. Other / Ibindi (Specify / Sobanura) …………

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

III. Constituencies / Ibyiciro by'abaturage bihagarariwe

Which Constituency are you representing? / Ni uruhe rwego cg icyiciro cy'abaturage uhagarariye	1. National Council for Women (CNF)/ inama y,igihugu y'abagore	
	2. National Council for Youth (CNJ)/ Inama y'igihugu y'urubyiruko	
	3. National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPD)/ Inama y'igihugu y'abafite ubumuga	
	4. Private Sector Federation (PSF)/ Urwego rw'abikorera ku giti cyabo	
	5. Village /umudugudu	
	6. Cell/akagari	
	7. Sector/umurenge	

VI. Councillorship terms served / Manda y'ubujyanama

Which of the following terms have you served as a Councillor? / Ni iyihe manda muri izi zikurikira wabayemo umujyanama?	1. The 2011-2015 mandate/ Manda ishize (2011 – 2015)	
	2. The current mandate/ Iyi manda (2016 to date/kugeza ubu)	
	3. Both last and current madates / Manda ishize n'iyi turimo	
How long have you served as a Councillor? / Umaze igihe kingana iki uri Umujyanama	1. Less than one year/Munsi y'umwaka	
	2. Between 1 and 5 years/Hagati y"umwaka 1 n'imyaka 5	
	3. Between 5 and 10 years /Hagati y'imyaka 5 n'imyaka 10	
	4. More than 10 years/Hejuru y'imyaka 10	

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

B. Constituents and Councillors interactions/ Imikoranire hagati y'abajyanama n'ibyiciro by'abaturage bahagarariye

Awareness about citizen representation and levels of satisfaction / Ubumenyi ku bajyanama n'uko bishimiwe	
Citizens/Constituents/Bigenewe abaturage bahagarariwe	Elected Local Councillors / Bigenewe Abajyanama
Preliminary Questions / Ibibazo by'ibanze	Preliminary Questions / Ibibazo by'ibanze

1. Are you aware of the existence of the Elected Local Councillors? / Ese waba uzi niba hari abajyamana baguhagarariye mu nzego z'ibanze?
   1. Very much aware / Ndabizi cyane
   2. Much aware / Ndabizi
   3. Aware / Ndabizi biringaniye
   4. Less aware / Ndabizi buhoro
   5. I am not aware / Simbizi
	-

2. Who are the Elected Local Councillors do you know most (Select one response!) / Ni ku ruhe rwego uzimo Abajyanama benshi kurusha izindi (Hitamo igisubizo kimwe gusa)
   1. Elected Local Councillors at Village level / Abo ku rwego rw'umudugudu
   2. Elected Local Councillors at Cell level /Abo ku rwego rw'akagari
   3. Elected Local Councillors at Sector level / Abo ku rwego rw'umurenge
   4. Elected Local Councillors at District level / Abo ku rwego rw'akarere
	-

3. Whom of the Elected Local Councillors do you know? / Ni abajyanama bangahe uzi kuri urwo rwego?
   1. I know all members /Bose ndabazi
   2. I know some of the members /Bamwe ndabazi
   3. I only know the president of the Council / Nzi perezida wa Njyanama gusa
   4. I don't know any of the members / Nta n'umwe nzi
	1. To what extent do citizens know that you represent them in the Council? / Ni ku kihe kigereranyo abaturage bazi ko ubahagarariye muri Njyanama
	   1. To a great extent / Barabizi ku rwego rwo hejuru
	   2. To some extent Barabizi ku rwego ruringaniye
	   3. Little / Bazi gake
	   4. Very litte / Bazi gake k'ubusa busa

4. What factors incited people to become your Councillors / Wumva ari izihe mpamvu zituma abantu bashaka kuba Abajyanama
   1. They expressed interests to represent us / Guharanira inyungu zacu
   2. Citizens requested them to represent us / Abaturage babasaba kuduhagaraira
   3. They were targeting other higher positions / Baba bagamije kujya mu myanya yo hejuru
   4. I don't know / Simbizi
   5. Other (please indicate) /ibindi (sobanura)……………
	2. What factors incited you to become a Councillor? / Ni izihe mpamvu zatumye ushaka kuba umujyanama?
	   1. I was willing to represent citizens / Guhagararira abaturage
	   2. itizens requested me to represent them / Abaturage bansabye kubahagararira
	   3. I was targeting other higher positions / Nashakaga kuzamuka mu nzego zo hejuru
	   4. Other (please indicate)/ izindi mpamvu (sobanura)……………

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

5. Are you aware of the duties/responsibilities of your lElected Local Councillors? / Ese waba uzi inshingano z'Abajyanama mu nzego z'ibanze ku kihe kigero? 1. Very much aware /Ndazizi cyane rwose 2. Much aware / Ndazizi 3. Fairly aware / Ndazizi biringaniye 4. Less aware/Nzi nkeya 5. Not aware / Sinzizi	3. Are you informed about your responsibilities as an Elected Local Councillor? / Ese waba uzi inshingano zawe nk'Umujyanama ku kihe kigero? 1. Very much aware /Ndazizi cyane rwose 2. Much aware / Ndazizi 3. Fairly aware / Ndazizi biringaniye 4. Less aware/Nzi nkeya; 5. Not aware / Sinzizi
6. How much do you think Elected Local Councillors know about their responsibilities? / Ni mu ruhe rugero utekereza ko Abajyanama bazi inshingano zabo? 1. They all know their responsibilities / Bose bazi inshingano zabo 2. Only few know their responsibilities / Ni bake bazi inshingano zabo 3. They don't know their responsibilities / Ntibazi inshingano zabo 4. I have no idea / Ntacyo mbiziho	4. Do you know your responsibilities as provided by the law? / Ese waba uzi inshingano zawe nk'uko ziteganywa n'amategeko? 1. I know all of them / Ndazizi zose 2. I know some of them / Nzi zimwe muri zo 3. I know very little / Nzi nke cyane 4. I don't know any / Nta n'imwe nzi
7. What of the following do your Elected Councillors do? / Muri ibi bikurikira ni ikihe abajyanama bakora (Many responses are possible/ Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka) 1. To consult citizens before making decisions / Batega amatwi ibyifuzo by'abaturage mbere yo kubifataho umwanzuro 2. To serve their own interests / Bashyira inyungu zabo imbere 3. To represent the will of citizens/Constituents / Baharanira inyungu z'abaturage bahagarariye muri Njyanama 4. To impose decisions on citizens/Constituencies / Bategeka abaturage gushyira mu bikorwa imyanzuro yafashwe na Njyanama 5. To bridge a link between citizens/constituencies and local leaders / Bahuza abaturage bahagarariye n'abayobozi b'inzego z'ibanze 6. To interact with their constituencies/citizens over their needs / Kujya inama n'abaturage bahagarariye ku bibazo bahura na byo 7. To provide feedback to constituencies / Guha rapora abaturage bahagarariye ku myanzuro ifatirwa muri Njyanama ku bibazo bahura na bo 8. I have no idea/ Ntacyo mbiziho	5. Which of the following responsibilities are you supposed to do for your Constituents? / Ni izihe nshingano muri izi zikurikira ufite ku baturage uhagarariye? (Many responses are possible/ Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka) 1. To consult citizens before making decisions/ Gutega amatwi ibyifuzo by'abaturage mbere yo kubifataho umwanzuro muri Njyanama 2. To serve personal interests / Kwita ku nyungu zanjye nk'Umujyanama 3. To represent the will of citizens/Constituents / Guhagararira inyungu z'abaturage mpagarariye muri Njyanama 4. To impose decisions on citizens/constituencies/ kwikoreza abaturage/ibyiciro by'abaturage imyanzuro 5. To bridge a link between citizens/constituencies and local leaders / Guhuza abaturage mpagarariye n'ubuyobozi bw'inzego z'ibanze 6. To interact with constituencies/citizens over their needs / Kujya inama n'abaturage mpagarariye mu bibazo bahura na byo 7. To provide feedback to constituencies / Guha abaturage mpagarariye rapora ku myanzuro ifatirwa muri Njyanama ku bibazo bahura na bo 8. I have no idea / Ntacyo mbiziho

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

8. In real practice what do Councillors do? / Mu buryo bufatika, Abajyanama babakora iki? (There is possibility of many responses / Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)	6. In real practice what do you do for your Constituents? / Mu buryo bufatika mukorera iki abaturage muhagarariye muri Njyanama? (There is possibility of many responses / Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
1. They consult citizens before making decisions / Batega amatwi ibyifuzo by'abaturage mbere yo kubifataho umwanzuro 2. They serve their own interests / Bashyira inyungu zabo imbere 3. They make decisions without first consulting citizens/Constituents / Bafata imyanzuro idashingiye ku byifuzo by'abaturage bahagarariye muri Njyanama 4. They represent the will of citizens/Constituents / Baharanira inyungu z'abaturage bahagarariye 5. They impose decisions on citizens/constituencies / Bategeka abaturage bahagarariye kubahiriza imyanzuro yafashwe na Njyanama 6. They bridge a link between citizens/constituencies and local leaders/ Bahuza abaturage bahagarariye n'abayobozi b'inzego z'ibanze 7. They interact with their constituencies/citizens over their needs / Bajya inama n'abaturage bahagarariye ku bibazo bahura na byo 8. They provide feedback to constituencies / Baha rapiro abaturage bahagarariye ku myanzuro ifatirwa muri Njyanama ku bibazo bahura na bo 9. They do nothing / Ntacyo bakora; 10. Other/Ikindi:..	1. I consult citizens before making decisions/ Numva ibyifuzo by'abaturage mpagarariye mbere yo kubifataho imyanzuro muri Njyanama 2. I serve personal interests / Mparanira inyungu zanjye 3. I make decisions without first consulting citizens/Constituents / Mparanira ko ibyifuzo by'abaturage mpagarariye bishingirwaho mu gufata imyanzuro muri Njyanama 4. I represent the will of citizens/Constituents / Mpagararira inyungu z'abaturage mpagarariye 5. I impose decisions on citizens/constituencies / Mpamagaririra abaturage mpagarariye kubahiriza imyanzuro ifatwa muri Njyanama 6. I bridge a link between citizens/constituencies and local leaders / Mpuza abaturage mpagarariye n'abayobozi b'inzego z'ibanze 7. I interact with my Constituency over felt needs / Njya inama n'abaturage mpagarariye ku bibazo bahura na byo 8. I provide feedback to my Constituency / Ntanga rapiro ku baturage mpagarariye ku myanzuro ifatirwa muri Njyanama ku bibazo bahura na bo 9. I do not do anything / Ntacyo nkora gihambaye; 10. Other/Ikindi:..

-	7. Do you feel having enough power to make the Council consider your constituents' priority needs/ Ese wumva ufite ubushobozi buhagije bwatuma Njyanama ifata umwanzuro ushimishije abaturage uhagarariye?
	    1. Yes / Yego
	    2. No / Oya

9. What is your general level of satisfaction about the delivery of your Elected Councillors? / Ni mu ruhe rugero wumva unyuzwe n'uko Abajyamana babahagarariye?
    1. Very satisfied/ Ndayuzwe cyane
    2. Satisfied / Ndanyuzwe
    3. Fairly statisfied / Ndanyuzwe biringaniye
    4. Less satisfied / Nyuzwe gake
    5. Not satisfied / Sinyuzwe na mba
	8. What is your impression on the amount of time you devote to the Councillorship? / Wavuga iki ku gihe/umwanya umurimo w'Ubujyanama ugusaba?
	    1. Councillorship takes much of my time / Ubujyanama buntwara igihe kinini
	    2. The time Councillorship requires me is relatively acceptable / Igihe Ubujyanama buntwara kiragereranyije
	    3. I always have enough time for Councillorship/ Mfite igihe gihagije cyo gukora umurimo w'Ubujyanama

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

10. What is your level of trust in Elected Councillors? Ni ku kihe kigero ugirira ikizere abajyanama	9. What is your level of trust in your Constituents / Ni ku kihe kigero ugirira ikizere ikiciro cy'abaturage uhagarariye
1. Very high trust / Icyizere cyinshi cyane 2. High trust / Icyizere cyinshi 3. Fair trust / Icyiizere kiringaniye 4. Low trust / Icyizere gike 5. Very low trust I / Icyizere gike cyane; 6. None at all/Nta na gike	1. Very high trust/ Icyizere gike cyane 2. High trust / Icyizere cyinshi 3. Fair trust / Icyizere kiringaniye 4. Low trust/ Icyizere gike 5. Very low trust / Icyizere gike cyane; 6. None at all/Nta na gike
Interactions between Councillors and Constituencies / Imikoranire hagati y'abajyanama n'ibyiciro by'abaturage bahagarariwe	**Interactions between Councillors and Constituencies//**Imikoranire hagati y'abajyanama n'ibyiciro by'abaturage bahagarariwe
11. Whom do you <u>often</u> seek for support among the following? / Muri aba bakurikira ni nde wiyambaza akenshi kurusha abandi iyo ugize ikibazo ukeneyeho ubufasha? (Select only one response / Hitamo igisubizo kimwe gusa) 1. Mayor / Umuyobozi w'akarere 2. Executive secretary (Gitifu)/ Umunyamabanga Nshigwabikorwa w'Akarere 3. Executive secretary (Gitifu)/ Umunyamabanga Nshigwabikorwa w'Umurenge 4. Executive secretary (Gitifu)/ Umunyamabanga Nshigwabikorwa w'Akagari; 5. Umuyobozi w'Umudugudu; 6. The military / Inzego z'umutekano (ingabo): 7. The police / Inzego z'umutekano (polisi): 8. District Administrative Security Support Organ (DASSO) / Inzego z'umutekano (DASSO): 9. Reserve Force / Inzego z'umutekano (inkeragutabara) 10. Chairperson of the Council / Perezida wa Njyanama 11. Any member of the Council / Umwe mu bajyanama uwo are we wese 12. Mediators / Abunzi 13. Others / abandi (Specify/ Sobanura)	10. Whom do citizens <u>often</u> seek for support among the following? / Muri aba bakurikira ni nde wiyambazwa akenshi kurusha abandi iyo abaturage bagize ikibazo bakeneyeho ubufasha (Only one response / Hitamo igisubizo kimwe gusa) 1. Mayor / Umuyobozi w'akarere 2. Executive secretary (Gitifu)/ Umunyamabanga Nshigwabikorwa w'Akarere 3. Executive secretary (Gitifu)/ Umunyamabanga Nshigwabikorwa w'Umurenge 4. Executive secretary (Gitifu)/ Umunyamabanga Nshigwabikorwa w'Akagari; 5. Umuyobozi w'Umudugudu; 6. The military / Inzego z'umutekano (ingabo): 7. The police / Inzego z'umutekano (polisi): 8. District Administrative Security Support Organ (DASSO): 9. Reserve Force / Inzego z'umutekano (inkeragutabara): 10. Chairperson of the Council / Perezida wa Njyanama 11. Any member of the Council / Umwe mu bajyanama ubonetse wese 12. Mediators / Abunzi 13. Others / abandi (Specify/ Sobanura) ....
12. Whom of the following councillors do you most seek support from? /Ni uwhe mujyanama muri aba bakurikira wiyambaza kenshi. 1. Any member of the Council / Umujyanama uwo ari we wese 2. Only the Chairperson of the Council / Perezida wa njyanama gusa 3. The President of the appropriate Commission / Perezida wa Komisiyo	11. Whom of the following councillors do citizens most seek support from?/Ni uwhe mujyanama muri aba bakurikira wiyambazwa kenshi n'abaturage? 1. Any member of the Council/ Umujyanama uwo ari we wese 2. Only the Chairperson of the Council/ Perezida wa njyanama gusa 3. The President of Commission/ perezida wa komisiyo

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

ishinzwe ikibazo nshakaho ubufasha	
13. Who initiates the interactions between you and Elected Local Councillors? / Ni nde usembura imikoranire hagati yawe n'abajyanama? (Many responses are possible / Ibisubizo byinshi biremewe) 1. Citizens/Constituents / Abaturage bahagarariwe muri Njyanama 2. Local Councillors / Bamwe mu bajyanama 3. Local Council / Inama Njyanama 4. Lacal authorities authorities / Abayobozi b'inzego z'ibanze 5. Political parties / Imitwe ya politiki 6. Security organs / Inzego z"umutekano 7. Opinion leaders / Abavuga rikumvikana; 8. Civil society/Sosiyete sivili 9. Others (please specify) / abandi (bavuge)….	12. Who initiates the interactions between you and your Constituency? / Ni nde usembura imikoranire hagati yawe n'abaturage? (Many responses are possible / Ibisubizo byinshi biremewe. 1. Citizens/Constituents / Abaturage mpagarariye 2. Local Councillors / Abajyanama turi kumwe muri Njyanama 3. Local Council / Inama Njyanama 4. Local authorities/ Abayobozi b'inzego z'ibanze 5. Political parties / Imitwe ya politiki 6. Security organs / Inzego z"umutekano 7. Opinion leaders / Abavuga rikumvikana 10. Sosiyete sivili 8. Others (please specify) / abandi (bavuge)….
14. How valuable are the <u>interactions</u> between citizens and Elected Councillors? / Ese ubona imikoranire isesuye hagati y'Abajyanama n'abaturage bahagarariye ifite akamaro? 1. Much worthwhile / Ifite akamaro cyane 2. Worthwhile / Ifite akamaro 3. Fairly worthwhile / Ifite akamaro karinganiye 4. Less worthwhile / Ifite akamaro gake 5. Not worthwhile at all / Ntakamaro ifite na mba	13. Do you consider <u>worthwhile</u> the <u>interactions</u> between Elected Councillors and Constituencies? / Ese ubona imikoranire isesuye hagati y'Abajyanama n'ibyiciro by'abaturage bahagarariwe ifite akamaro? 1. Much worthwhile / Ifite akamaro cyane 2. Worthwhile / Ifite akamaro 3. Fairly worthwhile / Ifite akamaro karinganiye 4. Less worthwhile / Ifite akamaro gake 5. Not worthwhile at all / ntakamaro ifite na mba
15. How <u>often</u> do Elected Councillors <u>interact</u> with citizens? / Ese ni kenshi Abajyanama bakora gahunda yo guhura namwe abaturage bahagarariye? 1. Always / Ni kenshi 2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe 3. Never/ Nta na rimwe	14. How <u>often</u> do you <u>interact</u> with your Constituency? / Ese ni kenshi ukora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage uhagarariye? 1. Always / Ni akenshi 2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe 3. Never / Nta na rimwe
16. How many times do Elected Local Councillors approximately plan to interact with their Constituencies? / Ugereranije, ni inshuro zingahe abajyanama bakora gahunda yo guhura namwe nk'abaturage bahagarariye? 1. At least once a week / Byibuze rimwe mu cyumweru 2. At least once a month / Byibuze rimwe mu kwezi 3. At least once a quarter / Byibuze rimwe mu gihembwe; 4. At least once every six months/ Byibuze rimwe mu mezi atandatu;	15. How many times do you approximately plan to interact with your Constituency? / Ugereranije, ni inshuro zingahe ukora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage uhagarariye? 6. At least once a week / Byibuze rimwe mu cyumweru 7. At least once a month / Byibuze rimwe mu kwezi 8. At least once a quarter / Byibuze rimwe mu gihembwe; 9. At least once every six months/ Byibuze rimwe mu mezi atandatu; 10. At least once a year/ Byibuze rimwe mu mwaka

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

5. At least once a year/ Byibuze rimwe mu mwaka	

17. Which of the Local Councills do <u>most</u> plans to interact with citizens? / Ni uruhe muri izi nzego zihagarariye abaturage rukora gahunda yo guhura nabo kenshi kurusha izind (Select only one response / Hitamo urwego rumwe)
     1. Village Council / Komite Nyobozi y'umudugudu
     2. Cell Councill / Njyanama y'Akagari
     3. Sector Council / Njyanama y'Umurenge
     4. District Council / Njyanama y'Akarere
	16. Which of the Local Councills do citizens <u>most </u>interact with? / Ni uruhe muri izi nzego zihagarariye abaturage rukora gahunda yo guhura nabo kenshi kurusha izindi (Select one response / Hitamo urwego rumwe)
	     1. Village Council / Komite Nyobozi y'umudugudu
	     2. Cell Councill / Njyanama y'Akagari
	     3. Sector Council / Njyanama y'Umurenge
	     4. District Council / Njyanama y'Akarere

18. How regular did Elected Councillors plan to interact with citizens <u>between 2011 and 2015</u>? / Ese ni buri gihe abajyanama bagiye bakora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage bahagarariye?
     1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
     2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe
     3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe
	17. How regular did you plan to consult/interact with your Constituency <u>between 2011 and 2015</u>? (To be only answered by those who served the previous terms)/ Ese ni buri gihe wagiye ukora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage uhagarariye hagati y'umwaka wa 2011 na 2015? (Gisubizwa n'Abajyanama babaye no muri manda zabanjirije iyi ya 2016)
	     1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
	     2. Sometimes regular / Rimwe na rimwe
	     3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe

19. <u>How regular did Elected Councillors plan consult/interact</u> with citizens <u>since March 2016</u>? / Ese ni kenshi abajyanama bagiye bakora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage bahagarariye kuva muri Werurwe 2016 batorwa kugeza magingo aya?
     1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
     2. Sometimes regular / Rimwe na rimwe
     3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe
	18. How regular <u>did you plan to consult/interact</u> with citizens <u>since March 2016</u>? / Ese ni buri gihe wagiye ukora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage uhagarariye kuva watorwa muri Werurwe 2016 kugeza magingo aya?
	     1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
	     2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe
	     3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe

20. For what <u>purpose did Elected Local Councillors plan to interact</u> with you over the last five years? (Many responses are possible) / Ni izihe mpamvu zatumye abajyanama bakora gahunda yo guhura namwe mu myaka itanu ishize (Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
     1. To collect priority needs expressed by Citizens/Constituents / Kwakira ibyifuzo by'abaturage bahagarariye
     2. To give feedback on decisions made at the Local Council level / Gutanga raporo ku myanzuro yafashwe na Njyanama
     3. To explain to Constituents why some of their needs were or not considered at Local Council level / gusobanurira abaturage bahagarariye ibyagendeweho Njyanama ifata umwanzuro ku byifuzo
	19. For what <u>purpose/aim did you plan to meet/consult/interact</u> with your Constituency following your election? (Many responses are possible) / Ni izihe mpamvu zatumye ukora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage uhagarariye kuva watorwa? (Ibisubizo byinshi biremewe)
	     1. To collect priority needs expressed by Citizens/Constituents / Kwakira ibyifuzo by'abaturage bahagarariye
	     2. To give feedback on decisions made at the Local Council level / Gutanga raporo ku myanzuro yafashwe na Njyanama
	     3. To explain to Constituents why some of their needs were or not considered at Local Council level / gusobanurira abaturage bahagarariye ibyagendeweho Njyanama ifata umwanzuro ku byifuzo byabo

150

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

byabo 4. To give Constituents unilateral orders / Gutanga amabwiriza ntakuka y'inzego z'ubuyobozi bw'igihugu 5. To force Constituents to implement decisions / Guhamagarira abaturage bahagararire gushyira mu bikorwa amabwiriza yatanzwe n'inzego 6. I don't know / Simbizi 7. Other (specify) /I bindi (bisobanure)…………….	4. To give Constituents unilateral orders / Gutanga amabwiriza ntakuka y'inzego z'ubuyobozi bw'igihugu 5. To force Constituents to implement decisions / Guhamagarira abaturage bahagararire gushyira mu bikorwa amabwiriza yatanzwe n'inzego 6. I don't know / Simbizi 7. Other (specify) /I bindi (bisobanure)……………

21. Are you aware of what regulations say about the frequency of interactions between Elected Local Councillors and Citizens? / Ese waba uzi icyo amategeko ateganya ku byerekeye inshuro Abajyanama bagomba gukora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage bahagararire?
    1. Yes / Yego
    2. No / Oya
Gevels of citizens engagement
	20. Are you aware of what regulations say about the frequency of interaction between Elected Local Councillors and their Constituents? / Ese waba uzi icyo amategeko ateganya ku byerekeye inshuro Abajyanama bagomba gukora gahunda yo guhura n'abaturage bahagararire?
	    1. Yes / Yego
	    2. No / Oya

22. How often did Elected Councillors come to collect your proposal for solutions to your needs/problems over the last five years? / Ese ni kenshi Abajyanama bagiye baza kubabaza ibyifuzo mufite ku bisubizo by'ibibazo byanyu mu gihe cy'imyaka itanu ishize?
    1. Always / Ni kenshi
    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never/ Nta na rimwe
	21. How often did you go out to engage your Constituents in the search for solutions to their needs/problems over the last five years? (To be answered by who served both 2010 & 2016 terms)/ Ese ni kenshi mwagiye muza kubaza ibyifuzo abaturage muhagararire bafite ku bisubizo by'ibibazo byabo mu gihe cy'imyaka itanu ishize? (Gisubizwa n'abajyanama babaye muri manda ya 2010 n'iya 2016)
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

23. How regular did Elected Local Councillors come to collect your priority needs since 2010? / Ese ni buri gihe Abajyanama bagiye baza kubaza ibyifuzo by'abaturage bahagararire kuva mu mwaka wa 2010?
    1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
    2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe
	22. How regular did you go out to collect priority needs from your Constituents since 2010? / (To be answered by who served both 2010 & 2016 terms / Ese ni buri gihe wagiye ugaruka kubaza ibyifuzo by'abaturage uhagararire kuva muri 2010? (Gisubizwa n'abajyanama babaye muri manda ya 2010 n'iya 2016)
	    1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
	    2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe

24. How regular have Elected Local Councillors collected your priority needs since March 2016? / Ese ni kenshi abajyanama bagiye baza kukubaza ibyifuzo by'abaturage	23. How regular have gone out to collect priority needs from your Constituents since March 2016? / / Ese ni kenshi wagiye ujya kubaza ibyifuzo by'abaturage uhagararire kuva

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

bahagarariye kuva Werurwe 2016 kugeza magingo aya?
    1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
    2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe
	Werurwe 2016 kugeza magingo aya?
	    1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
	    2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe

25.What channels are generally used in your interactions with your Local Councillors? (Many responses are possible) / Ni izihe nzira/uburyo Abajyanama bakoresha ngo muhure nabo? (Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
  1.   1. Citizens Councils/ Inteko z'abaturage
  2.   Organized community meetings / Inama zihuza Abajyanama n'abaturage
  3.   Social media (internet) / /mbuga nkoranyambaga & murandasi (interineti)
  4.   Announcements in media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)/ amatangazo mu bitangazamakuru (radiyo, imboneshakure, ibinyamakuru)
  5.   Announcements in religious gatherings/ amatangazo yo mu nsengero no mu misigiti
  6.   Box of suggestions / Agasanduku k'ibitekerezo
  7.   Household visits / Gusura abaturage mu ngo zabo
  8.   Community works / umuganda
  9.   Convivial parties / Ubusabane
  10. Civic education academy / Itorero
  11. Notices on local administrative offices (Sector, Cell, District)/ amatangazo ku biro by'inzego z'ibanze (Umudugudu, Akagari, Umurenge, Akarere)
  12. Parents evenings / Imigoroba y'ababyeyi
  13. Opinion leaders/abavuga rikumvwa
  14. Others (indicate)/ Indi miyoboro (yivuge)……………….………..
	24. What channels are generally used in your interactions with your Constituents? (Many questions are possible) / Ni izihe nzira/uburyo mwifashisha ngo muhure n'abaturage muhagarariye? (Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
	    1. Citizens Councils/ Inteko z'abaturage
	    2. Organized community meetings / Inama zihuza Abajyanama n'abaturage
	    3. Social media (internet) / /mbuga nkoranyambaga & murandasi (interineti)
	    4. Announcements in media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)/ amatangazo mu bitangazamakuru (radiyo, imboneshakure, ibinyamakuru)
	    5. Announcements in religious gatherings/ amatangazo yo nsengero no mu misigiti
	    6. Box of suggestions / Agasanduku k'ibitekerezo
	    7. Household visits / Gusura abaturage mu ngo zabo
	    8. Community works / umuganda
	    9. Convivial parties / Ubusabane
	    10. Civic education academy / Itorero
	    11. Notices on local administrative offices (Sector, Cell, District)/ amatangazo ku biro by'inzego z'ibanze (Umudugudu, Akagari, Umurenge, Akarere)
	    12. Parents evenings / Imigoroba y'ababyeyi
	    13. Opinion leaders/abavuga rikumvwa
	    14. Others (indicate)/ Indi miyoboro (yivuge)……………….………..

26. Which of the following channels do you prefer to interact with your Elected Councillors? (Many responses are possible) / Wowe nk'umuturage ni iyihe nzira/uburyo ukunda gukoresha igihe ushaka kugaragariza abajyanama ibibazo byawe (Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
    1.   Citizens Councils/ Inteko z'abaturage
    2.   Organized community meetings / Inama zihuza Abajyanama n'abaturage
    3.   Social media (internet) / /mbuga nkoranyambaga & murandasi (interineti)
	25.Which of the following channels do you prefer to interact with your Constituents? / (Many responses are possible) Wowe nk'umujyanama ni iyihe nzira/uburyo ukunda gukoresha igihe ushaka kumenya ibibazo by'abaturage uhagarariye (Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
	    1. Citizens Councils/ Inteko z'abaturage
	    2. Organized community meetings / Inama zihuza Abajyanama n'abaturage
	    3. Social media (internet) / /mbuga nkoranyambaga & murandasi (interineti)

152

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

4. Announcements in media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)/ amatangazo mu bitangazamakuru (radiyo, imboneshakure, ibinyamakuru) 5. Announcements in religious gatherings/ amatangazo yo mu nsengero no mu misigiti 6. Box of suggestions / Agasanduku k'ibitekerezo 7. Household visits / Gusura abaturage mu ngo zabo 8. Community works / umuganda 9. Convivial parties / Ubusabane 10. Civic education academy / Itorero 11. Notices on local administrative offices (Sector, Cell, District)/ amatangazo ku biro by'inzego z'ibanze (Umudugudu, Akagari, Umurenge, Akarere) 12. Parents evenings / Imigoroba y'ababyeyi 13. Opinion leaders/abavuga rikumvwa 14. Others (indicate)/ Indi miyoboro (yivuge)……………….………..	4. Announcements in media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)/ amatangazo mu bitangazamakuru (radiyo, imboneshakure, ibinyamakuru) 5. Announcements in religious gatherings/ amatangazo yo mu nsengero no mu misigiti 6. Box of suggestions / Agasanduku k'ibitekerezo 7. Household visits / Gusura abaturage mu ngo zabo 8. Community works / umuganda 9. Convivial parties / Ubusabane 10. Civic education academy / Itorero 11. Notices on local administrative offices (Sector, Cell, District)/ amatangazo ku biro by'inzego z'ibanze (Umudugudu, Akagari, Umurenge, Akarere) 12. Parents evenings / Imigoroba y'ababyeyi 13. Opinion leaders/abavuga rikumvwa 14. Others (indicate)/ Indi miyoboro (yivuge)……………….………..

27. What channels/tools do Elected Local Councillors use to collect priority needs from Constituents? (Many responses are possible) / Ni ubuhe buryo abajyanama bakoresha kugira ngo bakure ibyifuzo mu baturage b'ibyiciro bahagarariye? (Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
   1. Citizens Councils / Inteko z'abaturage
   2. Organized community meetings / Inama n'abaturage
   3. Social media (internet) / Murandasi (interineti)
   4. Announcements in media (Radio, TV, Newspapers) / Amatangazo mu bitangazamakuru(radiyo, imboneshakure, ibinyamakuru)
   5. Announcements in religious gatherings / Amatangazo yo mu kiliziya n"amateraniro
   6. Box of suggestions / Agasanduku k'ibitekerezo
   7. Household visits / Kubatemberera mu ngo zabo
   8. Community works / Umuganda
   9. Community self-help activities / Ubudehe
   10. Convivial parties / Ubusabane
   11. Civic education academy / Itorero
   12. Notices on local administrative offices (Sector, Cell, District)/
	26. What channels/tools do you use to collect priority needs from your Constituents? / (Many responses are possible) Ni ubuhe buryo ukoresha kugira ngo ubone ibyifuzo mu buaturage uhagarariye? (Ibisubizo byinshi birashoboka)
	   1. Citizens Councils / Inteko z'abaturage
	   2. Organized community meetings / Inama n'abaturage
	   3. Social media (internet) / Murandasi (interineti)
	   4. Announcements in media (Radio, TV, Newspapers) / Amatangazo mu bitangazamakuru (radiyo, imboneshakure, ibinyamakuru)
	   5. Announcements in religious gatherings / Amatangazo yo mu kiliziya n"amateraniro
	   6. Box of suggestions / Agasanduku k'ibitekerezo
	   7. Household visits / Kubatemberera mu ngo zabo
	   8. Community works / Umuganda
	   9. Community self-help activities / Ubudehe
	   10. Convivial parties / Ubusabane
	   11. Civic education academy / Itorero
	   12. Notices on local administrative offices (Sector, Cell, District)/ Amatangazo ku

153

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Amatangazo ku biro (akagari, Umurenge, akarere) 13. Parents evenings / Imigoroba y'ababyeyi 14. Opinion leaders / abavuga rikumvikana 15. None of the suggested channels / Nta na kimwe mu byavuzwe hejuru 16. Others (indicate)/ ubundi buryo (buvuge)…………….	biro (akagari, Umurenge, akarere) 13. Parents evenings / Imigoroba y'ababyeyi 14. Opinion leaders / abavuga rikumvikana 15. None of the suggested channels / Nta na kimwe mu byavuzwe hejuru 16. Others (indicate)/ ubundi buryo (buvuge)…………….
28. How <u>often</u> do you suggest solutions to Elected Local Councillors to address identified needs/problem? / Ese ni kenshi abaturage baha Abajyanama babahagarariye inama y'uko ibibazo/ibyifuzo bahura na byo byakemuka? 1. Always / Ni kenshi 2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe 3. Never/ Nta na rimwe 4. If the answer is never, why? / Niba igisubizo ari <u>'nta na rimwe'</u>, sobanura impamvu: ……………	27. How <u>often</u> do your Constituents suggest solutions to address their identified needs/problems? / Ese ni kenshi ujya abaturage uhagarariye baguha inama y'uko ibibazo/ibyifuzo bahura na byo byakemuka? 1. Always / Ni kenshi 2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe 3. Never/ Nta na rimwe
29. How <u>regular</u> do you suggest solutions to Elected Local Councillors to address identified needs? /Ese ni <u>kenshi</u> abaturage baha baha Abajyanama babahagarariye inama y'uko ibibazo byabo byakemuka? 1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe 2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe 3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe	28. How <u>regular</u> do your Constituents suggest solutions to Elected Local Councillors to address their identified needs? / Ese ni <u>kenshi</u> abaturage muhagarariye bagiye batanga inama y'uko ibibazo bahura/ibyifuzo na byo byakemuka 1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe 2. Sometime regular / Rimwe na rimwe 3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe
30. Do Elected Local Councillors ever help you to identify <u>your real needs</u>? / Ese Abajyanama bajya bafasha abaturage bahagarariye gusobanukirwa n'ibisubizo nyakuri kugirango ibibazo bahura nabyo mu buzima bicyemuke? 1. Yes / Yego 2. No / Oya	29. Do you ever help you Constituents to identify their <u>real</u> needs? / Ese mujya mufasha abaturage bahagarariye gusobanukirwa n'ibisubizo nyakuri kugirango ibibazo bahura nabyo mu buzima bicyemuke? 1. Yes / Yego 2. No / Oya
31. Do you ever reach any consensus with Elected Local Councillors about your <u>real needs</u>? / Ese hari igihe mujya mubasha kwemeranwa n'Abajyanama ku bibazo bihari'? 1. Always / Ni kenshi 2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe 3. Never / Nta na rimwe 4. If the answer is never, who decides? Niba igisubizo ari 'Nta na rimwe', ni nde wemeza ibibazo bihangayikishije: …………………	30. Do you ever reach any consensus with Constituents about their <u>real needs</u>?/ Ese hari igihe mujya mubasha kwemeranwa hamwe n'abaturage muhagarariye ku bibazo bahura na byo mu buzima'? 1. Always / Ni kenshi 2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe 3. Never / Nta na rimwe
32. How <u>often</u> do Elected Local Councillors advise you to identify your priority needs? /	31. How <u>often</u> do you advise your Constituents to identify their priority needs? / Ni

154

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

Ni kangahe Abajyanama bafasha abaturage bahagarariye gushakashaka ibisubizo by'ibibazo bahura na byo mu buzima?
    1. Always / Ni akenshi
    2. Sometimes /Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never / Nta na rimwe
	kangahe mufasha abaturage muhagarariye gutekereza ibisubizo by'ibibazo bahura na byo mu buzima?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

33. How regular do Elected Local Councillors advise you on how to prioritize your needs? / Ese ni kenshi Abajyanama bafasha abaturage bahagarariye gusumbanyisha ibibazo bahura na byo mu buzima?
    1. Always regular /Ni kenshi
    2. Sometimes regular / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never regular / Nta na rimwe
	32.How regular do you advise your Constituency on how to prioritize their needs?/ Ese ni buri gihe mufasha abaturage muhagarariye gusumbanya ibibazo bahura na byo mu buzima?
	    1. Always regular / Akenshi buri gihe
	    2. Sometimes regular / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never regular / Ntabwo ari buri gihe

34. How often do Elected Local Councillors ever give you an opportunity to suggest solutions to your needs/problems? / Ese hari igihe Abajyanama bajya baha abaturage bahagarariye amahirwe yo gutanga ibitekerezo by'uko ibibazo byabo byakemuka?
    1. Always / Ni kenshi
    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never / Nta na rimwe
 	
Feedback to constituencies
	33. Do you ever give an opportunity to your Constituents to suggest solutions to their needs/problems? / Ese hari igihe ujya utanga urubuga ku baturage uhagarariye ngo bakubwire uko bumva ibibazo byabo byakemuka?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

35. Do Elected Local Councillors ever give you feedback about final decisions made at the Local Council level? / Hari ubwo Abajyanama bagaruka kubabwira ibyemezo Njyanama cyangwa izindi nzego zafashe ku byifuzo n'ibitekerezo byanyu?
    1. Always / Ni akenshi
    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never / Nta na rimwe
	34. Do you ever give feedback about final decisions made by the local Council? / Hari ubwo mugaruka ku baturage muhagarariye kubabwira ibyemezo Njyanama cg izindi nzego zafashe ku byifuzo n'ibitekerezo baba batanze?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes /Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

36. How often did Elected Local Councillors give you feedback about final decisions made at the level of Local Council between 2011-2015? / Ni kangahe Abajyanama bagiye bagaruka kubasangiza imyanzuro yafashwe na Njyanama mu gihe cy'imyaka itanu ishize?
    1. Always / Ni kenshi cyane
    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never / Nta na rimwe
	35. How often did you give you feedback about final decisions made at the level of Local Council since you were elected Local Councillor? / Ni kenshi wagiye gusangiza abaturage uhagarariye imyanzuro yafashw Njyanama mu gihe cy'imyaka itanu ishize?
	
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi cyane
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

155

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

37. How often did the feedback about final decisions made at the Local Council level reflect your priority needs between 2011-2015? / Ni kenshi imyanzuro ya Njyanama yagiye isubiza ku buryo bushimishije ibyifuzo by'abaturage hagati ya 2011 na 2015?
 	
    1.   Always / Ni kenshi
    2.   Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3.   Never / Nta na rimwe
	36. How often did your feedback about final decisions reflect the priority needs of your Constituents between 2011-2015? (To be answered by those who served the previous term)/ Ni kenshi imyanzuro ya Njyanama yagiye isubiza ku buryo bushimishije ibyifuzo by'abaturage uhagarariye hagati ya 2011 na 2015? (Gisubizwa n'abakoze manda ya 2010 & 2016)
	    1. Always / Ni akenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

38. How often did the feedback about final decisions made at the Local Council level reflect your priority needs since March 2016? / Ni kenshi Njyanama yafashe ibyemezo ku byifuzo n'ibitekerezo mwashyikirije Umujyanama wanyu kuva Werurwe 2016 kugeza magingo aya?
    1.   Always / Ni kenshi
    2.   Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3.   Never / Nta na rimwe
	37. How often did your feedback about final decisions reflect the priority needs of your Constituents since March 2016?/ Ni kenshi Njyanama yafashe ibyemezo ku byifuzo n'ibitekerezo abaturage uhagarariye bagushyikirije kuva Werurwe 2016 kugeza magingo aya?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

39. Are there any of your needs that found no appropriate response at the level of the Local Council? Haba hari bimwe mu byifuzo mwashyikirije Abajyanama ntibyabona umwanzuro ubashimishije?
    1.   Yes / Yego
    2.   No / Oya
	38. Does the Local Council address all your Constituents' priority needs / Ese Njyanama yakemuye ibibazo byose abaturage uhagarariye bagushyikirije?
	    1. Yes / Yego
	    2. No / Oya

40. How often do Elected Local Councillors explain to you why the Local Council has or not considered some of your priority needs since March 2016? (To be answered by those with 1) in Question 37) / Kuva muri Werurwe 2016, ni kenshi Abajyanama bagaruka kubasobanurira impamvu bimwe mu byifuzo byanyu biba bitabonewe umwanzuro uzimishije? (Gisubizwa n'abasubije 1) mu kibazo cya 37)
    1.   Always / Ni kenshi
    2.   Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3.   Never / Nta na rimwe
	39. How often do you explain to your Constituents why the Local Council has or not considered some priority needs of the Constituents since March 2016? / Ni kenshi usobanurira abatuturage uhagarariye impamvu ziba zashingiweho bifatirwe umwanzuro runaka?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

41. How many times have your Local Councillor ever explained to you why the Council has or not considered some of their priority need up to now? / Kugeza ubu ni kangahe wasobanuriwe n'abajyanama baguhagarariye ibibazo byawe n'ibyifuzo bititaweho mu myanzuro hagati ya 2011-2015?
    1.Always / Ni kenshi
    2.Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3.Never / Nta na rimwe
	40. How many times have you ever explained to your Constituency why the Council has or not considered some of their priority need up to now?/ Kugeza ubu ni kangahe wasobanuriye abaturage uhagarariye impamvu ibibazo n'ibyifuzo byabo bititaweho mu buryo runaka hagati ya 2011-2015?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

42. How <u>regular</u> do Elected Local Councillors explain to you why the Council has or not considered some of your priority need? / Ese ni buri gihe Abajyanama babasobanura impamvu ibibazo byanyu byitaweho cyangwa bititaweho na Njyanama?
    1. Always regular/ Ni kenshi
    2. Sometimes regular / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never regular / Nta na rimwe
	41. How <u>regular</u> did you explain to your Constituents why the Local Council has or not considered some of their priority need? / Ni buri gihe usobanurira abaturage uhagarariye impamvu Njyanama iba yafashe imyanzuro runaka ku bibazo byabo?
	    1. Always regular / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes regular / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never regular/ Nta na rimwe

43. What is your level of satisfaction <u>about the feedback</u> by Elected Local Councillors <u>about</u> final decisions made the Local Council level? / Ni ku ruhe rugero wanyuzwe n'imyanzuro ifatirwa mu nama njyanama?
    1. Very high level / Naranyuzwe ku gipimo cyo hejuru cyane
    2. Highl level / Naranyuzwe ku gipimo cyo hejuru
    3. Average level / Naranyuzwe ku gipimo kiringaniye
    4. Low level / Naranyuzwe ku gipimo gito
    5. Very low level / Nanyuzwe ku gipimo gito cyane	

44. How convincing were the explanations about final decision made at the Local Council level by Elected Local Councillors<u>?</u> / Wanyuzwe n'ibisobanuro wahawe n'abajyanama ku myanzuro yafashwe na njyanama ku ruhe rugero?
    1. Very Convincing / Naranyuzwe cyane
    2. Convincing / Naranyuzwe
    3. Fairly Convincing / Naranyuzwe biringaniye
    4. Less convincing / Naranyuzwe gake
    5. Very unconvincing / Sinanyuzwe na gato
    6. Not at all / sinanyuzwe
Levels of citizens' empowered	

45. To what extent do you receive support from Elected Local Councillors to implement	42. To what extent to you offer support to your Constituents to implement the final

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

the final decisions addressing your needs? / Ni ku kihe kigereranyo Abajyanama bafasha abaturage bahagarariye gushyira mu bikorwa imyanzuro ibafasha gusubiza ibibazo bahura na byo mu buzima?
    1. To a great extent/ Birashimishije cyane
    2. To some extent / Birashimishije biringaniye
    3. To little extent / Birashimishije gato
    4. To very litte extent/ Birashimishije ku rugero ruto cyane
    5. No support at all/ Nta gishimishije na gato
	decisions addressing their needs? / Ni ku kihe kigero utanga raporo ku byiciro by'abaturage kugushyira mu bikorwa imyanzuro ya nyuma ku bisubizo by'ibibazo byabo?
	    1. To a great extent/ B̶irashimishije cyane
	    2. To some extent / B̶irashimishije biringaniye
	    3. To little extent / B̶irashimishije gato
	    4. To ery litte extent/ B̶irashimishije ku rugero ruto cyane
	    5. No support at all/ Nta gishimishije na gato

46. What is your overall level of satisfaction of your interactions with Elected Local Councillors? / Wishimira ute imikoranire y'abaturage n'Abajyanama babahagarariye?
    1. Very high level / nabyishimira cyane
    2. High level / ndabyishimira
    3. Moderate level / ndabyishimira biringaniye
    4. Low level / ndabyishimira gacye
    5. Very low level / ndabyishimira gake cyane
    6. No satisfaction at all /simbyishimira na gacye
	43. What is your overall level of satisfaction regarding your interactions with your Constituents? / Wishimira ute imikoranire y'Abajyanama n'abaturage bahagarariye?
	    1. Very high level / nabyishimira cyane
	    2. High level / ndabyishimira
	    3. Moderate level / ndabyishimira biringaniye
	    4. Low level / ndabyishimira gacye
	    5. Very low level / ndabyishimira gake cyane
	    6. No satisfaction at all /simbyishimira na gacye

47. Are there any challenges hindering the optimal regularity of interactions between you and Elected Local Councillors? / Ese haba hari imbogamizi zibangamira imikoranire isesuye hagati y'abajyanama n'abaturage bahagarariye?
    1. Yes / Yego
    2. No / Oya
    3. If there are some, list key ones / Niba ari zihari, vuga iz'ingenzi: ………
    4. If there are none, list some supporting factors/reasons and best practices / Niba ntazihari, vuga amahirwe ariho ubwo busabane bushingiyeho mu nzego z'ibanze………………………………
	44. Are there any challenges hindering the optimal regularity of interactions between you and your Constituents? / Ese haba hari imbogamizi zibangamira zibangamira imikoranire isesuye hagati y'abajyanama n'abaturage bahagarariye?
	    1. Yes / Yego
	    2. No / Oya
	    3. If there are some, list key ones / Niba ari zihari, vuga iz'ingenzi: ………
	    4. If there are none, list some supporting factors/reasons and best practices / Niba ntazihari, vuga amahirwe ariho ubwo busabane bushingiyeho mu nzego z'ibanze………………………………

Implications for accountable local governance / Kubazwa inshingano	**Implications for accountable local governance / Kumurika ibikorwa**i

48. Do Elected Local Councillors document and file your identified priority needs? / Ese abajyanama bandika ibyo bagejejweho n'abaturage bahagararirye kandi bakabishyingura ahantu hizewe?
    1. Always / Ni kenshi
    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
    3. Never / Nta na rimwe
    4. I have no idea / Ntacyo mbiziho
	45. Do Elected Local Councillors document and file the priority needs identified with Constituents? / Ese mwandika ibyo mwagejejweho n'abaturage muhagararirye kandi mukabishyingura ahantu hizewe?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

49. Where are files on priority needs kept? (To be responded by those who answered 1 & 2 on Question 48) /Inzandiko zigaragaza ibibazo n'ibyifuzo Abajyanama baganira n'abaturage bahagarariye zibikwa/zishyingurwa he? (Girasubizwa n'abasubuje 1 & 2 ku kibazo cya 48)
 	
    1.   Village office / Ku biro by'Umudugudu
    2.   Cell office / Ku biro by'Akagari
    3.   Sector office / Ku biro by'Umurenge
    4.   District office/ku biro by'Akarere
    5.   Others (indicate) / ahandi (havuge)…………………..
	46. Where do Elected Local Councillors keep files on identified priority needs? (To be responded by those who answered 1 & 2 on Question 45) / Inzandiko zigaragaza ibibazo n'ibyifuzo Abajyanama baganira n'abaturage bahagarariye zibikwa/zishyingurwa he? (Girasubizwa n'abasubuje 1 & 2 ikibazo cya 45)
	
	    1. Village office / Ku biro by'Umudugudu
	    2. Cell office / Ku biro by'Akagari
	    3. Sector office / Ku biro by'Umurenge
	    4. District office/ku biro by'Akarere
	    5. Others (indicate) / ahandi (havuge)…………………..

50. Should Elected Local Councillors be held accountable for their responsibilities? / Ese birakwiye ko Abajyanama babazwa n'abaturage babatoye buryo ki buzuza inshingano zabo?
 	
    1.   Very much / Birakwiye cyane
    2.   Sometimes / Birakwiye rimwe na rimwe
    3.   Never / Ntabwo bikwiye na rimwe
	47. Do you ever account for your responsibilities? / Ese wumva bikwiye wahora umurikira abaturage uhagarariye ibyo ubakorera n'uko ubikora?
	
	    1. Very much / Birakwiye cyane
	    2. Sometimes / Birakwiye rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Ntabwo bikwiye na rimwe

51. Who has the power to hold Elected Local Councillors accountable for their responsibilities? / Ni nde ufite ububasha bwo gusaba Abajyanama kumurikira abaturage ibyo babakora?
 	
    1.   Citizens/Constituents / Abaturage bahagarariwe
    2.   Local Councillors / Abajyanama
    3.   Local Council / Njyanama
    4.   Authorities/Leaders / Abayobozi
    5.   Political parties / Imitwe ya politiki
    6.   Security organs / Inzego z'umutekano
    7.   Opinion leaders / Abavuga rikumvikana
    8.   Others (please indicate) / Abandi (bavuge)….
	48. To whom do you account for your responsibilities? / Ni nde umurikira ibyo bakora?
	
	    1. Citizens/Constituents / Abaturage bahagarariwe
	    2. Local Councillors / Abajyanama
	    3. Local Council / Njyanama
	    4. Authorities/Leaders / Abayobozi
	    5. Political parties / Imitwe ya politiki
	    6. Security organs / Inzego z'umutekano
	    7. Opinion leaders / Abavuga rikumvikana
	    8. Others (please indicate) / Abandi (bavuge)….

52. How often have your Elected Local Councillors been held accountable for their responsibilities? /Ni kenshi mwasabye abajyanama babahagarariye kubamurikira ibyo babakorera?
 	
    1.   Always / Ni kenshi
    2.   Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	49. How often have you accounted for your responsibilities? / Ni kenshi umurikira abaturage uhagarariye ibyo ubakorera n'uko ubikora?
	    1. Always / Ni kenshi
	    2. Sometimes / Ni rimwe na rimwe
	    3. Never / Nta na rimwe

State of Elected Local Councillors and Constituency Interactions in Rwanda:
Implications for Accountable Local Governance

3. Never / Nta na rimwe 4. I don't know / Simbizi	

53. How <u>regular</u> have your Elected Local Councillors been held accountable for their responsibilities? (To be responded by those who answered 1 & 2 on Question 50)/ Ni buri gihe mwasabye Abajyanama babahagarariye basabwa kubamurikira ibyo babakora? (Gisubizwa n'uwasubije 1 & 2 ku kibazo cya 50)
     1. Always regularly / Akenshi ni buri gihe
     2. Sometimes regularly / Rimwe na rimwe ni buri gihe
     3. Never regularly / Ntabwo ari buri gihe
     4. I don't know / Simbizi
	50. How <u>regular</u> have you accounted of your responsibilities? (To be responded by those who answered 1 & 2 on Question 49)/ Ese ni buri gihewamurikiye abaturage ibyo bakora? (Gisubizwe gusa n'abasubije 1 & 2 ikibazo cya 49)
	 Ni buri gihe usabwa kumurikira abaturage uhahagarariye ibyo ubakorera bakora?
	     a) Always regularly / Kenshi buri gihe
	     b) Sometimes regularly /Rrimwe na rimwe buri gihe
	     c) Never regularly / Ntabwo ari buri gihe

54. What action would you take against failing Elected Local Councillors? / Ese ni iki wakora ubonye umujyanama atuzuza inshingano yatorewe?
     1. Reporting to administrative authorities / Kubimenyesha abayobozi
     2. Reporting to security organs / Kubimenyesha inzego z'umutekano
     3. Reporting to the Local Council / Kubimenyesha Njyanama
     4. Reporting to opinion leaders / Kubimenyesha abavuga rikumvikana
     5. Removing them from the Council through a vote of no-confidence / Kubeguza muri Njyanama hakoreshejwe amatora yo kubakuraho icyizere
     6. Removing them from the Local Council during the next election / Kutongera kubatora barangije manda
     7. Signing a petition / Hakoreshejwe urwandiko rumusabira kweguzwa
     8. I don't know/simbizi
     9. Other means (indicate)/ ubundi buryo (buvuge)…………	

55. .Do you think the failure of Elected Local Councillors in delivering expected outputs might impact on their re-election? / Utekereza ko ukutuzuza inshinga ku Mujyanama byabangamira amahirwe yo kongera kwitoza muri manda ikurikiraho?
     1. Yes / Yego
     2. No / Oya	

56. Have you ever refused to re-elect an Elected Local Councillor on the grounds of poor performance in previous terms? / Ese waba warigeze kwanga kongera gutora umujyanama kubera ko yakoze nabi muri manda ishize?
     1. Yes/yego
     2. No/oya	

Appendix 2: Geographical intervention zones of DALGOR Project

Names of DALGOR beneficiary Districts	Intervention Sectors per District	Intervention Cells per Sector	Intervention Villages per Cell
BURERA	1. Gatebe	1. Gabiro	1. *Nyakabungo*
			2. *Zihare*
		2. Musenda	3. *Sebukima*
			4. *Cyankaranka*
	2. Rugarama	3. Gafumba	5. *Bambiro*
			6. *Rugarama*
		4. Cyahi	7. *Rubeja*
			8. *Karutwe*
GASABO	3. Kimironko	5. Kibagabaga	9. *Rugero*
			10. *Ramiro*
		6. Nyagatovu	11. *Itetero*
			12. *Urugwiro*
	4. Gikomero	7. Munini	13. *Munini*
			14. *Runyinya*
		8. Murambi	15. *Kimisebeya*
			16. *Twina*
NGOMA	5. Remera	9. Bugera	17. *Gatare*
			18. *Munini*
		10. Kinunga	19. *Nyarugenge*
			20. *Urusagara*
	6. Mugesera	11. Ntaga	21. *Rukoki*
			22. *Akabande*
		12. Nyamugali	23. *Nyamabuye*
			24. *Gisenyi*
NYAMASHEKE	7. Gihombo	13. Gitwa	25. *Nyagahinga*
			26. *Gasharu*
		14. Butare	27. *Rwatsi*
			28. *Gahanda*
	8. Bushenge	15. Gasheke	29. *Kivoga*
			30. *Gikombe*
		16. Karusimbi	31. *Karusimbi*
			32. *Kigaga*
NYAMAGABE	9. Gasaka	17. Nyamugari	33. *Nyamugari*
			34. *Nyarusange*
		18. Nzega	35. *Gitantu*
			36. *Kagoma*
	10. Mugano	19. Gitondorero	37. *Maso*
			38. *Gakomeye*
		20. Suti	39. *Cyabute*
			40. *Turyango*

Appendix 3: Distribution of leaders involved in the survey

Elected Local Councillors

The determination of the sample size of Elected Local Councillors used the judgment sample design as follows:

1. *Six (6) of the members were sampled from the District Council* in line with the Law No 87/2013 of 11/09/2013☐ determining the organization and functioning of decentralized administrative entities (O*fficial Gazette no Special of 30/10/2013), Art.126,* p. 92:
    1) One of the Councillors elected at the Sector level;
    2) One of the members of the Bureau of the National Youth Council at the District level;
    3) The Coordinator of the National Women's Council at the District level;
    4) One of the female members to the Council;
    5) The Coordinator of the National Council of Persons with Disabilities at the District level;
    6) The Chairperson of the private Sector federation at the District level.

2. *The ten (10) of the Sector Council members* were selected in line with the Law No 87/2013 of 11/09/2013☐ determining the organization and functioning of decentralized administrative entities (O*fficial Gazette no Special of 30/10/2013), Art. 187,* p.145-146:
    1) A member of the Council representing the Cell at the Sector level;
    2) The members of the bureau of National Youth Council at Sector level;
    3) The Coordinator of the National Women Council at the Sector level;
    4) The Coordinator of the National Council of persons with disabilities at the Sector level;
    5) The female member of the Council;
    6) The representative of head teachers of primary schools operating in the Sector;
    7) The representative of headmasters of secondary schools operating in the Sector;
    8) The representative of non government organizations operating in the Sector;
    9) The Chairperson of the Private Sector at the Sector level;
    10) The medical official representing hospital, and health centres or dispensaries operating at Sector level.

3. *Seven (7) members of the Cell Council were selected in accordance with the* Presidential Order N° 28/01 of 06/7/2009 modifying and complementing the Presidential Order n° 57/01 of 15/10/2006 determining the responsibilities, structure and functioning of Village, Cell and Sector. Op.37*:*
    1) A Councilor representing the Village;
    2) A female member of the Council;
    3) The Coordinator of the National Women's Council;
    4) The Coordinator of the National Youth Council;
    5) A representative of Heads of nursery schools;
    6) A representative of teachers of primary schools in the Cell;
    7) A representative of the private sector in the Cell.

4. *Two (2) out of five members of Village Executive Committee:*
    1) The Village Coordinator
    2) The in-charge of information and education

In total, the sample size for Elected Local Councillors interviewed is summarized as follows:
    1. District Councillors; that is, 6 for each District= 6 Councillors*5 Districts=30 Councillors.

2. Councillors at Sector level totalling 10 for each Sector= 10 Councillors* 10 Sectors=100
3. Councillors at Cell level; that is 7 per Cell= 7*20 Cells=140
4. Village Executive Committee members; that is 2 per Village =2*40=80

The total of elected Local Councillors was thus **350.**

Executive Local Authorities

1) *At district level*:
   1. Mayor
   2. Director of Good Governance,
   3. District Council Affairs Specialist,
   4. Director of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
   5. Executive Secretary of the District.

Since the study covered five (5) districts, the total number of Executive Local Authorities amounts to **25**.

2) *At Sector level (1)*: The Executive Secretary

The study covered ten (10) Sectors. Hence, the total number of Executive Local Authorities at Sector level is **10.**

3) *At Cell level* (*1)*: The Executive Secretary

The study covers twenty (20) Cells; the total number of Executive Local Authorities at Cell level is **20.**

The study covered **55** Executive Local Authorities in total**.**

Key informants:

1. Representatives from MINALOC, RGB, RALGA, CNF, CNJ, National Council for People living with Disability, PSF

The total of key informants, subject to this study, was thus **5.**

Appendix 4: Ibyiciro by'abantu bahuye n'abashakashatsi mu Mirenge

I. Icyiciro cya mbere: Abaturage basanzwe (10 muri buri karere)

Abagore 4:

- Abagore babiri (2) babiri bo mu cyiciro cya mbere cy'Ubudehe
- Umugore 1 uri mu cyiciro cya kabiri cy'Ubudehe
- Umugore 1 uri mu cyiciro cya gatatu cyangwa cya kane cy'Ubudehe

Abagabo 3:

- Umugabo umwe (1) uri mu cyiciro cya mbere cy'Ubudehe
- Umugabo 1 uri mu cyiciro cya kabiri cy'Ubudehe
- Umugabo 1 uri mu cyiciro cya gatatu cyangwa cya kane cy'Ubudehe

Urubyiruko 3:

- Umuhungu 1;
- Abakobwa 2
  Bose hamwe bari 50

II. Icyiciro cya kabiri: Abavuga rikumvikana (20 muri buri Karere)

- Umuyobozi wa Njyanama y'Umurenge
- Umuyobozi w'Umurenge cyangwa uwuhagarariye
- Umujyanama uhagarariye Umurenge mu Nama Njyanama y'Akarere
- Uhagarariye Inama y'Igihugu y'urubyiruko ku rwego rw'Umurenge
- Uhagarariye Inama y'Igihugu y'abagore ku rwego rw'Umurenge
- Uhagarariye abarezi ku rwego rw'Umurenge
- Uhagarariye abaganga ku rwego rw'Umurenge
- Uhagarariye Inama y'igihugu y'abafite ubumuga ku rwego rw'Umurenge
- Uhagarariye ababana n'ubwandu bwa SIDA
- Uhagarariye abanyamadini
- Uhagarariye abikorera ku rwego rw'Umurenge
- Uhagarariye amakoperative
- Uhagarariye inkeragutabara
- Uhagarariye abunzi
- Abayobozi b'Utugari 2 umushinga DALGOR ukoreramo
- Abayobozi b'Imidugudu 2 umushinga DALGO ukoreramo muri buri Kagari katoranyijwe, ni ukuvuga abantu 4.

Bose hamwe bari 100

Appendix 5: Interview guide (Ibiganiro mu matsinda)

A. Residence of ELC & implications to councillorship performance

1. Urebye aho batuye n'aho batorewe gukorera imirimo yabo y'Ubujyanama, ni izihe ngaruka (implications) ku guhura no gukorana (interactions) hagati y'Abajyanama n'abaturage bahagarariye? (Figure 9)

- Ese kuba Umujyanama atuye ahandi hatari aho yatorewe gukorera imirimo y'ubujyanama hari ingaruka bifite ku mikoranire (interactions) n'abaturage ahagarariye?
- Ese ubundi ni ngombwa ko Abajyanama baba batuye aho batorewe?
- Niba ari yego cyangwa bamwe na bamwe, ni abo ku zihe nzego?

B. Awareness of Councilors' responsibilities

1. Ubushakashatsi bugaragaza ko abaturage bazi cyane Abajyanama bo ku rwego rw'Umudugudu. Byaba biterwa n'iki? (Figure 13)

- Hari aho bihurira na service z'ibanze (service de base) abaturage babakeneraho mu buzima bwa buri munsi?

2. Nk'uko binemezwa n'Abajyanama, hari umubare munini w'abaturage bagaragaza ko ari bo ubwabo basabye bagenzi babo kwitoreza kubahagararira nk'Abajyanama. Bivuzeze iki ku mikoranire y'abaturage n'Abajyanama mu buyobozi n'iterambere by'u Rwanda? (Figure 15)

3. Ubushakashatsi bwagaragaje ko abaturage benshi cyane, ndetse n'Abajyanama hafi ya bose, bazi inshingano z'Abajyanama. Ubwo bumenyi babukuye he? (Figure 16)

- Hari amahugurwa Abajyanama bahabwa mbere yo gutangira inshingano batorewe (induction)?
- Hari amategeko ateganya izo nshingano?
- Ayahe?

4. Ububasha Njyanama ifite n'ubwo Nyobozi ifite bihuzwa gute (mukorana mute) mu ifatwa ry'ibyemo? (Figure 20)

5. Hari Abajyanama bavuze ko umushara muto/udahagije utabangamiye na gato inshingano bafite z'ubujyanama. Bivuze iki mu miyoborere y'u Rwanda? (Figure 25)

C. Interactions between ELC & Constituents

1. Ubushakashatsi bwagaragaje ko iyo abaturage bagize ikibazo bitabaza cyane abayobozi b'Umudugudu kurusha abandi. Byaba biterwa n'iki? (Figure 29)

- it is not established whether citizens seek support from village leaders because they 'represent them' or they associate them with 'executive powers' at Village level

2. Ubushakashatitsi bwagaragaje ko Nyobozi (local authorities) ari yo ifata iya mbere mu guhuza abaturage na Njyanama aho kuba bo ubwabo. Murabivugaho iki? (Figure 31) Niba ari byo:

- Bifite ngaruka ki ku bubasha bwa Njyanama?
- Bifite ngaruka ki ku gusohoza inshingano (imikorere) kwa Njyanama?

- Bifite ngaruka ki mu mikoranire ya Njyanama n'abaturage?
- What is the democratic meaning of the fact that citizens (50.2% and 38.7%) request their fellows to represent them?
- Why some respondents (5.6% and 0.4%) think that people often compete for Councillorship yet targeting others higher positions.

3. Ubushakashatisi bwagaragaje ko igihuza abaturage n'Abajyanama ari umuganda. Nyamara mu gihe Abajyanama bashimangiye ko umuganda ari wo n'ubundi wakabahuje n'abaturage, abaturage bo bahitamo kuba basurwa n'Abajyanama mu ngo zabo (household visits). Murabyumva mute? (Figure 33)

4. Ni kangahe Abajyanama bakwiye kujya bahura n'abaturage bahagarariye baganira ku bibazo binyuranye? (Figure 36)

- Ese ubundi ni ngombwa ko bahura?
- Hari icyo amategeko ateganya ku nshuro bagomba guhura?

5. Ugereranyije manda iherutse (2011-2015) na manda y'ubu (kuva muri Werurwe 2016), ubushakashatsi bugaragaza ko habaye gusubira inyuma mu guhura kw'Abajyanama n'abaturage. Byaba biterwa n'iki? (Figure 38)

- Kuki habaho iryo dohoka ariko abajyanama barangije manda bakagira ubushake bwo kwiyamamariza izikurikiyeho?
- Ni iki gikorwa kugira ngo uko gusubira inyuma kudakomeza?

6. Ese Abajyanama baha abaturage amahirwe yo kubagezaho ibibazo byabo? (Figure 45 & 50) Niba ari yego:

- Babafasha se kumenya ibibazo byabo nyakuri no kubisumbanyisha (Priority)? (Figure 50 or 39)
- Baha se abaturage amahirwe yo gutanga ibitekerezo n'inama z'uburyo ibibazo byabo byakemuka? (Figure 42)
- Bajya se bagaruka kugeza no gusobanurira abaturage imyanzuro ya Njyanama? (Figure 52 & 58)
- Ese abaturage banyurwa n'ibyo byemezo ndetse n'ibisobanuro bahawe? (Figure 55 & 60)
- Ugereranyije manda iherutse (2011-2015) na manda y'ubu (kuva muri Werurwe 2016), ubushakashatsi bugaragaza ko igikero cy'uburyo Abajyanama bajya bagaruka gusobanurira abaturage imyanzuro ya Njyanama cyazamutse bishimishije cyane. Ibanga ryaba ryarabaye irihe? (Figure 59)
- Babafasha se abaturage gushyira mu bikorwa ibyemezo bya Njyanama? (Figure 61)

7. Ugereranyije manda iherutse (2011-2015) na manda y'ubu (kuva muri Werurwe 2016), ubushakashatsi bugaragaza ko igikero cy'uburyo Abajyanama baha abaturage amahirwe yo kubagezaho ibibazo byabo cyazamutse bishimishije cyane. Ibanga ryaba ryarabaye irihe? (Figure 46)

D. Implications for Accountable local Governance

1. Ese birakwiye ko Abajyanama babazwa uko basohoza inshingano zabo? (Figure 66) Niba ari yego:

- Ni bande bakwiye kubibabaza? (Figure 67)
- Mubona Umujyanama utujuje inshingano ze yafatirwa ibihe byemezo? (Figure 69)
- Ese haba hari Abajyanama bigeze gufatirwa ibyemezo kubera kutuzuza inshingano zabo? Niba ari yego, bafatiwe ibihe byemezo?